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Summary 
The primary concern of the thesis is the development of a materialist 
analysis of the state regulation and administration of labour in the 
context of the development of the water industry in England and 
Wales over the past two centuries. The project develops and explores 
the methodological and conceptual premises of Karl Marx contained 
principally in Vol. I. of Capital, the Grundrisse and A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy. The project determines the form 
and function of the state 'logically' as a precipitate of the 
contradiction between value and use-value, and traces the 'historical' 
manifestation of state 'forms' through the movement of this 
contradiction. The 'determination' of the 'municipal', 'planner-state' 
and 'neo-liberal' state 'forms' of regulating the water industry 
developed through the contradiction between value and use-value and 
the project traces the way in which this was manifested through the 
struggle between concrete and abstract labour or the working class 
and capital. The struggle between abstract and concrete labour 
shifted the contradiction between value and use-value to the level of 
the state which became manifested through the struggle over the form 
of the state; as manifested through the contradiction between 
regulation and administration. The specific form of this struggle 
with respect to the water industry became a struggle over the form 
of 'public service'. The thesis, therefore, develops an analysis of the 
struggle between concrete and abstract 'public service'. The thesis 
emphasises the way in which different forms of abstract and concrete 
state regulation have fundamental implications for the form of 
'management' within industry; and highlights the importance of 
'valorisation' imperatives with regard to the study of management and 
labour process. The thesis finally develops the 'socialist pluralism' 
of GDH Cole to develop an outline of a non-alienated water industry. 
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Part Onc 
The Logical and Historical Determination 
of State Regulation and Administration. 
- 15 - 
Cizapter One 
Abstract Labour. Class 
Struggle grid the Problem of 
Statte Regulation, 
This thesis is concerned with the state regulation of 'public 
service' labour in capitalist society. Through a materialist analysis 
of the water industry in England and Wales, it is an attempt to trace 
historically and logically the development of the capitalist state as 
it has impinged upon the regulation and management of labour in the 
water industry during the past 200 years, The methodological approach 
of my analysis is premised on the historically materialist method 
outlined by Karl Marx in the 'Introduction' to the Grundrisse, an 
approach that Marx applied to his critique of political economy. The 
starting point of my analysis is thus the position that the state and 
management are 'determined' forms, and in order to proceed 
scientifically it is necessary to begin with the simplest social 
determinations of these forms; to proceed from these simple 
(abstract) determinations to the analysis of more complex (concrete) 
forms as a 'rich aggregate of many determinations and relations' 
(Marx, 1973: 101). The analysis of the complex forms of state 
regulation and utility management proceeds from the simplest social 
- 16 - 
determination in a society of generalised commodity production: the 
commodity form of labour and the value relations contained therein. 
In this chapter I proceed through the methodology prescribed by 
Marx to derive the form and function of state regulation and 
administration from the most simple social determinants of bourgeois 
society. I begin with the commodity form and proceed through the 
increasingly complex determinations implied by the money form, legal 
form, capital form and state Corm. This will demonstrate the way in 
which the state is a complex determination of the capital relation, 
and subject to the same inherently contradictory tendencies as 
capitalist society, viz, the contradiction between value and use-value 
that is the result of capitalist production being simultaneously a 
labour process and a valorisation process: The development of 
capitalist state regulation is the result of contradiction in 
movement, and the process through which the state attempts to 
resolve or formalise the contradictions inherent in its social form 
constitutes the main dynamic of social development in capitalist 
society. This Chapter will explore this dialectic of capitalist 
development and provide the basis for a consideration of its concrete 
manifestation in the development of forms of water industry 
management and state regulation. 
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I . 1. TI-i OEB Value Tl-ieory of Labour 
grid tine Alienation of Human Needs. 
The enduring importance of Marx's theory of value derives from 
its object - labour. The 'value theory of labour' is concerned with 
the forms taken by labour in capitalist society, and the political 
implications of it assuming these forms (Elson, 1979: 123-4). The 
simplest social form in which the products of labour are contained in 
bourgeois society is the commodity. Labour takes the form of and is 
socially realised through the commodity; and the contradictory 
determination of the commodity determines the alienation of human 
needs. The analysis of the commodity, therefore, was the point of 
departure for Marx in his critique of political economy. Similarly, 
the commodity is the starting point for my analysis of complex 
(determined) forms of state regulation and utility management. The 
importance of the commodity results from the way in which bourgeois 
social relations take the alienated form of relations between things. 
The task of political economy is to delineate the character of these 
social forms and the production relations specific to them; a task 
that Marx achieved through his theory of commodity fetishism (Rubin, 
1973: 2). 
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1.1. a. Commodity Fetishism and the Value 
Theory of Labour. 
The theory of commodity fetishism forms the fundamental basis 
of Marx's theory of value. Through this theory Marx demonstrated both 
the way in which commodity production results in the 'illusion' by 
which things are ascribed characteristics originating in the social 
relations between (wo)men and the objective economic basis of this 
process. The way in which: 
Social relations inevitably took the form of things 
and could not be expressed except through things. The 
structure of the commodity economy causes things to 
play a particular and highly important social role 
and thus acquire particular social properties' (Rubin, 
ibid. - 5). 
Things come to play a social role owing to the distinctive 
character of the commodity economy. The management and organisation 
of production is constituted by independent commodity producers who 
produce for society rather than for themselves. The universal 
alienation of the products of these independent producers through 
exchange or the market results in the development of a unified 
productive system: the distinctive feature of this system being the 
way in which the market regulates the production of use-values or 
- 19 - 
things. In the commodity economy commodities (indirectly) regulate 
the working activity of people as the direct production of use-values 
must take into account the expected conditions of the market. The 
conditions of capitalist reproduction, therefore, define the social 
character of labour. 
The working activity of one member of society is affected by 
the work activity of others only through things. Social relations 
inevitably take on a reified form: the form in which they both exist 
and are realised The thing is an intermediary of social relations, 
and the circulation of things both expresses and creates production 
relations among (wo)men (Rubin, ibid., 7-13). In order to grasp the 
specific social form of labour in bourgeois society it is necessary 
to uncover the social relations that underlay the circulation of 
things, In bourgeois society social relations of production take on a 
particular and contradictory form; a form determined by the 
generalised and universal nature of commodity production. 
1.1. b. The Contradictory Determinations of the 
Commodity. 
In capitalist society water is a commodity which has a two-fold 
aspect - use-value and exchange-value (Marx, 1971: 27). As a use- 
value water has value in use and is realised in the process of 
consumption; water in its palpable form necessary for the sustenance 
- 20 - 
and enjoyment of life and as a means of production with respect to 
other use-values. It is not the concern of my scientific enquiry to 
pursue the social determination of use-value per se, for as Marx 
noted in the Critique, in the analysis of the world of commodities 
the analysis of use-value is confined to instances in which use- 
values have a determinate form: that is, where 'use-value is the 
immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship - 
exchange-value - is expressed' (Marx, ibid: 28; Marx's Italics). The 
labour contained in use-values is of a particular useful and concrete 
kind, but as exchange-values, determined by labour-time, the 
qualitative difference between use-values must be eliminated, and the 
labour that creates exchange-value is constituted by abstract, 
homogeneous, general labour. The labour contained in exchange-value 
is specifically social labour - labour for other people - labour that 
is constantly determined as 'human labour in general' or 'simple' 
labour by a real social process of abstraction Social labour is 
social in the particular sense of denoting a specific type of society 
-a society of generalised commodity production. 
The 'equalisation' and 'homogenisation' of labour in exchange- 
value has important implications with respect to the regulation of 
labour. In a society of generalised commodity production the 
production of use-values, the social division of concrete, useful 
labour, is regulated by the law of value, Through exchange-value the 
labour of particular individuals is represented as labour-time in 
general and this determines the social character of labour. The 
- 21 - 
labour-time necessary for the production of a use-value is resolved 
into the labour-time socially necessary for its production. Labour 
must find expression in a universal product or universal equivalent, 
and only in this form does it represent a social magnitude: 
The labour of an individual can produce exchange- 
value only if it produces universal equivalents, that 
is to say, if the individual's labour-time represents 
universal labour-time or if universal labour-time 
represents individual labour-time. The effect is the 
same as if the different individuals had amalgamated 
their labour-time and allocated different portions of 
the labour-time at their joint disposal to the 
various use-values (Marx, Ibid. 32; Marx's italics). 
While individual labour-time is the time socially necessary to 
produce a given use-value, Marx was concerned with the manner in 
which the social character of labour was established. In bourgeois 
society social labour has the following contradictory determination: 
Labour which manifests itself in exchange-value 
appears to be the labour of an isolated individual. It 
becomes social labour by assuming the form of its 
direct opposite, of abstract universal labour (Marx, 
ibid. 34). 
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The contradictory determination of labour in a society of 
generalised commodity production has important implications with 
respect to the satisfaction of human needs. The subordination of 
concrete labour by its opposite qua abstract labour results in the 
subordination of human needs to the needs of the economy. The 
distinctive feature of a society of generalised commodity production 
is, therefore, the alienation of human needs. 
I. I. C. The Alienation of Human Needs in 
Bourgeois Society, 
In bourgeois society the production of use-values is regulated 
by the law of value, and there is no reason why the production of 
use-values should approximate to social need. While commodities are 
produced for others there is no reason why they should meet the 
needs of others. The reduction of needs to economic needs is an 
expression of the capitalist alienation of needs (Marx, 1975: 324-7). 
Products of labour confront the worker as a hostile and alien force 
that are used to satisfy the needs of others. This is the hallmark of 
a society in which 'the goal of production is not the satisfaction of 
needs, but the valorisation of capital, in which the system of needs 
is constituted from the division of labour and need appears only on 
the market in the form of effective demand' (Heller, 1974: 26). 
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The division of labour and associated increases in productivity 
have vastly increased the material wealth available to society. The 
necessity of maintaining and extending effective demand has produced 
an increasing diversity of needs and the means to satisfy these 
needs. Increases in productivity have made it possible to reduce the 
socially necessary labour-time devoted to the production of needs, 
and made possible the satisfaction of 'higher needs' by ordinary 
(wo)men. In capitalist society, however, the valorisation process 
imposes limits to the reduction in necessary labour-time, and needs 
can only be mediated through the market. In capitalist society the 
only value is economic value, and needs are defined in terms of the 
valorisation of capital; the needs of workers within this system 
appearing as the limits of wealth through the subordination the 
human senses to 'crude practical needs' (Heller, ibid: 26--9). 
In this thesis I an concerned with the way in which the state 
has been involved in the alienated satisfaction of the need for an 
effective water and sewerage service in Britain during the last 200 
years. In order to grasp the alienating form of the 'public service' 
provision of commodities in capitalist society it is necessary to 
consider the positive categories developed by Marx. Marx envisaged 
the development of a 'system of non-alienated needs': a society of 
'associated producers' in which the economy would be subordinated to 
the satisfaction of human needs, rather than human needs being 
subordinated to the economy. A society in which the satisfaction of 
physical needs allowed the development of non-economic, 'higher 
- 24 - 
needs'. It is therefore important to counterpose the wasteful and 
alienating stupidity of capitalist society with: 
The higher phase of communist society, after the 
enslaving subordination of the individual to the 
division of labour..... after labour has become not 
only a means of life but life's prime want; after all 
the productive forces have also increased with the 
all round development of the individual, and all the 
springs of' cooperative wealth flow more abundantly - 
only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right 
be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on 
its banners: From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs! (Marx, 1968: 320-1). 
1.2. "rne Contrudictlorns of -t t ti 
Commodity Form Grid the 
Determinaºtion of the Money Form. 
The social determination of exchange-value is hidden beneath a 
material veil. In a society of generalised commodity production social 
relations of production take the form of things. The labour of 
different individuals is equated and treated as universal labour only 
by equating use-values as exchange-values. Exchange-value is 'nothing 
but the material expression of a specific social form of labour'. The 
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fundamental contradiction of the commodity form results from the 
commodity being simultaneously a use-value and an exchange-value. 
Commodities exist only in relation to other commodities, and the 
'exchange process of commodities is the real relation that exists 
between them'. The owners of commodities thus 'exist for one another 
only in so far as their commodities exist' (P1arx, 1971: 41; Marx's 
italics). The commodity is simultaneously a use-value and not a use- 
value, For the owner of a commodity it is a use-value only in the 
exchange for the use-value of others - as a 'means of exchange' - 
and thus 'the commodity is a use-value for its owner only in as far 
as it has an exchange-value': 
To become a use-value, the commodity must encounter 
the particular need which it can satisfy. Thus the 
use-values of commodities become use-values by 
mutual exchange of places: they pass from the hands 
of those for whom they were a means of exchange into 
the hands of those for whom they serve as consumer 
goods. Only as a result of this universal alienation 
of commodities does the labour contained in them 
become useful labour (Marx, ibid. 42; Marx's italics) 
The essentially contradictory nature of this relation was 
highlighted by Marx. A relation between essentially equal commodities 
that differ only in magnitude as units of universal labour-time, must 
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be simultaneously a relation between qualitatively different things 
as distinct use-values. This constitutes: 
A whole complex of contradictory premises since the 
fulfilment of one condition depends directly upon the 
fulfilment of its opposite. The exchange process must 
comprise the evolution and solution of these 
contradictions (Marx, Ibid. - 44). 
The contradiction is resolved through the emergence of a 
universal equivalent or money. The emergence of the money form as 
the- universal equivalent is not the prerequisite of commodity 
production, but an emergent result of a social process; a solution to 
the problem that universal labour-time exists only as an abstraction 
for individual commodities - 'every commodity is the commodity which 
as a result of the alienation of its particular use-value, must 
appear as the direct materialisation of universal labour-time' (Marx, 
ibid: 45). The determination of the universal equivalent highlights 
both the contradictory premises of the money form and the extent to 
which money is the precipitate of a real historical process of 
abstraction. Money emerges or is determined by the contradictions 
inherent in the commodity form of labour. 
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1 . 2. a, The Contradictory Determination of 
Money as Universal Equivalent. 
With respect to the social determination of money, Marx was 
concerned with the following problems: 'How is it possible to present 
a particular commodity as materialised universal labour-time? or 'How 
can individual labour-time in a particular commodity assume a 
universal character'? '. The solution to these problems is contained 
within the social process of exchange through which universal labour- 
time appears as a specific thing, as a commodity in addition to and 
apart from all other commodities. A social process through which one 
commodity becomes 'the universal equivalent as a consequence of the 
universal action of all other commodities in relation to it'; a 
process resulting in the 'direct reification of universal labour-time' 
(Marx, ibid: 46-7; Marx's italics). The commodity set apart acquires a 
dual use-value: a 'specific' use-value and a 'universal' use-value: the 
latter having a socially determined form and having the same use- 
value for all other commodities as a universal medium of exchange. 
Money is a crystallization of the exchange-value of commodities 
formed in the exchange process: that is, commodities must assume a 
new determinate form in order to confront each other as exchange- 
values. Thus: 
A social relation of production appears as something 
existing apart from individual human beings, and the 
distinctive relations into which they enter in the 
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course of production in society appear as the 
specific properties of a thing - it is this perverted 
appearance, this prosaically real, and by no means 
imaginary, mystification that is characteristic of all 
social forms of labour positing exchange-value (Marx, 
ibid: 49). 
The determination of the contradictions of bourgeois society is 
thus to be found in the process of exchange or the circulation of 
commodities. In order to isolate the contradictions inherent in the 
commodity form, it is necessary to consider the forms of money 
arising from the exchange of commodities, and the way in which these 
forms develop through contradiction. In the Critique, Marx assumes 
the 'measure of value' to be gold: that is, the exchange-values of all 
commodities is expressed in relation to 'a definite quantity of gold 
and a definite quantity of this commodity containing equal amounts of 
labour-time' (Marx, ibid: 66). This has both a quantitative and a 
qualitative aspect: 'golden equivalents' reflect the universal 
character of the labour-time contained in them on the one hand, and 
its quantity on the other: 
The exchange-value of commodities thus expressed in 
the form of universal equivalence and simultaneously 
as the degree of this equivalence in terms of a 
specific commodity, that is a single equation in 
which commodities are compared with a specific 
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commodity, constitutes price Price is the converted 
form in which the exchange-values of commodities 
appears within the circulation process (Marx, Ibid. - 
66; Marx's italics). 
The universality of the dynamic by which gold becomes the 
measure of value presupposes that every single commodity is measured 
in terms of gold in accordance with the labour-time embodied in both 
commodities, viz that the real measure is labour-time 
Gold becomes the measure of value only because all 
commodities are measured in terms of gold; it is 
consequently merely an illusion created by the 
circulation process to suppose that money makes 
commodities commensurable. On the contrary, it is 
only the commensurability of commodities as 
materialised labour-time which converts gold into 
money (Marx, Ibid., 67-8). 
In a society of generalised commodity production the social power of 
money is determined by its function as universal equivalent: as a 
reified embodiment of abstract labour through which the concrete 
labour of individuals is mediated and determined. Money is determined 
by and embodies the contradiction between value and use-value; and 
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this contradictory determination articulates the fundamental crisis 
tendencies of bourgeois society. 
1.2. b. I he Contradictions of the Money Form 
and the Origins of Capitalist Crisis. 
Commodities become universal equivalents through alienation. 
However, the prices of commodities represent only the nominal 
conversion of commodities into the universal equivalent, The 
conversion of commodities into gold has still to be put into practice 
through their sale on the market. Commodities are made to sell, but 
they must be sold in order to prove their social usefulness. 
Commodities confront each other in a dual form: really, as use-values 
and nominally, as exchange-values; and within the latter, universal 
labour-time assumes an imaginary existence as price. This constitutes 
the fundamental contradiction of the commodity form, for while the 
difference between exchange-value and price appears to be nominal, it 
is 'so tar from being a nominal difference that all the storms which 
threaten the commodity in the actual process of circulation centre 
upon it'. Only circulation can show whether a commodity is 
transformed into the quantity of gold anticipated in its price - the 
commodity must prove itself to be a use-value: 
The commodity as such is an exchange-value, the 
commodity has a price. 'fhis difference between 
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exchange-value and price is a reflection of the fact 
that the particular individual labour contained in the 
commodity can only through alienation be represented 
as its opposite, impersonal, abstract, general - and 
only in this form social labour, ie., money..... Gold as 
a measure of value, entails the necessity for the 
alienation of commodities in exchange for glittering 
gold, and thus the possibility for their non- 
alienation In short, there is here contained in 
latent form the whole contradiction which arises 
because the product is a commodity, or because the 
particular labour of an isolated individual can 
become socially effective only if it is expressed as 
its direct opposite ie., universal labour (Marx, tbid: 
69-70; My italics). 
In bourgeois society production relations do not exist in advance, but 
must be established by the transfer of things. In contrast to a 
planned economy, the relationship between the technical and social 
aspects of production results in the production relations between 
(wo)men being organised by things, rather than for the purpose of the 
material production of things. The 'transfer of things establishes a 
direct production relation between determined individuals' (Rubin, op 
cit: 15). The 'material process of production' and the 'system of 
production relations' are not adjusted to each other in advance, and 
the process is consequently liable to continual crisis: 
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They must be adjusted at each stage, at each of the 
single transactions into which economic life is 
formally broken up. If this does not take place, they 
will inevitably diverge, and a gap will emerge in the 
process of social reproduction. In the commodity 
economy such a divergence is always possible. Either 
production relations which do not stand for real 
movements of products in the process of production 
are developed (speculation), or production relations 
indispensable for the normal performance of the 
production process are absent (sales crisis) (Rubin, 
ibld: 17). 
A society of generalised commodity production is, therefore, 
marked by the important social role played by things. The social 
function of things corresponds to different production relations 
among (wo)men. In the Critique and Vol. 1 of Capital the basic 
production relations of a commodity producing society are examined, 
with more complex determinations being established in later volumes 
of Capital. It is evident from Marx's analysis that the social 
function of a thing gives the thing a determined social form, and 
Marx's system examines an increasingly complex determination of 
forms, IIarx traces the social and historical development of these 
forms, and demonstrates the way in which they reflect social 
relations between (wo)men. Having begun with the commodity as the 
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simplest social determination in capitalist society, and the emergence 
and importance of the money form and its fundamental contradictions, 
I will now move to a consideration of the simplest social 
determinations of 'law' in capitalist society: the legal subject. This 
will lay the basis for an analysis of the more complex determination 
implied by the capitalist state. 
1.3. Commodity Prodiuctiori and the 
Legal For-m: T2-ieý D4Bterm: f natJon of" 
the Legal State. 
In developing an analysis of the legal form it is necessary to 
start with its most simple and abstract determination: the legal 
subject. As with the analysis of the value form, it is necessary to 
begin with the most abstract and pure form and move historically 
towards the concrete. In this way it is possible to see law as an 
historical category corresponding to a particular form of society. The 
state is not merely an 'ideological form', but constitutes a 'form of 
social being' which expresses material social relations. The state 
form is social with respect to a particular form of society - 
capitalist society - and a basic prerequisite for legal regulation is 
thus a conflict of private interests. This is both the logical premise 
of the legal form, and the historical origin of the development of 
the legal superstructure (Pashukanis, 1989: 72-6,81). 
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1.3. a. Private Property and the Determination 
of the Abstract Legal Subject. 
The development of the legal form corresponds to the 
development of private property or the possibility of the 'unimpeded 
possession' and 'alienation' of property. Property becomes the basis 
of the legal form only when it can be freely disposed of on the 
market. The category of subject is the most general expression of 
this process, and the form of the legal subject follows directly from 
the analysis of the commodity form. While commodities (objects) 
constitute the 'social link' between individuals in the production 
process, the realisation of the value embodied in commodities 
requires an active will with respect to the owner of the commodity: 
At the same time, therefore, that the product of 
labour becomes a commodity and a bearer of value, 
man acquires the capacity to be a legal subject and a 
bearer of rights..... Relations of a kind where man is 
defined only by contrast with an object, that is as a 
subject..... The social relation that is rooted in 
production presents itself simultaneously in two 
absurd forms: as the value of commodities, and as 
man's capacity to be the subject of rights 
(Pashukanis, ibid. - 112-3). 
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As the multiplicity of concrete labour dissolves into the 
abstract with the value form, so the legal form abstracts from the 
multiplicity of relations between (wo)men and objects to produce an 
abstract and impersonal legal subject. In capitalist society legal 
subjects are absolutely free and equal to all other owners of 
commodities, but this freedom is defined in abstraction from concrete 
individuals, and becomes fixed, not to particular objects, but to 
objects in general. The process precipitates 'an absolute, fixed right 
which follows the object wherever chance may take it'. Consequently: 
In addition to the mystical quality of value, there 
appears a no less enigmatic phenomenon: law. A 
homogeneously integrated relation assumes two 
fundamental abstrvct aspects at the same time: and 
economic and a legal aspect..... Subjective law is a 
social phenomenon attributed to the individual in the 
same way that value - likewise a social phenomenon - 
is attributed to the object as a product of labour. 
Legal fetishism complements commodity fetishism 
(Pashukanis, ibid. 117; My italics). 
In capitalist society the general capacity to possess a right is 
distinguished from concrete legal claims. This form is generated 
historically through the process of exchange by which the constant 
movement of values creates the idea of a fixed bearer of abstract 
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rights. Pashukanis highlighted the process of abstraction inherent in 
capitalist development and the determination of the legal state: 
As socially regulative forces become more powerful, 
so the subject loses material tangibility. His 
personal energy is supplanted by the power of the 
social, that is of class organisation, whose highest 
form of expression is the state In this form, the 
irrpersonal abstraction of state power functioning 
with ideal stability and continuity in time and space 
is the equivalent of the interpersonal, abstract 
subject (Pashukanis, ibid. 118-9; My italics). 
Logically and temporally prior to the state is an organically 
established norm of subjective domination. This norm is premised on 
the abstract nature of labour and legal subjects in bourgeois 
society. The legal subject is what Pashukanis (ibid: 121) termed an 
'abstract owner of commodities raised to the heavens'. In bourgeois 
society, property in the form of capital denotes the freedom to 
transform property into successive forms in order to secure the 
maximum amount of unearned income, and this is a movement that is 
inconceivable without a class of propertyless individuals. Bourgeois 
freedom is purely formal freedom, and presupposes a class whose 
rights have been expropriated. This dialectic between the form and 
content of bourgeois rights is explored by Marx in his analysis of 
'primitive accumulation' (Marx, 1954: 667-724). The dialectic of 
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capitalist property is both absorbed by 'fixed' legal forms and 
constantly explodes these forms through the direct use of force and 
violence (Pashukanis, op cit: 127). 
1.3. b, Abstract Labour, Abstract Freedom and 
the Determination of the Abstract Legal State. 
The state emerges historically as a 'guarantor of market 
exchange' or as an authority representing the 'impersonal interests of 
the system'. The power of the state is, therefore, abstracted from the 
direct power of the propertied class. While the bourgeoisie rules 
directly with respect to the dependence of the state on the banking 
sector and the dependence of the worker on her employer, this does 
not explain the form of the state. This raises the question: 'Why does 
class rule not remain what it is, the factual subjugation of one 
section of the population by the other? Why does it assume the form 
of official state rule? (or) Why does the machinery of state coercion 
not come into being as the private machinery of the ruling class; why 
does it detach itself from the ruling class and take on the form of 
an impersonal apparatus of public power, separate from society? 
(Pashukanis, ibid. 139). In order to answer these questions it is 
necessary to examine the material determination of the legal state as 
a form of social being. 
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The emergence of ideological state forms takes place 'behind the 
backs' of individuals, and it is always necessary to examine the 
material relations they reflect and express. The subjugation affected 
by the capitalist state is not an ideological duplication of the 
subjugation of the worker by the capitalist. The state is separate 
from the interests of the ruling class and does not mediate the 
individual exploitative relations between capital and labour. In 
capitalist society, the state must appear as the abstract collective 
person; as a coercive body acting in the interests of all parties to 
legal transactions. 
The autonomous will of those engaged in exchange is 
an indispensable precondition wherever the categories 
of value and exchange-value come into play. Exchange- 
value ceases to be exchange-value, the commodity 
ceases to be a commodity, if exchange ratios are 
determined by an authority situated outside the 
internal laws of the market..... Coercion is neither 
abstract nor impersonal - hence it cannot figure as a 
social function (Pashukanis, ibid. 143). 
The modern constitutional state is a very convenient form for 
the bourgeoisie, but this should not veil the fact that it is derived 
from objective reality. State power represents the general will only 
to the extent that society is a market. However, the free and equal 
owners of commodities that meet in the capitalist market are free 
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and equal only with respect to abstract relations of appropriation 
and alienation. In bourgeois society, commodity owners are not all 
free and equal, but are bound by ties of mutual dependence. These 
networks of mutual dependence form the real basis of state power. 
The abstract state is determined by the abstract regulation of labour 
in a society of generalised commodity production. The legal state is 
ultimately determined by the contradiction between use-value and 
exchange-value; with the state logically premised on the maintenance 
of abstraction. 
The work of Rubin and Pashukanis has made a significant 
contribution to the development of a scientific analysis of the 
capitalist state. Pashukanis illustrated the way in which the 'legal' 
form of the state is a derivative of the social relations of 
production in a society of generalised commodity production. Law is 
not 'ideological' or part of the political and legal 'superstructure', 
but is a material phenomenon that exists only in institutions such as 
the state through which it is expressed. Law is commodity production: 
the 'legal' form corresponding to its 'economic' content. However, 
Pashukanis was concerned to develop an analysis of the class state, 
without exploring the specific form of capitalist class power 
embedded in particular relations of production The analysis of 
Pashukanis should be relegated to the status of a useful and 
important preamble for a more genuine and concrete theory of the 
capitalist state (Binns, 1980: 107) U]: the capitalist state is 
determined at a lower level of abstraction. In order to develop an 
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adequate analysis of the the complex determinations of the capitalist 
state, I will now move from the analysis of 'legal regulation' to a 
consideration of the 'class regulation' implied by capitalist 
(re)production. 
1.4. TY-ie Capital Form and ti 4-- 
Determiraatiorn of' the Class State. 
In order to develop a scientific analysis of the capitalist 
state, it is necessary to consider the historically specific nature of 
production and reproduction in bourgeois society. Capitalism arises 
out of, but is not identical with, commodity production. The approach 
of Rubin and Pashukanis results in the 'fetishism of commodity 
fetishism' (Binns, ibid: 105): the form of the state derived 
exclusively from the exchange of commodities. In capitalist society, 
the state form is determined by social forms of labour derived not 
from the production of commodities, but the production of surplus- 
va1ua In capitalist society: 
The process of production is the immediate unity of 
labour process and valorisation process, just as its 
immediate result, the commodity, is the immediate 
unity of use-value and exchange-value. But the labour 
process is only the means whereby the valorisation 
process is implemented and the valorisation process 
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is essentially the production of surplus-valu4 ie. 
the objectification of unpaid Labour (Marx, 1976: 991; 
Marx's italics). 
The production of capitalist commodities must be considered as 
a continuous and connected process by which the capital relationship 
between capitalists and wage-labourers is constantly produced and 
reproduced. The conditions of production are also those of 
reproduction (Marx, 1954: 531-2). Part of the social product must be 
devoted to the production of new products or to the process of 
productive consumption. Capitalist production involves the 
reproduction of capital or self-expanding value. Marx was concerned 
to highlight the way in which the continuity of the production 
process endows it with new characteristics vis f vis simple commodity 
production, viz the emergence of mcaney as the fundamental and most 
abstract form of social power. 
1,4a1 Variable Capital and the Reproduction 
of Labour-Power. 
Through the expenditure of labour-power in the production 
process, the labourer produces a fund out of which she is paid 
(variable capital), and from this fund the labourer receives a sum of 
money representing the transmuted form of a part of her product. 
Considering capitalist production as a whole, the capitalist class 
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constantly provide the labouring class with 'order-notes' in the form 
of money representing a portion of the product produced by the 
labourers that has been appropriated by the capitalist class. The 
'order-notes' constantly flow back to the capitalist class, and in this 
way the labouring class receives a share in its own product; although 
the nature of this transaction is 'veiled by the commodity form of 
the product and the money form of the commodity' (Marx, ibid: 533). 
Variable capital represents the historical form of the maintenance 
and reproduction of labour in capitalist society, by which the 
capitalist class advances a portion of labour, realised in a product, 
back to the labourer in the form of money 
The continuous nature of reproduction ensures that all capital 
is transformed into accumulated surplus-value: capital as value 
appropriated without equivalent that is appropriated through the 
unpaid labour of others materialised in either commodities or money. 
As Marx (ibid. 535) demonstrated, the transformation of money into 
capital involves more than the production and circulation of 
commodities: 
On the one side, the possessor of value or money, on 
the other, the possessor of the value-creating 
substance; on the one side, the possessor of the 
means of production and subsistence, on the other, 
the possessor. of nothing but labour-power, must 
confront one another as buyer and seller. The 
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separation of labour from its product, of subjective 
labour-power from the objective conditions of labour, 
was therefore the real foundation in fact, and the 
starting point of capitalist production (Marx, ibid. 
535). 
As a result of the continuous process of 'simple reproduction', 
the above premise becomes the 'peculiar result' of capitalist 
production. This result is constantly renewed and perpetuated through 
capitalist (re)production. The labourer enters the labour process 
alienated from her labour-power that has been sold to the capitalist, 
and proceeds to produce a product that belongs to the capitalist. The 
labourer produces objective material wealth, but in the form of 
capital - an alien power that dominates and exploits her. So what is 
produced over and above everything else is the wage labourer. In 
capitalist society, the distinction between individual and productive 
consumption disappears. The capitalist class benefits both from what 
is received from the labourer in the form of labour-power, and what 
is advanced in return, in the form of money. The capital given in 
exchange for labour-power allows the reproduction of that means of 
production indispensable to capital, vi7, the labourer: 
The individual consumption of the labourer is 
unproductive as regards himself, for it reproduces 
nothing but the needy individual; it is productive to 
the capitalist and to the state since it is the 
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production of the power that creates their wealth 
(Marx, ibid. 538). 
The political power of capital is determined by the social power 
of money. The state is logically premised on a particular form of 
abstraction, viz, the abstraction of individual labourers from the 
means of (re)production. The logical and historical premises of 
capitalist state power is, therefore, the maintenance of the social 
power of money qua capital The form of the capitalist state is 
determined by the unity of capitalist production as a labour process 
and a valorisation process. The class state is determined by the 
contradictions of the capital form of labour. 
1.4. b. The Capital Form and the Determination 
of the Capitalist. Class State. 
The reproduction of labour-power through variable capital 
highlights the important relationship between money and the state. 
The form and function of the capitalist state is derived from the 
social power of money in the reproduction of labour-power as capital 
(rather than from the maintenance of the abstract premises of 
commodity circulation as implied by the work of Pashukanis). It is 
important to differentiate between the two distinct but 
simultaneously occurring circuits involving the 'simple' circulation of 
commodities (C] and money (M] (Marx, 1954: 145-53; 1971: 86-125): 
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C-M-C 
N- C-M 
The circuit C-M-C, or selling in order to purchase represents the 
'metamorphosis' through which every commodity passes in order to 
become a direct use-value for its owner: it is resolved into C-C, or 
use-value exchanged for use-value, with money facilitating the 
intermediary stage of the metamorphosis. The circuit is contradictory 
owing to the separation of sale and purchase, and the polarisation of 
the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value at each phase 
of the circuit (ie. C-M, M-C). The circuit does not, however, imply the 
'exploitation' of labour as labour-power: 
The social movement is for the commodity owners on 
the one hand an external necessity and on the other 
merely a formal intermediary process enabling each 
individual to obtain different use-values of the same 
total value as that of the commodities which he has 
thrown into circulation (Marx, ibid: 101; My italics). 
In contrast, the circuit M-C-M, or buying in order to sell, in 
which money appears as the goal of circulation, is resolved into M-M. 
While it appears absurd to exchange money for money, this absurdity 
disappears as soon as the specificity of bourgeois production is 
considered: 
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In real life people do not buy in order to sell, but 
they buy at a low price in order to sell at a high 
price. The exchange of money for commodities in order 
to then exchange these for a larger amount of money, 
so that the extremes M, M are quantitatively 
different, if not qualitatively. This quantitative 
difference presupposes the exchange of non- 
equivalents (Marx, ibid., 123; Marx's italics). 
The distinction between C-M-C and M-C-M can be resolved into 
the distinction between money as money and money as capital. In the 
circuit M-C-M, value is an active factor, or value in process, and 
constantly changes in both form and magnitude in order to throw off 
surplus-value. The fundamental basis of capitalist class relations is 
the abstract power of money as capital. The circulation of 
commodities in the circuit C-M-C is important to the development of 
private property, but the exchange of commodities as concrete 
equivalents does not require the emergence of the state to create 
and maintain the abstract subject. The material basis of the 
development of the capitalist state is, therefore, the development of 
money as capital, or the insertion of money into the process of 
production. While law is commodity production (Pashukanis, supra: 23), 
the state Is capital; or more specifically, a political form of the 
capital relation. The state is a social relation, or a form of social 
being that expresses material social relations: the relations between 
capital and labour. 
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1.4. c. Money and the State: the Determination 
of the Abstract Power of Capital. 
Money, the law and the state are the complementary economic, 
legal and political forms of capitalist power: a unity embodied in 
capitalist property where money represents the most abstract form of 
capital, and the power of money is institutionalised in the law and 
enforced by the state (Clarke, 1988: 15). The political power of 
capital is embodied in the social power of money. The separation of 
these forms of power articulates the basic form of the liberal state. 
The logical and historical emergence of the liberal state form 
approximates to the penetration of capital into production, the 
subordination of social production to the rule of money. The 
ideological and political crises associated with 'primitive 
accumulation' were resolved through the reconstitution of the state 
on the basis of a fundamental separation of civil society and the 
state, or to put it in the terms introduced above, the separation of 
the social power of money from the political power of the state. It 
is, therefore, the penetration of capital into production that 
provides the fundamental premise of the liberal state form: 
The subordination of social production to the power 
of money gave rise to antagonistic social relations 
of production in which the power of money confronted 
the direct producers in the form of capital, and in 
which social production was subordinated to the 
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reproduction of capital. Money and the law were 
consequently the social forms through which civil 
society and the state were subordinated to the power 
of capital (Clarke, ibid: 18). 
The above argument has fundamental implications with regard to 
the theoretical study of the form and function of the state in 
capitalist society. The state is not an 'instrument' of capital, but is 
itself a form of the capital relation 121. The state is determined by 
the contradiction between value and use-value, and this contradiction 
is inherent in the institutional and representative mechanisms of the 
state. The development of the state form is a result of this 
contradiction in movement. The abstract state developed alongside the 
abstract legal subject or 'citizen'. Capitalist society is not, however, 
constituted by abstract legal subjects, but with concrete social 
actors with concrete demands and needs which diverge from the 
demands and needs compatible with the rationality of the abstract 
order. The abstraction of the state from the direct rule of capital 
implies that the representation of concrete interests through 
'democratic' state mechanisms cannot be totally formalised within the 
abstract order. Legal and monetary regulation need, therefore, to be 
complemented by bureaucratic and administrative control 
At the level of the state, the contradiction between value and 
use-value is manifested in the form of the contradiction between 
legal/monetary regulation and administration: underlying the formal 
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and abstract regulation of the liberal state are control, force and 
violence. 
1.5. Regulation, Administratiori and 
the Problem of Abstraction. 
The contradiction between value and use-value that is inherent 
in the capitalist state form makes it impossible for the concrete 
claims and demands articulated through the representative mechanisms 
of the state to be adequately formalised and made compatible with 
the abstract order: force and control are thus the logical 
concomitants of abstract regulation. The maintenance of order in 
bourgeois society is premised on the continued separation of needs 
and capacities implied by the 'absolute poverty' of bourgeois private 
property (Kay & Mott, 1982: 1-27). Bourgeois society is marked from 
earlier social formations through its unitary system of order: the 
relationship between producers and non-producers is neither immediate 
nor personal, but mediated through a single, over-arching framework 
qua the state. Politics is abstracted from relations of production by 
the establishment of formal equivalence through the law of contract, 
and the task of maintaining this order becomes the exclusive function 
of the state. The state is historically and logically premised on the 
maintenance of abstraction. 
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I. S. a. Regulation, Administration and the 
Contradictions of the Capitalist State. 
In bourgeois society force and violence are abstracted from the 
immediate relations of production; the latter becoming the subject of 
the 'dull compulsion of the uncomprehended laws of reproduction', 
while force is made the legitimate function of a single body that 
stands outside and apart from the process of production (Holloway & 
Picciotto, 1978: 24). Linked to the development of the state is the 
development of a mass of uniform subjects (population): a vital 
prerequisite to a system of social production in which the means and 
conditions of life are constituted by identical social things qua 
commodities, Equivalence and the development of the 'abstract 
individual' thus has its political roots in citizenship and the state, 
and is created and reproduced through the exercise of actual or 
threatened force. 
The state is constituted as part of the abstract order, and the 
maintenance of abstraction is the precondition for the preservation 
of the state. The historical development of the modern state 
presupposes the abolition of social specificity, and the establishment 
of uniformity as the fundamental principle of regulatory 
classification (Kay & Mott, op cit: 91). The development of capitalism 
and the intensification of private property required that social 
classes were created and maintained by the state. This process 
originated in primitive accumulation through which the means of 
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production were forcibly separated from the direct producers, and the 
latter developed as labour-power through the administrative machinery 
of the state. The dialectic of capitalist property was both absorbed 
by 'fixed' legal forms, and constantly exploded these forms through 
the direct use of violence (Pashukanis, supra: 20). 
Law is derived from categories in which abstraction is inherent. 
In contrast, the universality of administration is purely formal, for 
in the last instance the state serves merely to confirm the rights of 
private property (Marx & Engels, 1970: 80); to impose the legal form 
on social relationships, and thus to restructure economic activity 
into capital and labour on an orderly basis (Kay & Mott, op cit: 95). 
The contradictory determination of the state makes this process 
problematical, and the formal and abstract mechanisms of the law are 
necessarily complemented by the substantive and discretionary 
mechanisms of administration. The state form is determined, therefore, 
by the perpetual struggle between concrete and abstract labour; 
between the working class and capital. The origins of administration 
are the development of social labour. Administration and legal forms 
arise from the movements of social labour, and the efforts of the 
state to contain these developments in formal terms. The activities 
of the state are directed at discontinuities of abstraction 
a posteriori. 
The study of law and administration over time can be 
taken as an archaeology of decayed bodies politic, 
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the corpses of organised working class oppositions..... 
Administration is working class power post fest um; 
working class political victories captured and 
formalised at their moment of triumph (Kay & Mott, 
ibid: 96) 
The work of Kay & Mott is fundamentally important with respect 
to highlighting the way in which the capitalist state is determined 
through the struggle between concrete and abstract labour. However, 
the work of Kay & Mott is undermined by a 'formalistic' approach to 
the analysis of the form and function of the capitalist state. The 
fundamental weakness of Political Order and the Law of Labour is the 
way in which Kay & Mott fail to differentiate between administration 
and regulation, and thus the way in which the contradiction between 
value and use-value are manifested at the level of the state. The 
way in which regulation is formal and abstract while administration 
is concrete and discretionary. The contradiction between 
administration and regulation is the way in which the contradiction 
between value and use-value is manifested at the level of the state. 
Kay & Mott collapse the contradiction, and as a consequence, their 
analysis tends towards the 'reflectionist' and 'epiphenomenalist' 
approach which their work is explicitly attempting to avoid. The 
development of a concrete analysis of state regulation and 
administration needs to be premised on an examination of the specific 
role of the state in the regulation and administration of use-values 
in capitalist society. 
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I. S. b. The Regulation of Production and 
Consumption in Bourgeois Society. 
Working class struggle takes on a dual form that reflects the 
duality of capitalist production as a labour process and a 
valorisation process: the struggle of the working class as consumers 
for unmediated use-values and the struggle of the working class as 
producers for control over the conditions of labour. However, in 
capitalist society there is an 'immediate unity' between production 
and consumption: 
Production is consumption, consumption is production. 
Consumptive production. Productive consumption..... 
then make a further distinction. The first figures as 
reproduction, the second as productive consumption. 
All investigation into the first concern productive or 
unproductive labour; investigations into the second 
concern productive or non-productive consumption 
(Marx, 1973: 93) 
In bourgeois society the unity is mediated by relations of 
distribution Capital is posited doubly as an agent of production and 
a source of income qua profit and interest. However, distribution 
presupposes the subsumption of individuals to specific relations of 
production; while exchange is the process of mediation between 
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production-determined distribution and consumption. Production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption 'form members of a totality' or 
'distinctions within a unity': a definite production thus determines a 
definite consumption, distribution and exchange, as well as definite 
relations between these different moments (Marx, ibid: 99; Marx's 
italics), Struggle over the distribution of use-values determines the 
way in which use-values are produced, while struggle over the way in 
use-values are produced determines the distribution and exchange of 
use-values. 
The state must simultaneously maintain consumptive production 
and productive consumption. The former implies an antagonistic 
relation between the state and labour, as the the state attempts to 
formalise working class struggle within the labour process. The 
latter implies an antagonistic relation between the state and labour 
as the state attempts to formalise working class struggle over the 
products of labour. The state has a non-antagonistic relation with 
capital with respect to both functions: the state attempting to 
formalise the struggle between capitals with respect to both the 
production and realisation of surplus-value. The extent to which the 
contradictory premises of the state prohibit the formalisation of 
these struggles through legal and monetary regulation results in 
determination of bureaucratic and administrative control. 
The regulation and administration of industrial relations, 
utility consumption and health and safety at work constitute examples 
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of the three types of state regulation and control outlined above, 
and form the substantive focus of my thesis. In this Chapter I have 
demonstrated the contradictory determination of these forms of state 
regulation, The proceeding chapters will explore the concrete 
manifestation of these contradictions in the historical and logical 
development of state regulatory agencies concerned with the British 
water industry 
1.6. Scife 1n TI ±r Hands? Abstract 
Labour ¬i1-id th Politics o-f "Public 
Service". 
In this thesis I trace the logical and historical development of 
the capitalist state as it has impinged in a very specific way on the 
regulation and management of the water industry in England and Wales 
over the past 200 years. The thesis will explore the contradictions 
inherent in the practice and ideology of 'public service' as 
manifested in forms of state regulation and administration; the way 
in which they are determined by the contradiction between value and 
use-value. My analysis will proceed logically and historically. I 
consider both the way in which the state has attempted to maintain 
its fundamental 'liberal' form through the formalisation of 
contradiction and the historically specific forms of administrative 
control that have developed in response to working class struggle. 
- 56 - 
The fundamental theoretical concern of my analysis is to demonstrate 
the extent to which contradiction is inherent in the state form and, 
therefore, a fundamental locus of class struggle in capitalist 
society: the continual struggle to impose the commodity form on 
labour, and labour's attempts to escape this imposition, and to impose 
its autonomy as something independent of capital and its social forms 
(Cleaver, 1979). 
The state regulation and administration of the water industry 
was determined through the contradiction between value and use-value. 
The contradiction became increasingly manifest in the 19th Century as 
the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of Britain increased the 
need for effective use-values in the form of pure and wholesome 
drinking water and systems of waste disposal. The need for water 
services was incompatible with the valorisation imperatives of 
capital: the result was a serious threat to 'public health' which 
threatened the reproduction of labour as 'variable capital'. The early 
development of the water industry was determined through the 
regulation of the liberal state torm which attempted to 'formalise' 
the contradiction within the 'abstract order'. Throughout the 19th 
Century legislation attempted to 'regulate' the production of water 
services (use-values) through the 'legal form' of contract. The state 
attempted to force water companies to supply water services on 
demand and determined maximum levels of price and minimum levels of 
service. The legislation was resisted by water capitals as it posed a 
direct threat to the valorisation of capital. The contradiction could 
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not be contained within the 'abstract order' and the state became 
increasingly involved in the (concrete) administration of water 
services. 
The contradiction between value and use-value could not be 
contained within the 'abstract order'. The municipalisation of water 
services resulted in a marked improvement in the quality of drinking 
water produced by water undertakings and the systems developed by 
local authorities for the disposal of sewage and industrial effluent. 
However, the direct administration of water services by the state 
shifted the contradiction between value and use-value to the level of 
the state. The development of 'municipal enterprise' facilitated the 
(concrete) management of water services and the technical and 
administrative determination of use-values to be mediated by a 
politically mediated 'law of money' qua municipal taxation. The 
emergent threat of organised labour heightened the contradictions of 
the municipal state. The direct representation of (concrete) labour 
within the municipal state and the discretionary powers of municipal 
state administration resulted in a serious 'fiscal crisis' of the 
municipal state. The crisis was resolved through the 
bureaucratisation of the demands of the labour movement: the 
development of concrete managerial structures to mediate the 
democratically determined demand for use-values in the context of the 
(abstract) valorisation imperatives of capital accumulation. 
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The development of 'public service' bureaucracy allowed the 
demands of the labour movement for use-values to be 'planned' in the 
context of the valorisation imperati""es of an increasingly 'socialised' 
and 'centralised' capital. The development of the 'public service' 
state was legitimated through 'Fabian Socialism' which highlighted the 
'democratic' form of centralised state planning. The Fabian water 
industry was marked by the development of 'concretist' and 
hierarchical managerial structures concerned with 'planning' the 
effective production and distribution of water services in accordance 
with the politically-determined demand for use-values. The 
development of Fabian/Keynesian planning shifted the contradiction 
between value and use-value to the centre of the state apparatus: 
the democratic determination and technocratic provision of use-values 
undermined the 'liberal' basis of the state and evoked a serious and 
protracted 'fiscal crisis' of the state. The contradiction became 
manifest with respect to the water industry in an increasingly 
serious institutional paralysis through which the Fabian/Keynesian 
water industry became increasingly incapable of effectively delivering 
use-values whilst simultaneously undermining the production of 
surplus-value. 
The crisis of the Fabian/Keynesian water industry was resolved 
through the restructuring of the (concrete) managerial structure of 
the industry on the basis of a technocratic rationality which 
attempted to mediate the production of use-values through a 
politically-determined 'law of money'. The 1973 Water Act created 
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large regional water authorities and subjected these entities to 
rigorous financial constraints. The technocratic 'managerialism' 
undermined the democratic rationality of state planning and resulted 
in their being no rational basis for investment decisions. The 
'managerialist' water industry became increasingly ineffective: the 
operation of the industry resulted in fiscal inflation and the 
constraints imposed by the state in response resulted in further cuts 
in investment and levels of service. The Fabian/Keynesian form of 
state and management decomposed from within, and the decomposition 
was legitimated through a neo-liberal discourse which articulated the 
institutional paralysis of 'managerialism'. 
The crisis of the 'managerialist' water industry was resolved 
through the privatisation of the industry in 1989. The managerialist 
restructuring of the water industry produced large efficient entities 
capable of operating as capital: the privatisation of the water 
industry resolved the institutional paralysis of 'managerialism' and 
facilitated a fundamental increase in capital investment and 
associated improvements in levels of service. The neo-liberal 
restructuring resolved the crisis of the state through (re)imposing 
the abstract domination of money on to the state regulation and 
management of the water industry. The neo-liberal state is 
constituted by OFWAT which has the function of ensuring that the 
(concrete) use-values produced by the water industry are mediated 
through (abstract) exchange-values. The neo-liberal restructuring of 
the water industry has resulted in a fundamental restructuring of 
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management and managerial control systems: the restructuring of 
(concrete) managerialisnn on the basis of the (abstract) imperatives 
of capital accumulation. The development of 'abstract management' is 
therefore the principal precipitate of the process through which 
concrete labour has been subordinated to the abstract power of 
capital. 
In Part One I examine the historical development of the 
regulatory and administrative forms that have been determined by the 
contradictions inherent in the nature of water as a commodity. I 
examine the development of these forms as 'contradiction in movement' 
and examine the material basis of a series of 'ideological' forms 
premised on 'public service'. In Chapter Two I explore the 
determination of the municipal state in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries and its ideological form as Gas and Water Socialism. In 
Chapter Three I examine the determination of the 'planner-state' and 
its ideological form of Fabian socialism. In Chapter Four I examine 
the determination of the 'neo-liberal' state and its ideological form 
of neo-liberal 'citizenship' rights. In Part Two I explore the 
determination of 'abstract management' in the neo-liberal water 
industry. 
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Notces 
1. See also Warrington (1980) for a critical assessment of the work 
of Pashukanis, and the contribution of Pashukanis to the analysis 
of the capitalist state. 
2. Most writers within the Marxist tradition have tended to collapse 
the contradiction between value and use-value when considering 
the determination of the capitalist state. This is evident in 
Classical Marxism, particularly the Communist Manifesto, and later 
works by Engels and Lenin (Marx & Engels, 1965: 34-5; Engels, 
1968a: 575-83; Lenin, 1968: 265-272). This is particularly evident 
with respect to Lenin's State and Revolution. Following Engels in 
The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, Lenin 
presents the state as 'a product and a manifestation of the 
irreconcilability of class antagonism'. The state is presented as 
standing 'above society' and 'alienating itself more and more from 
it'. While Lenin correctly presented the state as a class state, 
his instrumentalist approach fails to highlight the contradictory 
determination of the state and, therefore, the limitations of the 
functionality of the state for capital. 
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The erroneous conceptualisation of the state was perpetuated by 
Antonio Gramsci (1971: 210-78) who differentiated between the 
'economic' and 'political' power of capital, and conceptualised the 
state as a 'relatively autonomous' agency with the function of 
resolving crises originating within civil society. The separation 
of state and civil society and, therefore, the collapsing of the 
contradiction between value and use-value with respect to the 
determination of the capitalist state, is also evident in the work 
of Marxist and Post-Marxist theories of the state - particularly 
the structural functionalism associated with Louis Althusser, 
Nicos Poulantzas and Jürgen Habermas (Althusser, 1990: 87-128; 
Habermas, 1088; Offe, 1984; Poulantzas, 1978). Similarly, writers 
from the French Regulation School stress the functionality of the 
state for capital without considering its contradictory 
determinations (Aglietta, 1979; Palloix, 1976; and more recently, 
Jessop, 1990, particularly, pp. 191-272). These approaches are 
fundamentally flawed as they presuppose the separation of the 
'political' and economic' spheres of society, and fail to consider 
the contradictory determination of all social forms in capitalist 
society. 
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Chapter Two 
Gas and Water Socialism? 
Tiie Contradictions of Municipal 
Stete Enterprise. 
In capitalist society water is a commodity with the 
contradictory determination of being simultaneously a use-value and 
an exchange-value. In its concrete and palpable form water is 
essential both to the maintenance of life and to the production, 
processing and distribution of other use-values. The contradictory 
determination of the water commodity means that the concrete and 
palpable aspects of water supply and disposal are determined and 
mediated by abstract labour or exchange-value: the human need for 
pure and wholesome drinking water and clean and unpolluted waterways 
subordinated to the valorisation of capital. As Marx noted in Vol. III. 
of Capital, the contradictory determinations of production in 
capitalist society results in the 'excretions' of human consumption 
grossly contaminating rivers rather than being applied to the 
production of useful agricultural goods (Marx, 1959: 101). In the 
context of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation during the 19th 
Century, this contradiction had dire consequences for the living 
conditions of the nascent working class. 
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The main manifestation of the contradiction between value and 
use-value in the production of utilities was the increasing threat to 
public health and safety. The threat was particularly marked in the 
cities and towns which were subject to phenomenal growth during the 
19th Century 117. The contradiction determined the development of 
forms of state regulation and administration focused predominantly at 
the municipal level. The development of Gas and Water Socialism as an 
ideological form developed behind the backs of 19th Century social 
actors; articulating the material contradiction between value and 
use-value at the level of the municipal state. The political struggle 
over the municipal state form resulted in the concept taking on 
divergent class perspectives. The emergent working class movement 
developed Gas and Water Socialism as a critique of the capitalist 
system. Gas and Water Socialism constituted an important argument 
for production based on unmediated use-value and cooperation. In 
contrast, the concept was developed by liberals and Fabian socialists 
in an attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the working class while 
containing working class demands within the abstract order. 
In this Chapter I will explore the concrete development of the 
contradiction between value and use-value and the divergent class- 
based responses to the contradiction constituted by the political 
programmes of liberals, Fabian socialists and radical working class 
socialists. I trace the resolution of the contradiction on the basis 
of Fabian socialism and argue that the resolution of 'public service' 
on the basis of class compromise and centralised administrative 
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bureaucratisation illustrates the contradictory and oppressive 
determination of 'public service' as a political, economic and 
ideological form. The analysis in this Chapter will provide the 
historical context for an examination of the development of 'public 
service' water industry regulation and management during the 20th 
Century. 
2.1. Lo issez-Faire and State 
Intervention iri t1-ie 19tIi Century 
Gas grid Woter Indti tr-i4ms. 
The evolution of the municipal state in Britain has been 
presented as the result of the need to ameliorate the increasingly 
deleterious effects of industrial development in the context of 
concerns that government should be limited, competent and 
representative (Smellie, 1957: 23-44). The need for social control 
became increasingly evident as the parallel processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation resulted in overcrowded and 
insanitary living conditions for the emergent working class. In the 
burgeoning towns and cities, streets and waterways were transformed 
into open sewers which, in the context of inadequate supplies of 
clean and wholesome drinking water, resulted in epidemics of serious 
diseases such as typhoid, typhus and cholera. The towns and cities 
were not only unhealthy and insanitary but increasingly unsafe and 
dangerous: the dispossession of agricultural workers and skilled 
artisans produced bands of paupers and vagabonds that preyed on the 
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wealthy middle class as they walked along unlit streets in the dark 
hours. 
The politics of 'improvement' developed as a response to the 
failure of private enterprise to produce utility goods that would 
ameliorate the worst excesses of these conditions. Throughout the 
19th Century the state became increasingly involved in the regulation 
and administration of utility services. The problem was how to 
contain social reform within the abstract order. In the provision of 
utilities the problem was resolved through the development of 
municipal enterprises The municipal state increasingly took over the 
function of utility provision: a development that shifted the 
contradiction between value and use-value to the level of the 
municipal state. The piecemeal and ad hoc nature of social reform in 
the 19th Century was ultimately determined by the contradictions 
inherent in the municipal state form. Similarly, liberal social and 
economic theory developed through the contradiction, and the shift in 
the locus of class struggle to the level of the state shifted the 
liberal emphasis from laissez-faire to state intervention and social 
reform. 
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2,1. a. Capitalist Contradiction and the 
Limitations of Laissez-Faire Liberalism. 
Nineteenth Century liberalism developed through the 
contradiction between value and use-value. The primary concern of 
liberal social theorists and politicians was how to 'manage' the 
contradictions of capitalism within the abstract order. The piecemeal, 
ad hoc and inconsistent process of social reform was ultimately 
determined by the contradictions inherent in the municipal state 
form. The contradiction between value and use-value and its 
manifestation in the increasing threat to public health and safety 
posed a serious challenge to the analytical models of society 
developed by Classical Liberalism. The analytical models of Classical 
Economics had to come to terms with the problems associated with 
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, and there was a marked 
contrast between analytical and prescriptive elements in the writings 
of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, - Thomas Malthus, and in the work of 
later liberals such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The 
classical liberals were faced with the problem that the concrete 
development of capitalist society increasingly diverged from their 
abstract analytical models; and theorists were increasingly forced to 
accept the regulatory role of the state in the maintenance of the 
liberal order. 
The contrast between the individualist tenets of laissez-faire 
liberalism and the incipient interventionism forced by the pressures 
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of industrial development was particularly evident with respect to 
the issue of public health. In Britain, economic individualism was 
compounded by varieties of religious individualism premised upon 
spiritual self-scrutiny and self-responsibility (Lukes, 1973: 94-8). 
The attack on the 1848 Public Health Act by The Economist was 
premised on the notion that suffering and evil were abominations of 
nature. Classical economists generally considered public health issues 
beyond their terms of reference, and economic individualists such as 
Thomas Macaulay and Samuel Smiles often turned collectivist on 
issues of social policy (Taylor, 1972: 45-6). These ambiguities were 
to play an important rille in the development of the 19th Century gas 
and water industries. 
The work of utilitarian liberals such as Jeremy Bentham and 
Edwin Chadwick constituted the most systematic attempt to address 
the contradictions of Classical Liberalism. Utilitarian Liberalism 
played a fundamental role in articulating the relationship between 
laissez-faire liberalism and state intervention. The work of Jeremy 
Bentham and Edwin Chadwick highlighted the need for reform; the 
necessary limits of state intervention; and the need for strong 
centralised control of public administration. The principal concern of 
Bentham and Chadwick was the need to limit the local discretion of 
improvement commissions and ad hoc boards by centralised state 
control. The greatest happiness of the greatest number compatible 
with the security of the person and property was resolved into the 
maintenance of total abstraction by the state. 
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The 19th Century liberals were also faced with increasing 
demands for the reform of local government and in particular demands 
for the extension of the franchise. Notwithstanding the fragmented 
and ad hoc response to the problems of public health, reform had 
shifted the contradiction to the level of the municipal state and the 
imposition of local taxation increasingly resulted in the demand for 
representation within the local state. The development of municipal 
enterprise undermined the abstract premises of the liberal state and 
necessitated a reformulation of liberal democracy on the basis of 
direct (concrete/abstract) rather than indirect (abstract) 
representation. The most important proponent of the new democratic 
theory was John Stuart Mill. The distinguishing feature of Mill's 
laissez-faire was the special rele granted to municipal 
government [2]. While Bentham and Chadwick were concerned with the 
efficiency of local government and the importance of centralised 
administrative control, Mill focused on the role of local government 
in the education for, and defence of, liberty; local representative 
government providing defence against the discretionary powers 
associated with the expansion of administrative intervention (Mill, 
1972,266-I). 
The work of Mill was fundamental to the development of Fabian 
socialism (Pease, 1916: 22; Webb 1962,78-9). In tracing the evolution 
of 'municipal socialism', Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1922: 397-487) 
argued that the evolution of the 'new principles' of local government 
could be traced to the relationship between the deleterious impact of 
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the industrial revolution and the profit system on the health of the 
masses and the emergence of new conceptions of 'political liberty' 
that were subsequently incorporated into the administrative and 
legislative projects of utilitarian philosophers. The new capitalist 
class 'unwittingly' laid the basis for modern democracy by destroying 
the guilds and monopolies that restricted citizenship to members of 
trade groups, and allowed the emergence of a universal and 
undifferentiated class of 'citizen-consumers: The principle of 
government had shifted from 'associations of producers' to 
'associations of consumers'. The abolition of the profit motive was 
effected not in the interest of the producers of services but in the 
interest of the whole body of consumers. 
The shift in the contradiction between value and use-value to 
the level of the municipal state shifted the focus of liberalism from 
laissez-faire to the development of constitutional structures that 
would impose abstraction at the level of the state. The discretion 
available to local administrators was to be limited by the imposition 
of the rule of money through the representation of (abstract) 
'citizen-consumers' qua ratepayers within the institutional mechanisms 
of the municipal state. In order to understand the development of 
liberalism in the 19th Century, it is necessary to trace the concrete 
development of the contradiction between value and use-value as the 
determination of the municipal state. 
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2.1. b. The Politics of Improvement and the 
Development of Municipal Enterprise. 
The most important departure from laissez- faire during the 
early 19th Century was the public provision of gas and water by 
municipal enterprise. The basis of the development of municipalism in 
Britain can be traced to the reforms of the 1830s. The Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834, and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, 
laid the basis for the central control of local authorities that was 
to endure until 1929. However, the 1835 Act failed to lay the basis 
for a systematic development of local government; specifying neither 
areas of responsibility nor demarcations of function. The development 
of public health services was therefore piecemeal and inconsistent, 
and usually resulted from the actions by progressive authorities and 
ad hoc bodies such as Improvement Commissions. 
The investigations of the Poor Law Commissioners were crucial 
in highlighting the problem of public health in 19th Century Britain. 
The 1842 Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain investigated the relationship between 
poverty and poor health. The Report highlighted the manifold defects 
of existing water supplies and the wasteful effects of competition. 
Competition, it was argued, resulted in neither an improvement in 
individual choice nor an amendment of supplies. The negative effects 
of the private ownership of water was further reported in the Royal 
Commission on the Health of Towns in 1845. The Commission reported 
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that in Coventry spring water supplies were adequate to meet the 
needs of the whole population. However, the conduit and right of 
supply had fallen into the hands of a private individual, and as a 
consequence only 300-400 from a total of 7,200 houses received a 
supply. In Liverpool, two companies had a monopoly over the supply of 
water, and were able to charge high prices and make large profits 
from water that was defective in quality and often contaminated by 
sewage. In Chester, poor citizens were not supplied at all, and were 
forced to obtain water either by begging, or by drawing water from 
the grossly polluted River Dee that flowed through the City. 
The Commission recommended that the only way to secure a 
copious supply of pure water for all citizens was to entrust the 
service to an independent and disinterested body, and that water 
companies should be forced to comply with the demands of local 
authorities; the latter being given powers to purchase ineffective 
companies or to establish waterworks where none existed. The process 
of reform was opposed by the powerful vested interests of private 
water companies. The 1848 Public Health Act reflected a compromise 
between the advocates of health reform and the influential private 
interests of water companies. The Act established local boards of 
health which were 'enabled' to provide water supplies for their 
districts; although the Act stipulated that boards could only act with 
the permission of existing private companies. The imposition of 
definite obligations on local authorities with respect to water 
supply was not achieved until the Public Health Act of 1875, which 
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enshrined the recommendations of the 1869 Royal Sanitary Commission. 
The 1875 Act gave local authorities the power to supply water to all 
or part of their districts that were not covered by SWCs. 
By the last quarter of the 19th Century the municipalisation of 
water was widely recognised as the only effective means of ensuring 
the effective regulation of water resources: an important landmark 
being the decision of the House of Lords to allow the passage of the 
Sheffield Corporation Bill (1887) which transferred the ownership of 
the Sheffield Water Company to Sheffield Corporation on the grounds 
of public policy. Municipalisation was responsible for improvements in 
the quality and quantity of water supply: an improvement attributed 
to the replacement of the principles of commercial enterprise with 
those of public utility (Robson, 1935: 319). The municipalisation of 
water proceeded at a rapid rate in the second part of the 19th 
Century: by 1914 there were 326 municipal water undertakings in 
Britain constituting 80% of undertakings and accounting for 82% of 
output (Millward, 1991: 117). 
The negative impact of competition was also an important 
determinant with respect to the state regulation of the gas industry. 
The early development of the gas industry reflected a total dominance 
of private enterprise 131; although development was also inextricably 
linked to the 'politics of improvement'. The initial business of a 
company was usually constituted by a contract with the local 
authority to supply gas for the purposes of streetlighting. Indeed, 
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the supply of cheap gas for streetlighting was usually a condition of 
a company being allowed to excavate thoroughfares in order to lay 
mains. Large companies that required large amounts of capital for 
their development were usually established by an act of Parliament 
that limited liability; and the resulting statute usually imposed 
strict conditions on the operation of the company [4]. 
The early development of the gas industry was marked by 
increasing public concern over the operational effectiveness and 
efficiency of gas companies. These concerns included the high 
monopoly charges resulting from amalgamations, price-fixing and 
zoning; the health hazards resulting from the duplication and often 
triplication of gas works through noxious fumes, leakage and the 
opening of highways; and the poor quality of gas with respect to 
pressure, neglect of apparatus and the inaccuracy of meters (Robson, 
op cit: 305-6). In the context of these problems Parliament was 
forced to develop increasingly powerful mechanisms of public 
regulation and control over the gas industry. 
In 1847 the Surveying Officers Commission reported on the 
deleterious impact of competition between gas companies vis 6 vis the 
interests of consumers: competition was usually short-lived and 
consumers had to pay for contests through rates paid on excess 
capital when companies merged or went bankrupt. During the 1860s and 
1870s state regulation restricted competition through 'districting' 
and 'zoning'; controlled prices and dividends; and put an obligation on 
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gas companies to supply customers on demand [5]. In the context of 
these problems there was an increasing trend for gas to be supplied 
by municipal enterprise, and by 1914 there were over 300 publically- 
owned gas companies accounting for 40% of all authorised 
undertakings (Millward, op cit: 116-8; Falkus, 1977: 146-51). 
The development of municipal enterprise was determined by the 
failure of state regulation that attempted to 'formalise' the need for 
effective utilities through the commodity form. The state attempted 
to force private utility companies to produce use-values 
commensurate with politically determined (concrete) needs. The 
enduring opposition of water and gas capitals, and the subsequent 
failure of the regulatory framework illustrates the extent to which 
the state was unable to transcend the abstract order and ensure the 
production of use-values beyond the level of effective demand 
through regulation The development of public utilities and the direct 
administration of utilities by the municipal state was determined by 
the inability of the state to adequately formalise the contradictions 
of capitalism. Municipal administration developed with the 
discretionary power to control the production of use-values beyond 
the level of effective demand and to force payment through local 
taxation. The development of municipal trading had, therefore, the 
fundamental implication of shifting the contradiction between value 
and use-value to the centre of the administrative and representative 
mechanisms of the local state. 
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211, c. The Contradictions of 




The development of municipal administration and the subsequent 
shift in the locus of the contradiction to the level of the state had 
important implications with respect to the labour employed by the 
utility industries. As the state was forced to take on the functions 
of the direct control and administration of utilities it also took on 
the function of maintaining the mediation of concrete by abstract 
labour. Public health legislation was implemented in the context of 
powerful and entrenched opposition of business. In London, the City 
Corporation, dominated by business interests, successfully exempted 
London from the provisions of the 1848 Public Health Act. Following a 
cholera epidemic in the same year a Royal Commission recommended the 
establishment of a single Metropolitan Commission for Drainage to 
replace the existing seven commissions, and the Metropolitan Board of 
Works (MBWI was established in 1855 with powers to oversee the 
reconstruction and maintenance of drainage on a London-wide basis. 
The development of the MBW resulted in the replacement of 'direct' by 
'contract' utility labour and heightened the contradictions of the 
municipal state form. 
The impact of the replacement of direct by contract labour was 
highlighted by Henry Mayhew in his London Labour and the London Poor. 
The development of contract labour had particularly serious 
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consequences on the pay and conditions of the 'sewer flushers'. The 
average pay of sewer flushers decreased from between 24 and 27 
shillings a week to between 21 and 22 shillings a week, and 
contractors forced workers to spend considerable sums of money in 
the provision of their own equipment. As Mayhew commented: 
It's the old story, I regret to say -a reduction in 
the wages of the labouring men. But this indeed is 
the inevitable effect of the contract system..... To 
contractors the comforts and health of the labouring 
men must necessarily be a secondary consideration to 
the realisation of profit. Men can always be found; 
safe investment cannot (Quoted in Dix & Williams, 
1987: 24). 
The employment of contract labour was an attempt by the 
municipal state to regulate utility labour through the 
commodification of labour. The failure of the state to adequately 
formalise the contradictions of capitalist development is illustrated 
by the failure of the contract labour to deliver the use-values 
commensurate with social need. As a consequence, the number of 
municipal workers rose dramatically in the latter half of the 19th 
Century: the state took on the function of the direct administration 
of utility industries. The increase reflected both the 
municipalisation of monopolies such as gas and water, and the 
concerns of 'ratepayers' groups' with 'local economy'; the latter 
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concern leading many parish authorities to employ direct labour 
following the dismissal of contractors where their work was 
considered inefficient and too costly. The origins of state labour was 
thus an attempt to overcome the contradictions inherent in capitalist 
production: an attempt to liberate concrete labour from processes of 
abstraction and reconstitute abstraction within the institutional 
mechanisms of the state. 
The increase in the number of municipal employees was not 
matched by an increase in trade union activity. Prior to the 
emergence of New Unionism municipal employees retained an ambiguous 
and somewhat hostile attitude to organised labour. Local government 
remained fragmented and unable to coordinate public health 
effectively. The exception was the development of municipal 
enterprise in Birmingham where a group of wealthy and creditworthy 
industrialists and bankers led by Joseph Chamberlain, developed a 
'new' liberalism that attempted to ameliorate the worst excesses of 
capitalist development, whilst integrating workers within the 
municipal state as individual 'citizen-consumers'. In Birmingham, 
municipal enterprise developed to the point where the municipal state 
was able to 'formalise' the contradictions of its own determination. 
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2.1. d. Joseph Chamberlain and the Development 
of the "Municipal Ideal" in Birmingham. 
The development of municipalism in the middle decades of the 
19th Century took place in the absence of an integrated or effective 
working class opposition. This was reflected in the form and function 
of municipal provision through which the state attempted to ensure 
the productive consumption of labour whilst maintaining the abstract 
mediation of utility commodities. In the 1860s and 1870s Birmingham 
was unique with respect to both the prominent r6le played by 
capitalists in the public life of the City, and the limited 
organisation of labour 161. These factors facilitated a programme of 
municipalisation developed by Joseph Chamberlain. The programme was 
based on an explicit concern with the public health of the labouring 
masses, and was developed in the context of an extension of the 
franchise to many working people in Birmingham by the 1867 Reform 
Act. 
Chamberlain was an advocate of deliberate reformism to protect 
the interests of wealth (Hobsbawm, 1968: 328). A conscious municipal 
policy was engineered premised on the problem of sewage (Briggs, 
1968: 214). Birmingham's sewage was piped into the River Tame at 
Saltley in a raw state. Following an injunction in the Chancery Court 
restraining the Council from depositing solid sewage at the Tame 
outfall, and the rejection of a plan by the 'Gladstonian' Public Works 
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Committee to build a new sewerage works in the Tame Valley, a 
special Sewage Enquiry Committee was established in 1870. The 
Committee was dominated by 'new' Chamberlainite Liberals, and 
produced an important and influential social document that 
highlighted the appalling state of the City's sanitary system, and 
demonstrated the way in which this was related to overall and 
differential mortality rates in the City. Chamberlain used the Report 
to highlight the disparities of life in the City, the relationship of 
these disparities to 'pestiferous nuisances', and thus the case for 
social control. Despite the opposition of private interests, by 1875 
the Committee had assumed responsibility for the implementation of a 
new sewage plan. This was given further impetus by the 1875 Public 
Health Act, which allowed the creation of 'united districts' for 
specified sanitary purposes, and which led to the creation of the 
Birmingham, Tame and New District Drainage Board 
The municipalisation of gas played a central r6le in 
Birmingham's ambitious plans for the development of a new sanitary 
system. Chamberlain argued that municipalisation strengthened the 
power and influence of the local council which should be encouraged 
to become a real local parliament. Monopolies sustained by the state 
should be in the hands of the representatives of the people, to whom 
the profits by right should go. A central tenet of Chamberlain's 
initial programme was that the substantial profits generated by a 
municipally-owned gas undertaking could be used to improve the 
health of Birmingham. In 1884 gas was taken into municipal ownership; 
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the purchase of the gasworks raising the borough debt from £O. 5M to 
£2.5M. 
Chamberlain's argument for the municipalisation of water was 
premised upon the 'great social weakness' of a system that forced the 
poor to drink water 'which is as bad as sewage before clarification'. 
" 
Following the 1869 Royal Commission on Sanitary Reform, he argued 
that 'the power of life and death' should not be left in private 
hands, and 'whereas there should be a profit made on a gas 
undertaking, the waterworks should never be a source of profit, as 
all profit should go in the reduction of the price of water' (Briggs, 
ibid., 223-4). The 1872 Public Health Act led to the appointment of a 
Medical Officer of Health, and his reports, together with a smallpox 
epidemic in 1874, and the results of the survey of sanitary 
conditions by the Sanitary Committee which was established following 
the 1873 local elections, allowed Chamberlain to overcome the 
opposition of the Birmingham Water Company and the House of Lords, 
and the waterworks were taken into municipal ownership in 1876. 
Chamberlain articulated the shift of the contradiction between 
value and use-value to the level of the municipal state. Chamberlain 
recognised that the contradictions of capitalist development could 
not be adequately formalised by the liberal state and consciously 
developed administrative mechanisms to mediate the contradiction. The 
principles that guided Chamberlain in Birmingham were inserted into 
the Radical programme of 1885, and were eventually applied to 
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Whitehall and Empire. The ideas developed in Birmingham were also 
important with respect to the reform of local government. By the 
1880s the structure that had developed piecemeal from 1832 was a 
morass of confused and overlapping authorities and ad hoc 
commissions. Following the 1884 Reform Act and the campaign by 
Chamberlain's National Liberals for the extension and codification of 
local government, the 1888 Local Government Act established County 
Councils, including the London County Council [LCC]. The Local 
Government Act of 1894 democratised urban and rural sanitary 
districts through the development of urban and rural district 
councils. 
New Liberalism provided the context for the emergence of Gas 
and Water Socialism as a political concept: the most important 
example of this being the Fabian/Progressive Liberal alliance on the 
LCC. Chamberlainite liberalism developed through the contradiction 
between value and use-value and the Radical reforms of the 1880s 
laid the basis for a heightened level of class struggle over the torn 
of the municipal state. The development of municipalism in Birmingham 
and other cities was a product of a liberalism that had developed 
through the contradiction between value and use-value. Liberalism had 
to adapt to the contradiction inherent in capitalist production 
emerging at the level of the municipal state. The maintenance of 
abstraction required the emergence of municipal abstract citizens or 
'citizen-consumers'. The emergence of labour as a class power in the 
late 1880s, however, threatened to rupture the abstract basis of the 
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municipal state. The working class response to the contradictions of 
capitalist development was to develop Gas and Water Socialism as a 
critique of capitalism and the alienating social relations inherent in 
capitalist production. 
2.2. Gas grid Wei ter Socialism as 
Revolutioriary Critique. 
The Radical Liberalism which developed in the 1860s and 1870s 
was fundamental in shaping the form of working class politics which 
emerged in the 1880s and 1890s. The power of democracy was a 
central theme in the revolutionary politics of the SDF and ILP. As the 
contradiction between value and use-value shifted to the level of the 
state, the concept of radical democracy took on polarised class-based 
perspectives, vii bureaucratic control and workers' control Class 
struggle' was increasingly constituted by struggle over the form of 
the state; and was manifested in the form of a strong anti-statist 
undercurrent in working class politics. In the development of 
political strategy, trade unionists and socialists were able to draw 
upon diverse currents of socialist theory. These theories were to 
play an important part in the development of a strong anti-statist 
undercurrent that was to emerge coterminously with the employers' 
counter-attack on New Unionism and the subsequent 'Labour Alliance'. 
Gas and Water Socialism was an important element in this incipient 
anti-statism as may be demonstrated with regard to theoretical 
expositions of socialists between 1890 and the emergence of 
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Syndicalism in 1911-2. This provides the key to understanding the 
political significance of Gas and Water Socialism as the crisis of the 
municipal state, 
2,2. a. Working Class Politics in Late 19th 
Century Britain: From Radical Liberalism to 
Revolutionary Socialism, 
The 'Great Depression' focused Radical Liberal opinion on the 
'Social Question', and the impact of mass unemployment led many 
radicals to search for a new social theory. From around 1879 there 
was a proliferation of new radical groupings: most notably, the 
'Democratic Federation' formed by delegates of radical clubs in 
London. The period was a time of intense flux and diversity, and the 
impact of Marxian currents from Continental Europe exacerbated the 
confusion. In particular, the 'Gotha Programme' and the electoral 
success of the SPD in Germany were to have a marked influence in 
Britain. The writings of Marx were not available in English, and as a 
consequence, Radicals were unable to differentiate the Marxian and 
Lassallean currents in the German settlement. The above confusion 
leads Barry (1965: 133-6) to suggest that four main models of the 
economic form of a future socialist society were available to 
socialists during the 1870s and 1880s. 
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First, John Sketchley, founder of the Social Democratic 
Association in 1878, and author of the Principles of Social Democracy 
(1879), equated 'scientific socialism' with the approach of Lassalle 
and argued that this was compatible with his own Chartist-Owenite 
conception of local, self-regulative co-operative associations 
protected by a central state. This illustrates the influence of 
Continental Anarchism that had been popularised by the Russian 
anarchist Peter Kropotkin. Second, and also influenced by the 'Gotha 
Programme' and Kropotkin, was Joseph Lane's Land and Labour League. 
The programme of the League contained Radical demands for political 
reform and land nationalisation, and demands that transcended 
Radicalism such as the proposal that the wealth of society should be 
shared by all. Third, Lane and his followers drifted further towards 
anarchism and anti-statism during the late 1890s. The Anti-State 
Communist Manifesto (1897) argued for the development of free 
associations of workers with no central authority over them. Fourth, 
the 'centralist' model developed by E. Belfort Bax. Bax had read the 
German edition of Capital, and was acquainted with Hermann Jung who 
had worked with Marx on the IWMA. In Modern Socialism (1879) Bax 
expounded the view that socialism would concentrate capital in the 
hands of the people as represented by the executive of a 
'democratised' modern state. 
When the Democratic Federation [DFI publically advanced to a 
socialist position in 1883, the proposals contained within Socialism 
Made Plain, Being the Social and Political Manifesto of the Democratic 
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Federation outlined the ultimate aim as the socialisation of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange. However, a programme 
of more immediate reforms were outlined including free education and 
school meals, an eight hour day, national banks, the nationalisation 
of the railways and the municipalisation of gas, water and 
electricity. In 1884 when the DF became the SDF, the party stood for 
the state (Municipal) ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange; the state having first been democratised 
by political reforms in order that the working class would elect a 
Government directly representing its own class interests. The 
formation of the SDF had included the affiliation of the Land and 
Labour League who were federalist and anti-statist, and this led to a 
vague commitment by the SDF to establish collective or common 
property regulated by society. The municipalisation of water and gas 
were therefore conceptualised in terms of workers' control; with 
socialist strategy clearly premised on class struggle over the form 
of the state. 
2.2. b. Class Struggle and the Form of the 
Municipal State: Gas and Water Socialism as 
Workers' Control. 
The principal focus of socialist theory and practice during the 
1890s was the form of the capitalist state. The response of capital 
to New Unionism included a marked 6ureaucratisattan of the state 
apparatus. In this context, leading socialists of the SDF and the ILP 
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increasingly advocated workers' control and cooperation as a response 
to the bureaucratic domination of capital and the state. Hyndman, for 
example, shifted substantially closer to an Owenite position during 
the 1890s; and increasingly questioned the efficacy of 
nationalisation. In the Economics of Socialism (1896), Hyndman 
developed an analysis of the Post Office which suggested that while 
the organisation was socialistic in form, it was not socialistic in 
'nature' ! content. The Post Office had the potential to become the 
'nucleus of a great co-operative system': postal workers and their 
families needed food, clothing and house-room, and all would render 
useful service in return for these and other necessaries of life. 
There is evidence that many socialists conceptualised Gas and 
Water Socialism as a mechanism that would facilitate an attack upon 
the alienating relation contained within the capitalist state: that is, 
that public ownership should raise the status of labour as workers. 
In 1894 Hyndman and William Morris wrote that workers should be 
encouraged to take a more direct interest in their enterprises; 
including the right to elect their own superintendents. This view was 
taken further by William Morris and E. Belfort Bax, who, in Socialism: 
its Growth and Outcome (1893), developed the argument that socialists 
should not attempt to capture the national state. In a statement of 
'anarchist federalism', they suggested that the growth of municipal 
government should be seen not as an extension of democracy under the 
national state, but as a means of destroying the national state. 
Through the continuous action of federalism and internationalism, the 
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power of the national state would be sapped. The writings of Tom 
Mann illustrate the extent to which elements of 'anti-statism' were 
present within the ILP. In Trade Unionism and Co-operation in the 
Future (1897), Mann argued for co-operative production rather than 
nationalisation as the main route to industrial democracy. 
The political dynamic of New Unionism was to play an important 
role in the emergence of independent labour politics. The increasing 
constitutionalism of the trade unions associated with New Unionism 
was a result of their defeat in the industrial struggles of the 1890s 
counter-attack (Hinton, 1983: 60-3). The new unions were successively 
defeated in the gas and docks industries, and needed to secure formal 
recognition sanctioned by Parliament. While the counter-attack was to 
play an important r6le in the establishment of the Labour 
Representation Committee in 1900, the partial nature of the attack 
led to the incorporation of labour through the establishment of 
collective bargaining frameworks. The labour alliance of 1895-1914 
forced socialists onto the periphery of the labour movement and into 
the structures of local government. The socialist currents alluded to 
above would seem to represent an important critique of these 
integratory and reformist movements. Socialist theory existed: the 
weakness of labour in the labour process forced retreat. This was 
illustrated by the ambiguous anti-statism amongst the working class 
vis 6 vis the Liberal social reforms of 1906 (Pelling, 1968). 
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The persistent anti-statism found expression in the syndicalist 
movement and in the industrial unionism that had become increasingly 
important by 1910. In the context of a fall in real wages, the 
failure of Labour MPs to win significant economic changes and the 
dead-end into which municipal socialism had run, the working class 
became increasingly frustrated. With regard to municipal socialism, 
Ramsey MacDonald was to comment, 'After gas and water - what? '. The 
syndicalist movement provided a useful critique of the orthodox 
strategy of securing nationalisation within a capitalist economy. Tom 
Mann was to claim that the running of industry through Parliament 
would prove more mischievous than present methods. Syndicalism 
allowed many gains in both membership and solidarity between 1912 
and 1914, and led to elements of workers' control to be woven into 
demands for nationalisation. Miners in South Wales published a 
manifesto entitled Miners' Next Step, that demanded democratic control 
of the coal industry at the level of the pit committee. 
The political programmes and discourses developed by socialists 
and trade unionists between 1890 and 1914 illustrates the extent to 
which Gas and Water Socialism was a focus of the political struggle 
over the form of the capitalist state. The contradictory determination 
of the municipal state form allowed real gains for labour and 
initiated the crisis of the municipal state form. The political 
manifestations of the crisis were an emergent anti-statism and anti- 
centralism with respect to labour, and an attempt by capital to 
centralise and bureaucratise the state through measures such as the 
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1906 Liberal Reforms. I will now examine the concrete manifestation 
of this crisis through an exploration of the relationship between New 
Unionism in the gas and water industries, the representation of 
labour within the structures of the municipal state and the 
fundamental crisis of the state that emerged in the first decade of 
the 20th Century. 
2.3. Municipalism and th40 Prob] Em 
of' Labour: TI-i Crisis of t171 to 
Municipal State. 
The liberal response to the contradiction between value and 
use-value was increasingly undermined by the autonomous struggles of 
the nascent working class movement. The late 1880s were marked by 
the emergence of a new wave of industrial unrest led by socialists 
of the SDF. This resulted in the unionisation of large numbers of 
previously unorganised unskilled and semi-skilled workers, including a 
large number of municipal public servants. The two moments were 
linked by SDF members such as John Burns, who was both a key player 
in the emergent New Unionism and an elected member of the LCC. The 
genesis of New Unionism was the successful organisation of unskilled 
workers in London by socialists of the SDF. The success of a weak 
group of workers, the 'Match Girls', who were able to overcome a 
strong employer with the aid of public support, prompted the 
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organization of other unskilled workers: most importantly, the dockers 
and the gas workers. 
2.3. a. New Unionism and the Emergent Challenge 
of Laborur. 
The struggles associated with New Unionism resulted in a vast 
increase in both union membership in general and in the organisation 
of unskilled labourers throughout Britain. The main feature of the 
New Unionism was a departure from the economism of the labour 
aristocrats. The new general unions espoused the principles of trade 
protection, paid few or no benefits and were avowedly political in 
their aims and objectives. The public, or at least semi-public 
structure, of the gas industry was one of the most important and 
enduring examples of New Unionism, and provided an ideal context for 
the material grounding of political concepts such as Gas and Water 
Socialism. 
The struggle of the gas workers illustrates the way in which 
working class politics was increasingly focused on the form of the 
municipal state. The organisation of the gasworkers in Britain was 
extremely important, as it demonstrated the exceptional case of the 
development of 19th Century unionism in a sector with the exceptional 
characteristics of having a high degree of public ownership and 
control; a high public profile and therefore exposed to the pressures 
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of public opinion; and a semi-skilled workforce in a powerful 
bargaining position (Hobsbawm, op cit: 172-3). The public profile of 
the gas industry was successfully manipulated by the gasworkers. 
Following the Reform Acts 1867 and 1884, and the Local Government of 
1888, the labour vote had to be considered at a local level. Gas 
undertakings were both monopolies and often municipally-owned. The 
bargaining power of workers in the gas industry was enhanced through 
their enjoyment of the dual protection of the law: as consumers and 
employee& Gas undertakings were legally obliged to maintain supplies 
and to offer minimum conditions of service to employees. 
The London gasworkers were organized by socialists such as John 
Burns, Tom Mann, Ben Tillet and Will Thorn, who was himself a 
gasworker. In May 1889, the Gas Workers and General Union [GWGU] was 
formed. The union claimed a reduction from a twelve to an eight hour 
day in August 1889 and the gas companies conceded this demand 
without a struggle. The main impetus to the disruption of 1889 was a 
combination of the intensification of work in a context of technical 
stagnation and the successful propaganda of the socialists (Hobsbawm, 
ibid. 163-5). The companies were forced to concede the demands for 
wage rises and the eight-hour day as they found themselves at the 
temporary mercy of the stokers. The gas companies were producing gas 
without margins in a technical context of the nascent competition of 
electricity, and in a political context which, given the municipally- 
owned and regulated form of the gas industry, forced attention on the 
emergent labour vote. 
- 93 - 
The success of the London gasworkers was followed by gas 
undertakings throughout Britain capitulating to the demand for an 
eight-hour day. The unwillingness of the gas companies to challenge 
the demands of the unions was premised upon the successful strike 
action of workers in Bristol. In Bristol, gasworkers already worked 
eight-hour shifts. In May 1889, the Bristol United Gaslight Company's 
Labour Vnion was formed with 200 members following a dispute over 
methods of wage payment. In October, a strike was called after the 
Company rejected the proposals of the union. In the context of low 
gas stocks, the Company capitulated in less than 24 hours on terms 
costing around £5,000 per annum. The victory march organised by the 
Trades Council, and attended by 10,000 socialists and trade unionists, 
demonstrated the political significance of the dispute. Addressing the 
demonstration, Vicary the gasworkers' leader, argued that: 
With the combination of the workers, capital must 
give way. Anything and everything you see around you 
is produced by the workers, and if they produced all 
they ought to have a share in all (Quoted in Nabb, op 
c1 t. - 28-9) 
Despite the collapse of other general unions, and a sustained 
counter-attack in the gas industry which included a sustained 
mechanisation programme between 1890 and 1910, the union managed to 
retain partial control. The gas industry went through a rapid period 
of expansion during this period and re-absorbed many of those 
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displaced by mechanisation. 'T'here was no rapid influx of new un- 
organized labour, and while many of the stokers operated the new 
machinery, there was resistance to the scrapping of existing and 
expensive capital equipment. In the context of the dual protection of 
the law alluded to above, the stokers were able to partially retain 
their bargaining position. The gasworkers had demonstrated the way in 
which the democratic basis of the state form could be exploited by 
labour in its struggle against capital. The increasing incorporation 
of the working class within the municipal state - as workers, voters 
and increasingly councillors - resulted in a severe and protracted 
crisis of this form of regulation. The emergence of labour as a 
powerful class force heightened the contradictions inherent in the 
municipal form of the state: the contradiction between value and use- 
value had shifted to the level of the state and as a result, class 
struggle had taken the form of struggle over the form of the state. 
2.3.. b. The Politicisation of Municipal Labour 
and the Contradictions of the Municipal State. 
The contradictions of the municipal state had initially been 
resolved through the development of the (abstract) municipal 'citizen- 
consumer', and through the commodification and intensification of 
municipal labour. The increasing representation of labour within the 
democratic mechanisms of the municipal state, however, increasingly 
undermined the abstract premises of this form of regulation. The 
unionisation of municipal employees, and the involvement of organised 
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labour in municipal politics, heightened the contradictions of the 
municipal state to a new level. Municipal employees were fertile 
ground for the growth of trade unionism. In contrast to the unstable 
and casual employment conditions of other groups of workers affected 
by New Unionism such as gasworkers and dockers, local government 
provided a stable and continual basis for growth. The conditions of 
municipal employees had improved little since the survey of Mayhew in 
the 1850s. Combined with the idealism of New Unionism, these factors 
resulted in a massive growth in the level of trade union membership 
and activity amongst public servants (Dix & Williams, op cit: 32-4). 
Within London, it was the water workers who were to provide the main 
thrust of this unionisation. 
The LCC main-drainage employees were concentrated at the main 
sewage outfalls at Beckton and Crossness on the north and south 
banks of the River Thames respectively. Beckton gas works had been 
the focus of Will Thorne's activity during the gasworkers' strike, and 
many of the LCC employees were to join the GWGU - most notably Albin 
Taylor who was a leading member of the SDF. During 1889, the men at 
Beckton threatened strike action unless their demands were met -a 
48 hour week, 5 shillings a day, 1 week annual leave and the 
provision of safety equipment. While Taylor and his fellow drainage 
men were eventually to break with the GWGU to join the rapidly 
growing Vestry Employees' Union EVEUI - who rejected the class-based 
unionism of the former in favour of a more traditional concern with 
pay, conditions, and funeral benefits - the involvement of water 
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workers within the GWGU demonstrates the potency of New Unionism 
during the earlier 1890s. Moreover, the primary objectives of the VEU 
were to limit the use of contractors and to increase the employment 
of direct labour; an objective that heightened the crisis of the 
municipal state. 
The counter-attack by capital against New Unionism was 
replicated within the municipal state through the victimisation of 
union officials by the 'surveyors' who were their de facto employers. 
In London, a prime objective of the VEU became the principle that no 
employee could be dismissed except through an elected committee of 
the vestry; the union subsequently winning support for this principle 
from 'progressive' members sympathetic to labour on the LCC. This had 
a fundamental impact on the principles and practice of public service 
trade unionism: 
(There was) a growing conviction amongst active 
members that municipal workers were in a unique 
position in that they were able to exert a decisive 
influence on who their employers were. A policy of 
winning sympathetic influence on local authorities 
through the ballot box by securing the election of 
candidates who were sympathetic to trade unionism 
was therefore adopted by municipal employees and 
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soon came to be seen as a priority objective in 
establishing the union (Dix & Williams, ibid: 41). 
The growth of New Unionism was perceived by bourgeois interests 
as a serious crisis of British industry, but as The Times noted on 
August 19th 1902, equally threatening to the 'national interest' was 
the 'political' moment of New Unionism qua municipal socialism. The 
Times noted the extent to which, following the Paris meeting of the 
International Socialist Conference in 1900, which had highlighted the 
importance of the municipal state to socialist struggle, the major 
strands of British socialism had all made the successful capture and 
manipulation of local government an important step on the road to 
'unqualified socialism'. The largest threat was constituted by 
socialists in the SDF and the ILP. The Times urged apathetic 
municipal electors to 'wake up' to this socialist threat, which 
threatened the entire basis of private enterprise either through 
direct appropriation, or through the increasing burden on the rates 
that was posing an increasing threat to levels of profitability. The 
concrete representation of labour within the institutional mechanisms 
of the municipal state became increasingly manifest through a severe 
and protracted fiscal crisis of the local state. 
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2.3. c. Municipal Labour, Class Struggle and 
the "Fiscal Crisis" of the Municipal State. 
The municipal state developed through and articulated the 
contradiction between value and use-value: the contradiction was 
manifest at the level of the state as the contradiction between 
regulation and administration, and was heightened by the 
representation of concrete labour through the democratic and 
administrative mechanisms of the state. Through the discretionary 
power inherent in the administrative moment of the state, municipal 
enterprise was able to produce unmediated use-values and thereby 
exacerbate the contradictions inherent in the municipal state form. 
The contradiction became manifest as the fiscal crisis of the state. 
The 'economic' struggle by capital against New Unionism was therefore 
complemented by the 'political' and 'ideological' struggle against 
municipal socialism. The struggle to (re)impose abstraction was an 
attempt to simultaneously restructure the political, economic and 
ideological aspects of the capital relation at the level of the 
municipal state: the result was the bureaucratisation and 
institutionalisation of the working class movement through collective 
bargaining and bureaucratic public service. 
The most explicit manifestation of the fiscal crisis of the 
state was the growing level of municipal debt. Municipal debt 
increased between 1874 and 1899 by £183M to £300M, against a 
reduction in the national debt of £137M; while taxation for the 
- 99 - 
purposes of local expenditure in England and Wales increased from 
£17M to £38M between 1869 and 1899 (The Times: 28-08-02). The 
negative impact of the increasing burden of local taxation can be 
illustrated with respect to the railway industry. Between 1882 and 
1901, the local tax burden on the great London railway companies 
increased by 160% from £76,703 to £199,420; an increase 'out of all 
proportion' to the improvements made to stock and property. Railways 
had been forced to contribute to the development of municipal 
tramway systems with which they were often in direct competition. 
Railway companies were increasingly unwilling to contribute to the 
development of 'municipal luxuries' such as water supply and drainage, 
from which they derived no intrinsic benefit. The direct losses fell 
on railway shareholders, and municipal enterprise became a subject of 
lamentation at the half-yearly meetings of all the major railway 
companies. 
Publications such as The Times were concerned to develop a 
'moral panic' suggesting that all municipalisation, whether carried 
out by 'labour' or 'progressive' local authorities, was part of a 
programme for the socialisation of production rather than for the 
'improvement' of public service or saving of rates. The Times quoted 
at length from the speeches and journals of the SDF, ILP and Fabian 
Society which equated municipal improvement with the struggle for 
socialism. The Times criticised the 'underhand' way in which 
socialists had been able to secure a hold on local government through 
the so-called 'Municipal Workers' Committees'. Delegates to these 
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committees were drawn from trade unions, trade councils, socialist 
bodies and co-operative societies. The committees provided a 
mechanism both for the formulation of socialist policy and for 
defraying the expenses of working class socialists standing in local 
elections. 
The election of working class socialists onto local government 
bodies was perceived as a grave political threat. On September 8, 
1902, The Times fulminated against 'the tendencies towards 
degeneration' involved in the process through which local authorities 
were taking on an increasing number of complex functions while at 
the same time 'businessmen' were increasingly reluctant to stand for 
municipal office - men willing to govern in the 'general interests of 
the community' were not always willing to 'keep shop' for their fellow 
citizens. Businessmen. had been disuaded from standing for municipal 
office through the increasing demands on their time, the increasing 
need to bid for municipal contracts, and the 'mischievous' campaigns 
run by trade unionists against businessmen who failed to either pay 
union rates or recognise trade unions. The resolution of the fiscal 
crisis of the state on the basis of capital required that abstraction 
was (re)imposed on the implementation of state functions and state 
labour processes. The regulation of labour could not be premised on 
the demands of concrete labour. As the correspondent of The Times 
argued: 
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The administration of the new municipalism involves 
the giving out of such important contracts, the 
employment of so much labour, and the expansion on 
so practical a scale of the fundamental principles of 
a thorough-going socialism, tends to encourage the 
entrance into municipal government of men who have 
axes to grind, who see advantages for their own class 
in direct employment, who want to promote the 
expansion of the socialist idea by still further 
exploiting the municipality. So the falling off in the 
one direction is accompanied by the greater 
introduction of undesirable elements on the other 
(The Times, 08-09-1902; My italics). 
The Times documented the cases of a gasworker from Blackburn, a 
street trader from Wolverhampton and a steelworker from a 'northern 
industrial town' who had all been recently elected as 'labour' 
representatives. None of the men earned over 30 Shillings a week, and 
were unlikely to possess 'that practical knowledge of finance and 
industrial management needed to efficiently run municipal 
enterprises'. Such men were unlikely to serve the general interest of 
the community qua ratepayers, were likely to have 'friends' in the 
trade union movement, and were therefore thoroughly untrustworthy 
with respect to 'the delicate question of the direct employment of 
labour'. 
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The new working class socialists placed the selfish interests of 
labour before the general (abstract) interests of municipal citizens. 
Within the structure of local government the refusal of 'efficient' 
members to cooperate with councillors whose 'position in life was 
little better than that of labourers', meant that the latter could not 
always be kept from the committees where they might do 'harm'. As a 
result, more and more public work was falling on the shoulders of the 
'more qualified' members, and as The Times pointed out, in the context 
of a rapid increase in the amount and complexity of tasks falling on 
local government, this could have only one consequence - an increase 
in siunicipal bureaucracy Increasingly, the real duties of local 
government were devolved to permanent officials and experts. The 
concrete demands of labour were institutionalised and formalised 
within the bureaucratic mechanisms of the state. 
The expansion of the municipal bureaucracy was also a source of 
political concern to the interest's of capital. Permanent officials had 
a vested interest in the expansion of municipal enterprise; a result 
of both their sense of 'public service' and the 'substantial pecuniary 
benefits' that would accrue to them. Municipal officials and experts 
were increasingly perceived as a 'distinct political force' with a 
vested interest in the expansion of municipal socialism; and 
increasingly viewed as a threat to ratepayers, private traders and 
national industries. The development of Gas and Water Socialism 
resulted in the contradictory determination of public service 
bureaucracy and the emergence of public servants as a distinct 
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political force. The challenge of labour had been institutionalised 
within the state and the resulting bureaucratisation and 
centralisation had shifted the contradiction between value and use- 
value to increasingly centralised mechanisms of state regulation and 
administration. This process occurred simultaneously with the 
demobilisation and institutionalisation of working class struggle at 
the level of the municipal state labour process. 
2.3. d. Direct Labour, Class Struggle and the 
Crisis of the Municipal State Labour Process. 
The origin of the direct employment of labour was the 
establishment of the London County Council Works Department in May 
1892. This had followed pressure by socialists on the LCC such as 
John Burns on the issue that LCC contracts should not be awarded to 
contractors who failed to observe trade union rates of pay and 
conditions. The inability of contractors to deliver services 
effectively on these terms led to the establishment of the Works 
Department. The control of the labour process by elected members of 
the council engendered an immediate crisis of labour discipline. A 
Manager of the LCC Works Department highlighted the 'demoralisation' 
that resulted from a situation in which workers elected their own 
employers: 
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[F]or some time after the Works Department was 
established there was a tendency on the part of the 
skilled workmen in our employ not to do the same 
amount of work for the Council as they would be 
expected to do for a contractor, and it was only 
after repeated dismissals that the idea was shaken..... 
In connexion with this matter I am afraid that the 
visits of individual members of the Council to our 
works, who enter into conversation with the men 
employed there, is apt to be misconstrued. Some of 
the men store up their grievances, real and fancied, 
until councillors go on to the works, when they are 
related, and often, I am afraid, in a most exaggerated 
form. Several of the foremen have complained to me 
of the bad effect this has on the men, and have 
stated that their authority over them is very much 
diminished (Quoted in The Times, 10-09-1902) 
Councillors naturally desired to stay on good terms with men 
whom they both employed and whose votes they depended on for their 
re-election. The situation was exacerbated with the emergence of 
public sector trade unions and the involvement of the unions in 
municipal workers' committees. In London, trade unions such as the 
Municipal Employees Association [MEAI had gained in strength owing to 
the related process of New Unionism and the expansion of local 
government employment. These unions pursued demands for minimum 
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wage provision, a 48 hour working week, and uniform wages for all 
grades in all districts irrespective of competence or efficiency. The 
unions increasingly used the elective strength of their collective 
membership to support or veto candidates in local elections on the 
basis of support for their programmes. 
The result of these developments was an increasing call for the 
disenfranchisement of municipal servants: the reconstitution of the 
employment relation on a more abstract basis. Sir Thomas Hughes, a 
municipal notable from Liverpool, is quoted in The Times as arguing 
that there was no great hardship in a man 'ceasing to have a voice in 
the choice of his master' on becoming a corporation employee. The 
threat of direct labour was not confined to the question of profit 
and loss: direct labour was presented as a central element of the 
socialist project of transferring all 'remunerative employment' to the 
state or municipality, and the trade union project of protecting 
workers from the discipline of the labour market (The Times, 10-09- 
1902). 
The resolution of the crisis on the basis of capital required 
the (re)imposition of abstraction on the institutional mechanisms of 
state production and consumption: a process achieved through the 
bureaucratisation of the working class movement as producers 
(bureaucratised collective bargaining) and consumers (public service 
bureaucracy). The municipal public servants were demobilised through 
the development of the centralised and bureaucratic mechanisms of 
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collective bargaining associated with 'Whitelyism'. The working class 
were not totally defeated but were demobilised and their demands 
were institutionalised through bureaucratic modes of regulation and 
administration. The theory and practice of Fabian Socialism 
articulated the class compromise and provided the ideological support 
for socialist strategies premised on the integration of the working 
class within the state. The crisis of the municipal state was 
resolved on the basis of Fabian socialism; and Fabian socialism was 
to provide the key ideological concepts for the development of the 
water industry in the 20th Century, viz, the grounding of state 
regulation, administration and management on notions of public 
service 
2.4. Fabiari Soci8lism, Class 
Compromise and tine Development of 
""pt. blic Service 1 Bureaucracy. 
The struggle over the municipal state form resulted in the 
concept of Gas and Water Socialism assuming divergent class 
perspectives: liberal reform and revolutionary critique. The struggle 
was not decisively resolved on the basis of capital: labour was 
demobilised and incorporated within the institutional mechanisms of 
the municipal state. Fabian Socialism developed as a response to the 
contradiction between value and use-value; attempting to resolve the 
crisis on the basis of labour through liberal social theory and 
practice. Fabian Socialism provided the ideological legitimation for 
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the class compromise associated with the bureaucratisation of the 
workers' movement. The Fabian articulation of socialist politics 
through the abstract concepts of liberalism provided the ideal 
ideological support for the development of the modes of 'public 
service' regulation and provision that developed through the 
bureaucratisation of working class demands. In order to demonstrate 
the contradictory determination of 'public service' it is therefore 
necessary to trace the abstract premises of Fabian social theory. 
24, a, Fabian Social Theory and the Problem of 
Labour. 
Fabian Socialism is premised explicitly on marginalist economics 
and liberal social theory. The emergence of marginalist economics 
reflected a concern to defend the liberal order against the combined 
threat of trade unionism, working class agitation and social reform 
towards the end of the 19th Century. Marginalism replaced the 
classical cost theory of value with a subjectivist theory of value 
that removed questions of distribution from the domain of economics, 
and reformulated the rationality of capitalism in terms of its 
allocative efficiency as a system for the provision of human needs. 
The 'problem of order' was redefined as 'the problem of reconciling 
the efficiency of capitalist relations of production and exchange with 
the equity of capitalist relations of distribution' (Clarke, 1991b: 9). 
The abstraction of the property-owning individual from capitalist 
social relations was premised on the irresolvable contradiction 
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between the formal rationality and substantive irrationality of 
capitalism: for Fabian socialists, the contradiction could be resolved 
through the transformation of private into state property (Clarke, 
ibid. 178) - the development of municipal enterppr-isa 
The development of working class agitation and politics in the 
early 1890s left Fabian Socialism with the 'problem' of rationalising 
the industrial struggle associated with New Unionism. The 
relationship between Fabian social theory and trade unionism is 
ambiguous and to some extent contradictory (Melitz, 1959: 554-560). 
The Fabians accepted the liberal definition of the state as the 
agency of ultimate sovereignty and the embodiment of legitimate 
coercion. The state was the most representative agency in society as 
it represented every individual, and therefore social change and 
development should only be effected by the state following the 
agreement of individual citizens expressed through the ballot box. 
Trade union methods premised on potential coercion, extra 
parliamentary action and the elevation of the narrow interests of 
labour over the wider interests of consumers and citizens were 
problematic. Fabians accepted the theory of wages developed by John 
Cairnes, which argued that trade unions could not affect general wage 
levels, and that the actions of organised workers could only be at 
the expense of their unorganised and less fortunate colleagues. 
The explosion of labour activity associated with New Unionism 
forced a reappraisal of the Fabian attitude towards trade unions, and 
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throughout the 1890s the Fabians adopted an increasingly pro-trade 
union position. The theoretical differences between Fabian socialism 
and. trade unionism were tackled by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 
Industrial Democracy (1920). Collective bargaining was reconciled with 
neo-classical economic theory on the basis of Alfred Marshall's 
'higgling and bargaining' theory of wage determination. Trade unions 
were reconciled with political liberalism through the focus on the 
increasingly democratic orientations and practices of trade unions: 
internally, through their representative structures and externally, 
through their function of sensitising society to the grievances and 
claims of the labouring class. The Webbs retained a very narrow view 
on the role and functions of trade unions, and this was reflected in 
the Fabian model of Gas and Water Socialism. 
The political strategy of the Fabian Society was premised upon 
the rejection of Marx's theory of value, and the development of a 
critique of capitalist society within the theoretical confines of the 
theory of marginal utility developed by Stanley Jevons. Fabian 
political strategy was premised upon the permeation of existing 
bourgeois political institutions - particularly local government and 
the Liberal Party. This position was most clearly set out in the 
Fabian Essays in Socialism published in 1889. In these essays Gas and 
Water Socialism emerged as a central theme. George Bernard Shaw 
developed the Devonian theory of value in order to assert the social 
origins of wealth; reversing the conclusions of neo-classical 
economics from its own premises. This allowed municipalism to be 
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directly equated with socialism: Sidney Webb arguing that the public 
policy of the Liberal Party in London and Birmingham represented 
important victories for socialism. 
The main concern of the Fabian socialists was the integration of 
labour within the democratic mechanisms of the state: to resolve the 
struggle over the state form on the basis of labour through the 
representation of individual labourers as abstract citizen-consumers. 
The Fabian model of public ownership was essentially a strategy of 
class compromise: the working class were to be given rights as 
citizen-consumers within the democratic mechanisms of the municipal 
state and the workplace, while the abstraction of labour was 
maintained at the level of the labour process. This was reflected in 
the Fabian model of public ownership. 
The Fabian conceptualisation of public ownership was explored by 
Annie Besant in the Fabian Essay entitled Industry Under Socialism. 
Besant argued for the development of the co-operative organisation of 
industry under the initiatives of the newly formed county councils 
and established town councils - the 'municipalisation of industry'. 
The 'great' industries were already being trustified by capitalists 
and would eventually be taken over by the state. 'Small' industries, 
such as the gas and water industries, would be managed locally by 
committees of the local council. The Fabians did not recommend major 
changes in the management structures of enterprises taken into state 
ownership. In Industrial Democracy (1897), the Webbs argued that 
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within state enterprises, policy should be determined by salaried 
officials of the state or municipality, technical management should 
remain with experts, and aspects of working conditions should be put 
in the hands of workers and their union. Workers were to have equal 
rights in the election of municipal and parliamentary representatives, 
but were to have no special or privileged rights as employees. The 
Fabians articulated the centralisation and bureaucratisation inherent 
in the contradictory determination of the municipal state. 
2.4. b. Class Struggle and the 
Bureaucratisation of the Workers' Movement. 
The primary concern of the Fabians was to provide an 
ideological justification for the bureaucratisation of the workers' 
movement. The approach of Sidney and Beatrice Webb was to argue that 
the trade unions had undergone a radical transformation, and as a 
result, the British working class had become thoroughly imbued with 
Fabian statism, constitutionalism and gradualism. The 'success' of New 
Unionism facilitated a shift in socialist strategy towards gradualism 
and constitutionalism. The new approach crushed the 'Revolutionary 
Owenism' that had emerged during the 1880s, and which, through 
publications such as 'Justice' (1883-9), preached the need for a 
collective commonwealth of all workers to effect a 'complete 
international social revolution'. 
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The Webbs presented the integration of working class socialists 
within the institutional mechanisms of the state as important 
advances for socialism. Developments such as the election of John 
Burns to the LCC in January 1889, and Tom Mann's appointment as 
president of the Dockers' Union, persuaded the labour movement of the 
impracticality of accepting the labour theory of value and the 
'inevitability of gradualism'. Mann and Burns left the SDF and 
embarked on the road to bureaucratic, municipal collectivism. The 
rationale of the new collectivist movement was to encourage working 
class socialists to become active, not only in their trade union and 
co-operative movement, but to stand for election in municipal 
elections, and more generally, to use their electoral influence to 
forward practical proposals to advance collectivist and labour 
interests (Webb & Webb, 1965: 412) . 
The Webbs argued that the local government reforms of 1888 and 
1894 enabled socialists to take a more active r81e in local affairs, 
widened the scope of public ownership, and demonstrated the practical 
feasibility of Fabian State Socialism. The most important result of 
New Unionism was that 'revolutionary socialism' ceased to grow, and 
the rival propaganda of constitutional action became the 
characteristic feature of the British Socialist Movement.... The new 
policy... from 1889 onwards, increasingly justified by its success' 
(Webb & Webb, ibid: 412-3). New Unionism represented an important 
advance in social theory and methods; a widening of mental horizons; 
a genuine elevation of the trade union movement facilitated by the 
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enfranchisement of the working class. The great engine of taxation 
was in the hands of the wage earners. The Owenite aim of superseding 
all existing social structures had been obviated by the fact that 
labour could now capture those that already existed. The ultimate 
function of Fabian Socialism was thus to provide the ideological 
legitimation for the development of public service bureaucracy. 
2.5. Summary grad Conclusiorn. 
The contradiction between use-value and value was inherent in 
the municipal state form. The municipal state emerged in order to 
provide the use-values essential to the effective reproduction of 
labour-power as capital. The liberal form of the municipal state 
limited the extent to which it could provide effective use-values, 
and the direct administration of gas and water resources by the 
municipal state resulted in the incorporation of labour; this 
incorporation heightening the contradictions of the municipal state 
form which became manifest through an increasingly serious fiscal 
crisis of the state. The growth of public service bureaucracy and the 
resulting administration by 'experts' was an attempt to solve the 
contradiction, and was ideologically legitimated through the Fabian 
equation of bureaucracy directly with socialism, As I will demonstrate 
in Chapter Three the contradictory determination of 'public service' 
as a management ideology and practice laid the basis for the 
development of the monolithic and centralised 'planner-state' 
regulation of the water industry. In this Chapter I have demonstrated 
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the historical materiality of the contradictions inherent in 'public 
service' as a state form. 
- 115 - 
Notes 
1. Between 1821 and 1831 the population of Manchester, Leeds, 
Bradford, Birmingham, Liverpool and Sheffield increased by 44.9%, 
47.3%, 65.5%, 41.5%, 45.8% & 40.5%. Population increases in large 
cities slowed towards the middle of the 19th Century. However, the 
population of London continued to rise throughout the Century: 
from 1,873,676 in 1841 to 4,232,118 in 1891 (Briggs, op cit: 60, 
86, passim). 
2. The attitude of John Stuart Mill to state intervention in the 19th 
Century water industry is explored by Schwartz (1966: passim). In 
1842 Mill wrote an article in The Examiner that examined a report 
entitled 'Public Agency v. Trading Companies' that had been 
prepared by the Metropolitan Sanitary Association in an attempt to 
agitate for the application of Edwin Chadwick's principles in 
London. The main convergence between Chadwick and Mill was on the 
issue of the social costs of bad sanitation: the way in which bad 
sanitation killed more people than any war, and the way in which 
infectious diseases were major causes of destitution, widowhood 
and orphanage. Indeed, the Report led Mill to modify his theory of 
population: proving that what Malthus called the 'positive checks 
of population' - misery and vice - did not diminish numbers, but 
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simply kept the population in a younger and more sickly state. 
Mill highlighted the 'economy of labour' that would result from 
London being supplied by a single water or gas company under 
state supervision. A discussion of the r6le of J. S. Mill in the 
development of the water industry in London can also be found in 
Gibbon & Bell (1939: 64-5). 
3. The growth of the gas industry in Britain reflected cyclical 
movements of economic activity. The primary periods of growth 
took place in the cyclical economic booms of 1818-25,1831-7 and 
1842-6. See Falkus (1967: 495-6) for a detailed discussion of the 
early development of the gas industry. 
4. In Bristol, the charter of the Bristol Gas Light Company, granted 
in 1819, limited dividends to 10% and stipulated that any surplus 
would be payable to the Commissioners for Public Lighting in aid 
of rates. The Company also agreed to supply the Commissioners 
with gas at a fixed price of £5 per lamp, per year, for a period 
of at least 21 years. See Rabb (op cit. 4-5) for a detailed 
discussion of the conditions under which the Bristol Gas Light 
Company was constituted. 
5. The Gasworks Clauses Act of 1847 limited company dividends to 10%. 
In 1860 the Metropolis Gas Act attempted to eliminate overlapping 
and waste through the concept of 'districting'. Successive gas acts 
- 117- 
from the 1840s controlled the price of gas supplied to private 
consumers and ensured that gas was supplied on demand. The 
'sliding scale' developed from the 1860s directly linked prices and 
dividends in an inverse relationship, while the Gasworks Clauses 
Act of 1871 placed an obligation upon gas undertakings to supply 
consumers on demand. See Williams (1981: 40-4) for an extended 
discussion of 19th Century gas legislation. 
6. In other cities it was more usual for shopkeepers and struggling 
professional men to play a leading role in municipal affairs. The 
main battles usually centred upon finance, and the quality of 
municipal provision was usually determined by the struggle over 
the level of rates and the quality of administrative officials. 
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Chripter ca- ca 
Planning For Freedom'? 
The Contradictions of tI-ie Fabiari 
Planner--State. 
The contradiction between value and use-value that is inherent 
in capitalist production resulted in the municipal state becoming 
increasingly involved in the direct administration of utility services 
throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The contradiction 
appeared at the level of the state as the contradiction between 
regulation and administration, and was heightened by the democratic 
representation of labour within the regulative and administrative 
mechanisms of the municipal state. The contradiction became manifest 
as a severe 'fiscal crisis' of the municipal state and was resolved 
through the development of a public service bureaucracy at the 
municipal level. The bureaucratisation of the workers' movement was 
ideologically legitimated through the discourse of Fabian Socialism 
which equated the development of public service bureaucracy directly 
with socialism. The Fabian discourse of 'public service' was to 
provide the ideological legitimation for the centralised state 
planning that developed through the progressive centralisation and 
concentration of capital; a development that shifted the contradiction 
0 
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between value and use-value to the centre of the state apparatus. 
The planner-state developed through and articulated the contradiction 
between value and use-value (Negri, 1988). 
The planner-state attempted to transcend the contradictions of 
capitalist development by planning the production and consumption of 
use-values whilst maintaining capital accumulation. The planner-state 
integrated labour within the state, and the resulting corporatist 
structures were ideologically legitimated by a Fabian discourse that 
focused on planning for freedom. The contradiction between value and 
use-value was shifted to the level of the state, and the rationality 
of the planner-state was increasingly undermined by its failure to 
transcend the law of money and deliver politically-determined use- 
values. The crisis of the planner-state was perceived as a technical 
problem, and the technocratic and managerialist reforms developed in 
the post-war period increasingly undermined the social democratic 
legitimation of state planning and evoked the internal decomposition 
of the planner-state. In this Chapter I trace the development, crisis 
and decomposition of the planner-state regulation and administration 
of the water industry in Britain; and demonstrate the way in which 
the crisis of the planner-state was resolved through the emergence 
of a neo-liberal project that (re)imposed abstraction on the 
regulation and provision of water services. 
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3.1. The Cizallerige of Labour and 
Development of tl-ie "Plaruzer-State"'. 
The work of the Italian 'autonomist' Toni Negri is useful in 
developing the concept of the planner-state. Negri's analysis is 
limited by his rhetorical approach to the periodisation of capitalist 
development and the 'economism' inherent in his analysis of the state. 
Negri presents 'the state as the plan' in a way that prevents an 
assessment of the contradictory determination of the capitalist state. 
The state is premised on the contradiction between value and use- 
value and is therefore simultaneously the plan and the anti-plan. 
However, the notion of the planner-state developed by Negri does 
provide an excellent basis for theorising the determination of the 
forms of centralised state planning which emerged in the first half 
of the 20th Century. 
The planner-state developed through the contradiction between 
value and use-value, The mediation of concrete through abstract 
labour became increasingly problematic owing to the autonomous 
struggle of the working class. The development of the planner-state 
represented the culmination of a process through which capital 
attempted to contain labour within the abstract order, The initial 
response of capital was violence and repression: externally, through 
the propagation of counter-revolution and internally, through the 
repression of the syndicalist and trade union movements and a 
fundamental refinement in strategies for the extraction of relative 
surplus-value - specifically, the development of mass-assembly 
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production (Fordism) and scientific management (Taylorism). The 
recomposition of the working class on this basis resulted in the 
massification and levelling of the working class and heightened the 
crisis of the liberal state-form. The crises following 1929 resulted 
in the recognition of the autonomy of the working class and 
attempted to harness the dynamic movements of the class to the 
development of capital: a development that required the emergence of 
the state as planner with 'permanent revolution' as its object (Negri, 
op cit: 14). 
The material development of the planner-state was articulated 
through the ideological discourse of Keynesianism. The emergence of 
the working class as a political entity introduced unknown variables 
into the equilibrium model of capitalism developed by neo-classical 
economics and invalidated Say's Law. The expansion of the supply base 
through the 1920s associated with the expansion of relative surplus- 
value failed to call forth its own demand. The build up of an excess 
of supply resulted in a lower level of net investment and reduced the 
marginal efficiency of capital. The uncertainty introduced by the 
autonomous existence of the working class upset the conventions 
linking present and future through investment expectations, The 
Keynesian planner-state was concerned with the emerging technical 
necessity of removing uncertainties and re-establishing economic 
convention. The planner-state emerged in order to undertake the de 
facto elimination of the pathological structural elements of 
capitalist development. The state emerged as 'productive subject' with 
the primary concern of confronting and preventing the depressive 
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moments of the economic cycle: guaranteeing the equivalence of* saving 
and investment in order to eliminate traces of over-investment. 
The theory of effective demand recognised the autonomous 
moment of the working class within and potentially outside capital. 
The dialectic of 'effective demand' attempted to control and contain a 
continual revolution of incomes and investment. The structure of the 
state needed to reflect the impact of the working class: the planner- 
state was a state based on labour. Keynesianism reiterated the 
relationship between monetary and productive capital, or the unity of 
capitalist production as a labour process and a valorisation process. 
Through the re-introduction of the laws of the 'average rate of 
profit' and the 'convergence of real and money wages', the relation of 
money capital disappeared and the law of value was able to regulate 
social development on the basis of the 'common good'. 
The Keynesian planner-state was ultimately premised on a 
utopian notion of capital: the illusory communism of capital (Negri, 
ibid., 32). The planner-state was utopian and illusory as the state is 
unable to overcome the contradiction between value and use-value 
through which it developed and on which it is constituted. The 
administrative and planning mechanisms associated with the planner- 
state developed in the attempt to contain labour within the abstract 
order. The integration of concrete labour within the state heightened 
the contradiction on which the planner-state was premised, and the 
planner-state was increasingly unable to ensure the production of 
either use-values or values. In Britain, the Fabians collapsed the 
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contradiction between value and use-value and presented the 
development of the planner-state as progressive and socialistic. The 
crisis of the planner-state was conceptualised as a technical problem 
that would be resolved through the application of science and 
technology to the regulatory and administrative mechanisms of the 
state. The Fabian technocratic-planner-state was determined therefore 
through the contradictions of Keynesianism. 
3.2. Rationalisation and the 
DevQlopment of tine Teciznocratic 
Fabian State. 
The technocratic-state was a moment of the planner-state and 
was premised on the application of science and technology to the 
contradictions of capitalist development. In capitalist society science 
and technology confirm the autocracy of capital and are powers 
inimical to labour through their confirmation of the real subsumption 
of labour to capital (Marx, 1954: 410; 1976: 1024) 117. The emergence 
of the technocratic-state was a response to the emergence of labour 
as an autonomous political subject; an attempt to socialise the 
development and refinement of mechanisms for the planning, 
coordination and production of relative surplus-value, During the 
1920s and 1930s in Britain, the main dynamic for the development of 
the technocratic-state was the 'rationalisation movement': 
representatives of capital concerned with the inability of competition 
to ensure the necessary restructuring of capital, and the need for 
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the Government and the banks to sponsor rationalisation in order to 
eliminate excess capacity, introduce advanced methods of production 
and increase investment on the basis of increased cooperation between 
capital and labour (Clarke, 1988: 230). The technocratic-state 
regulation of the water industry developed through the limitations of 
the central regulation-municipal administration configuration that 
developed during the 19th Century. 
3.2, a. The Limitations of Munic ipal ism: The 
Rationalisation and Centralisation of the 
Inter-War Water Industry. 
The main dynamic to the development of the water industry in 
the first half of the 20th Century was the concern of the state with 
respect to the uncoordinated and piecemeal operations of small ad hoc 
authorities. Undertakers operated either through special acts of 
Parliament based on the 1847 Waterworks Clauses Act that laid out 
sources and limits of supply, the nature and site of works and 
maximum prices and dividends (in the case of SWCs), or operated under 
the general powers of the Public Health Acts. The rapid urbanisation 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries forced municipal 
corporations to augment supplies from increasingly remote sources: 
Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham procuring supplies from 106,68, 
and 74 miles respectively. The result of these ad hoc developments 
was often overlapping and wasteful absurdities such as the 
competitive pumping of sources and the duplication of trunk mains 
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from remote sources. The undertakers that undertook extensions of 
supply were required to make a fresh application to Parliament in 
order to extend or modify their powers. The central state lacked both 
the powers and the knowledge to undertake long-term planning or to 
devise or enforce alternative and improved methods of supply, and 
could apply only restrictive and negative mechanisms of control. 
The overlapping and waste of ad hoc development became an 
increasing concern of the state. In 1923 an Advisory Committee on 
Water constituted by representatives of undertakers was established 
within the Ministry of Health in order to make recommendations on 
changes in water law and practice. This was complemented in 1924 
when the Ministry of Health started to encourage the formation of 
'Regional Advisory Water Committees' on which the interests of 
undertakers, county councils and the Ministry of Health were 
represented. It was however the unprecedented drought of 1934 that 
highlighted the limitations of the ad hoc development and fragmented 
nature of the water industry. The 1934 Water Supplies (Exceptional 
Shortage Orders) Act gave the Minister (temporary) powers to abolish 
or modify limitations on abstraction and supply and to force 
undertakers to supply other undertakers. The 1934 Rural Water 
Supplies Act facilitated the provision of exchequer grants for the 
extension of rural supplies that had previously been obstructed by 
the prohibitive costs of distribution. The 1934 Supply of Water in 
Bulk Act allowed the transfer of bulk supplies between undertakers 
with the consent of the Minister of Health. In 1935 the 'Inland Water 
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Survey' was established in order to collect and collate records on 
underground and surface water resources. 
The 1934 drought also resulted in the reconstitution of the 
Advisory Water Committee as the Central Advisory Water Committee 
[CAWCI on which the interests of all aspects of water were 
represented. Following its inception in 1937, the CAWC published a 
series of reports that were to be fundamental in shaping the reforms 
associated with the 1945 Water Act. The reports were concerned with 
the development of new mechanisms of water planning, the 
simplification of procedures by which undertakers could obtain 
additional powers, the supply of water for industry and the 
development of new river boards to take over the functions of land 
drainage, the prevention of pollution and the management of fisheries 
from existing local authorities and ad hoc bodies. In mapping out the 
'defects in the present system' the 1944 White Paper A National Water 
Policy HMSO, 1944) was concerned primarily with the vague and ill- 
defined responsibilities and powers of both central government and 
local undertakers; the multiplicity of undertakers; the lack of 
detailed information on water resources; the lack of a legal 
obligation on undertakers to supply water for non-domestic 
(industrial) purposes; and the inadequacy of rural supplies. 
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3.2. b. The 1945 Water Act as the Apotheosis of 
the Fabian Water Industry. 
The 1944 White Paper laid out the objectives and principles of 
a 'national water policy': viz, 'to make the best and most economical 
use of the nation's water resources..... allocation of resources must 
conform with a planned water economy and be based on informed 
estimates of needs'. This required the development of efficient means 
of collecting and using information relating to water resources and 
the development of effective mechanisms to apply this information. 
The Fabian planner-state regulation of water was to be premised on 
three general principles; principles that formed the basis of the 
1945 Water Act, viz: 
1. Central control: the prevention of haphazard and 
wasteful development. 
2. Democratic control: the responsibility for the 
administration of water resources to be placed 
with the Minister responsible to Parliament at the 
centre and elected local authorities at the 
periphery. 
3. Common good: Sectional interests subordinated to 
the national interest and the development of 
mechanisms to permit the political mediation of 
conflict GIMSO, ibid. 7). 
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The 1945 Water Act was designed to rationalise the provision of 
water in Britain. The Act gave the Minister responsibility for 
promoting the conservation and proper use of water resources and to 
secure the effective execution by water undertakers, under their 
control and discretion, of a national policy relating to water. The 
Act required water undertakers to procure adequate supplies in order 
to provide a wholesome and continuous supply, and where supplies 
were sufficient to make water available for those other purposes, 
such as industry and trade, on which the life and prosperity of the 
community depended. The Act facilitated the development of tariff 
scales that permitted the 'cross-subsidisation' of rural water and 
sewerage services. The Act established machinery designed to 
rationalise the industry with respect to the number of operating 
units; including the granting of compulsory powers to the Minister in 
order to enforce the merging of groups of small undertakers. The Act 
finally reconstituted the CAWC on a statutory basis with enhanced 
powers that enabled it to make representations to ministers on any 
questions within its terms of reference. 
3.2. c. Rationalisation, Planning and the 
Origins of Fabian Technocracy. 
The development of the technocratic state was rationalised by 
the left on the basis of Soviet planning, and the 'rationalisation 
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movement' found its political obverse in the 'planning movement'. The 
'planning movement' was dominated by 'radical' scientists such as 
Hyman Levy, PMS Blackett and JBS Haldane, The main vehicle of the 
radical scientists was the National Union of Scientific Workers 
(renamed the Association of Scientific Workers [AScW] in 1927). The 
leadership of the union consistently argued for the harnessing of 
science and technology for socialism. Capitalist society was unable to 
realize the full benefits of science and technology, and the 'planning 
movement' became increasingly concerned with the application of 
science through socialist planning: the maximisation of the production 
of use-values allowing the alleviation of unemployment and poverty. 
The radical scientists correctly highlighted the way in which 
capitalist social relations limit the production of use-values and 
allow social needs to be subordinated to the production of surplus- 
value. The radical scientists did not however problematise the form 
and function of science and technology in capitalist society, and this 
allowed the project of the radical scientists to be incorporated 
within the project of Fabian idealism. 
The most important dynamic in the development of scientific 
planning by the state was the practical necessity for the state to 
employ science and scientists in the war effort. The scientific 
functions undertaken by the state did not however challenge 
traditional patterns of ownership and control, and most of the 
scientific planning frameworks were dismantled following the end of 
the war (Steward and Wield, 1984: 185). The development of the 
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planner-state from the late 1940s resulted in the left in the AScW 
being increasingly marginalised in both the labour movement and the 
scientific institutions of the state. The orientation of the radical 
scientists was appropriated by the Fabian vision of a technocratic 
planner-state, and radical scientists such as JD Bernal and 
PMS Blackett were among the members of the Labour Party's 'science 
group', headed in the early 1960s by Richard Crossman, which was to 
provide the ideological backdrop for Harold Wilson's call to 'forge a 
new socialist Britain in the white heat of the scientific and 
technological revolution'. 
The Keynesian notion of 'common good' was amenable to 
incorporation within Fabian ideology and political discourse: the 
rupture of the liberal state-form facilitating the development of Gas 
and Water Socialism within the institutional mechanisms of the 
national state. The planner-state facilitated the political 
determination of use-values through mechanisms of centralised 
planning and coordination: the planner-state as public servant. The 
development of the planner-state as public servant can be traced 
through the work of GDH Cole: the marked changes in Cole's theory of 
the state illustrating the essential idealism of Fabian social theory 
and the redefinition and reinterpretation of 'public service' on the 
basis of a rationalisation of the progressive movement of capital. 
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3.3. Fabian Socialism and the 
Plarirner-State as "Public Servant". 
The main problem in assessing the development of Fabian state 
theory arises from the absence of a coherent or systematic Fabian 
paradigm. The conceptual premises of Fabianism are eclectic and 
essentially pragmatic: Utilitarian Liberalism, Hegelian Idealism, 
Christianity and Marxism-Leninism have all contributed towards the 
construction of a nebulous and logically inconsistent Fabian paradigm. 
There are a number of unifying elements that give an external 
coherence to Fabianism as a conceptual paradigm: total commitment to 
parliamentary democracy, unequivocal support for the welfare state, 
and an idealist interpretation of history by which socialism is seen 
as advancing and surpassing capitalism owing to the moral superiority 
of the socialist values of equality, freedom and fellowship (George & 
Wilding, 1985: 69-70). As I will demonstrate, however, Fabian 
Socialism is further unified by a total commitment to the notion of 
the state as public servant and this had important implications with 
respect to the legitimation of the centralised and bureaucratic 
planner-state as progressive and inherently socialistic. 
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3.3. a. Guild Socialism and the Democratic 
Determination of Production and Consumption. 
The work of GDH Cole between 1917 and 1944 illustrates both 
the idealism of Fabian state theory and the way in which this 
resulted in the ideological legitimation of the planner-state. Prior 
to WW1 the Left in Britain had become increasingly polarised between 
the syndicalism of the SDF and ILP and the technocratic statism of 
Fabian Socialism: the diametrically opposed models of Gas and Water 
Socialism developed by the syndicalists and Fabians being premised on 
the interests of producers and consumers respectively. The work of 
Cole represents an attempt to mediate the conflict between producers 
and consumers on the basis of a pluralistic and democratic socialism. 
The changing forms of democratic mediation expounded by Cole, 
however, underline the idealist nature of Fabian social theory: from 
the direct democratic control of production and consumption by labour 
within the municipal state to 'nationalisation' where consumption was 
to be determined democratically and production coordinated and 
controlled by the state on the basis of the 'common good'. 
The central concern of Cole's thought in the late 1910s was 
with workers' control and the mechanisms through which this could be 
achieved in contemporary capitalist society; the latter concern 
leading to Cole being the major exponent of 'Guild Socialism' [2]. The 
Fabian focus on distribution and a corresponding neglect of 
production led to Cole's initial rejection of Fabianism. In the context 
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of an incipient anarcho-syndicalism, Cole evoked the Romanticism of 
John Ruskin, William Morris, Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton in 
order to rail against a Fabian socialism that had 'forgotten the need 
to make the workplace the arena of joyful creativity, or to erect 
bulwarks against the development of servility and bureaucracy' 
(Wright, 1976: 24). 
The demand for 'workers control' was an objective trend to which 
Cole gave theoretical and practical expression (Cole, 1972); Cole 
attempting to develop a theory of democracy, citizenship and 
consumerism that was premised quite clearly on the labour theory of 
value (Cole, 1980: 18-19). The core of Cole's argument was that the 
tension between associated producers and associated consumers was 
soluble via democratic institutional mechanisms (Cole, ibid: 78-95). 
The capitalist value-form could be mediated politically; a principle 
that was later to underpin the modus operand. i of the planner-state. 
In 1919 democratic mediation was to be premised on the direct 
democracy of workers as producers and consumers. The abolition of 
class inequality was to be achieved by transferring the power of 
capital to self-governing associations (guilds) of producers. Cole's 
interest in the mediaeval guilds was premised upon the way in which 
their operation spanned the public/private dualism; a feature that 
offered a potential political configuration that would avoid both the 
egoism of capitalism and the collectivism of state socialism. 
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The guilds offered a model of associative production that was 
at once individual: the private (self) regulation of production in the 
context of public (social) responsibility to consumers. Guilds would 
be organised on the basis of 'function', and this offered a framework 
for the simultaneous differentiation and unification of interests: the 
private action of producers being functional for the whole of society. 
Guild society would be premised on an equitable balance of interests 
between producers and consumers: the development of a 'civic spirit' 
ensuring that producers were socially responsible and constrained by 
the social meanings of their decisions and actions. 
The 'Civic Spirit' highlights the relationship between Cole and 
the liberal state theory of Rousseau (Vernon, 1980: xvi-xxi). Cole 
argued that Rousseau's dichotomy between state and civil society was 
incidental to the major thrust of the Social Contract. The General 
Will ' (did) not reside merely in..... that complex of formal 
institutions which we call the state (but in) the whole life of the 
community'. Rousseau was a theorist of the 'social tie' concerned with 
the state as a 'complex of institutions' that embraced the 
public/private realm (Cole, 1973: xxi). This interpretation of Rousseau 
[3] provides the backdrop to Cole's theoretical schema: viz an 
attempt to fuse modes of association premised upon functional 
differentiation and participatory democracy. In contrast to Rousseau, 
who argued that the state was required as an antedote to 
'specialisation', Cole argued that it is in the performance of specific 
functions that the General Will finds its essential expression. This 
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led Cole to develop a theory of democracy that deviated markedly 
from classical jurisprudence: Cole advocating the extension of 
democracy into industry in order to release the creative impulses and 
'civic spirit' stifled by capitalism (Cole, 1980: 115-6). 
In Guild Socialism Restated (1920) Cole developed an argument 
for workers control, and attempted to specify the institutional 
mechanisms that would be required in order to extend citizenship into 
industry. Liberal democracy was in practice meaningless as voting 
could not alter the vital distinction between master and wage-slave 
and the material inequalities this implied. The basic principle of 
democracy was that the 'will of one cannot be substituted for the 
will of many'; that democracy can only be truly real when it is 
premised on function and purpose True representation was functional 
representation, and there needed to be as many elected groups in 
society as there were essential functions. The concept of functional 
democracy allowed Cole to address the tension between the interests 
of producers and consumers. The Fabians and the cooperative movement 
subordinated the interests of producers to those of consumers, while 
the trade unions subordinated the interests of consumers to those of 
producers. Guild Socialism was concerned with the interests of both 
producers and consumers, although the exercise of control by 
producers and consumers was premised upon different meanings of 
'control' and was to be exercised through different institutional 
mechanisms. 
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The control of production was related to the internal conditions 
of industry; the freedom (self-management) of workers by hand or by 
brain. The control of consumption was related to the quantity, quality 
and price of the products of industry. Production and consumption 
corresponded to two sets of interests that were related yet distinct: 
the whole body of producers constituting the whole body of consumers 
arranged in a different formation. The two interests could be 
mediated by functional democracy. The community would place self- 
governing producers on trust (by their honour) to produce goods and 
services, while simultaneously developing institutional mechanisms 
that represented and safeguarded the interests of consumers. 
Consumption was differentiated on the basis of goods that were 
either individually or collectively consumed, and these differentiated 
interests were to be functionally regulated by the various bodies 
that had spontaneously emerged from the movement of the working 
class. The trade unions, the cooperative movement and municipal 
corporations would regulate production, individual consumption and 
collective consumption respectively. 
In his outline of a future Guild Society, Cole envisaged the 
development of a series of institutional mechanisms that would 
replace the law of value by the democratic coordination of organised 
supply and organised demand. This mechanism would rescue producers 
from servility, while enabling and extending the freedom and autonomy 
of individuals. The 'sovereignty' of the consumer would not extend to 
the management of industry or the conduct of labour. The efficient 
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operation of industry was to be left to the guilds; guild labourers 
freed from the crippling servility of capitalist social relations 
being left 'on their honour' to provide willing and communal service 
The r81e of associated consumers was primarily 'complementary' rather 
than antagonistic; to articulate and define the needs and desires of 
consumers and to expect producers to be willing and eager to respond. 
In 1920, therefore, 'public service' was to be premised on the 
autonomy of the working class as producers and consumers outside 
capital. 
3.3. b. Capitalist Rationalisation and Fabian 
Idealism: From Workers' Control to Stalinist 
Central Planning. 
The contrast between the earlier writings of GDH Cole (Cole, 
1920,1972,1980) and the later writings (Cole, 1943) illustrates both 
the essentially idealist nature of Fabian socialism and the influence 
of Stalinism (41. In the context of marked changes in the historical 
materiality of capitalist state and civil society, Cole's conception of 
the state and socialism fundamentally changed between 1920 and 1943: 
from workers' self-government to centralised state planning and 
control (Cole, ibid. 32-3). The case for socialism still rested upon 
the ethics of social justice and human fraternity, on the inherent 
human desire to serve fellow human beings; but, while this still 
formed the fundamental premise of state intervention, the public 
service state had been moved to a higher level of structuration, and 
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the autonomy of workers as producers and consumers had disappeared 
under the juggernaut of the planner-state. 
During the inter-war period Cole increasingly advocated 
centralised bureaucratic planning as the desired model for British 
socialism (Cole, 1943: 30-51; 1950: passim). Socialism needed to be 
constructed within the emergent 'framework of hugeness'. Monopolists 
and oligopolists stood condemned because they failed to serve the 
public well. Capitalism stood condemned because the fundamental 
contradiction between value and use-value resulted in under- 
production and unemployment. The planner-state was a mechanism with 
the capacity to organize human society for the good of all in 
accordance with the fundamental ideals of socialism. 
Socialist planning worked in the Soviet Union where 
unemployment had been abolished allowing an expansion in the 
production of use-values to the limits of the productive power of the 
economy. The Soviet system had transcended the law of value and the 
development of systematic collective planning would enable the law of 
value to be transcended in Britain. Comprehensive war-time planning 
had partially suspended the law of value and illustrated to small 
employers, managers and technicians the practicality, and indeed the 
technical desirability, of an alternative economic system premised on 
Keynesian economics and centralised and bureaucratic planning (Cole, 
ibid. 30-51). The 'public service' state would resolve the 
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contradiction between value and use-value and produce an abundance 
of use-values for its citizens. 
The emergent hegemony of the consumer in Cole's work can be 
illustrated through an examination of Cole's prescriptive work that 
set out the model of nationalisation he envisaged following a post- 
war victory by the Labour Party (Cole, 1943: passim). The nationalised 
industries were to be subject to the general directives of a 
'planning commission': a non-executive body of managers and 
technicians that would be responsible to Parliament. This commission 
would also represent the interests of workers in an industry. Workers 
would become 'partners' with management through the establishment of 
'works councils'; bodies separate from trade unions that would 
exercise management functions in partnership with management 
technicians. Managers and technicians were to be left free in day-to- 
day administrative matters from the 'political interference' of 
planning authorities. The removal of the profit motive would enable 
(wo)man to fulfil her instinctive desire to serve her fellows, and 
this would ensure the optimum production and distribution of use- 
values. The social determination of needs were to be set politically 
by Parliament and the necessary use-values delivered by autonomous 
technical experts. 
The choice facing Britain in 1943 was whether the huge 
concentrations of capital, that would ultimately result in a form of 
unitary control, would be controlled by irresponsible monopolists or 
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subjected to democratic collective planning: a choice between 
socialism or fascism (Cole, ibid: 39). Socialism had to be centrally 
planned or it would fail, and it would fail because it would be 
unable to deliver the use-values that would deliver an adequate 
standard of living to the people. Through the 'socialisation' of key 
industries and top-down collective state planning, Fabian socialism 
would at once solve the central contradiction of capitalism, and 
demonstrate the moral superiority of socialism. Cole cited with 
admiration the system of planning developed within the Soviet Union. 
The Five Year Plan facilitated the firm control of 'key' industries 
and services by which their output was planned on the basis of a 
collective conception of needs. In Britain democratic planning was to 
be constructed with the freedom of individual 'consumers' safeguarded 
by Parliament and the 'price system' - the state and the (mediated) 
law of money (Cole, ibid: 45; 1950: 89). 
The work of Cole epitomised the political nat'vete of Fabian 
Socialism, but more fundamentally, Cole demonstrated the intellectual 
and political convergence of Fabian Socialism and Keynesian 
Liberalism. The work of Cole remained trapped within the utopian 
conceptualisation of state and capital articulated by Keynesianism. 
The idealist conceptualisation of the Fabian state was ultimately 
premised upon a technologically deterministic interpretation of social 
development. The British economy had failed to deliver the use-values 
commensurate with popular needs owing to the irrationality and 
incompetence of capitalist oligopolists and monopolists. The planner- 
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state would facilitate the political determination of needs and 
establish the rational planning and productive mechanisms necessary 
to produce the required use-values. The contradiction between value 
and use-value was a technical problem that was to be solved through 
the political application of the socialist values of equality, freedom 
and fellowship. 
The development of the planner-state marked the apotheosis of 
Gas and Water Socialism. The planner-state had, however, not resolved 
the contradiction between value and use-value, but had shifted the 
contradiction to the centre of the institutional mechanisms of the 
state: labour subordinated within the institutional mechanisms of the 
state to a socialised law of money. The problem of abstraction was to 
be become the primary function of the state. The Keynesian Post-War 
Settlement was simultaneously, therefore, the apotheosis and the 
crisis of the planner-state. I will now explore the way in which 
post-war Fabians perceived the crisis of the state in terms of 
technical limitations in the mechanisms for the production and 
distribution of use-values that would be resolved through the 
systematic application of science and technology. Technocracy however 
undermined the democratic rationality of the planner-state and the 
deepening contradictions were to form the basis for the emergence of 
the neo-liberal state in the 1980s. 
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3.4. -rll4EB Crisis of tl-i4B Plarnner- 
State and tine Rise of Fabiarz 
Technocracy. 
Fabian social theory rationalised the election victory of the 
Labour Party in 1945 as the transcendence of the capitalist value- 
form. Keynes had destroyed the economic argument for socialism, and 
only the 'political' and 'moral' arguments for socialism remained. The 
monolithic and bureaucratic planner-state was Gas and Water Socialism 
par excellence. The Fabians collapsed the contradiction between value 
and use-value, and equated the rationalisation and centralisation 
associated with the planner-state directly with socialist development. 
The Fabians were, however, left with the awkward task of explaining 
and legitimating the inequalities in power and resources that marked 
the immediate post-war period. These inequalities were articulated by 
an increasingly serious 'fiscal crisis' of the state, by which the 
ability of the state to satisfy social needs was increasingly 
constrained by prohibitive costs. Fabian socialists presented the 
crisis of the planner-state as a technical problem that would be 
resolved through the application of science and technology. The 
debate within Fabianism focused on the way in which science and 
technology were to be applied and controlled by the planner-state. 
The Liberal Fabian Richard Crossman argued for the partial re- 
integration of labour through the co-determination 
(mitbestimmungsrecht) of technological development; the actions of 
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industrialists and state technocrats mediated by works councils and 
ministers responsible to Parliament. The Technocratic Fabianism of 
Anthony Crosland articulated the internal decomposition of the 
planner-state, and argued for the application of quasi-market 
managerialism and technical rationality to the institutions of the 
state. The state had become an autonomous political entity and the 
main issue had become focused on whether the technocratic functions 
of the state were to be exercised in a progressive or reactionary 
way; an issue resolved into whether Parliament was controlled by the 
Labour Party or the Conservative Party. Crosland articulated the 
irrationality of the planner-state, and following the election victory 
of the Labour Party in 1964, the technocracy of Crosland was 
incorporated into Harold Wilson's vision for the forging of a 
socialist Britain through the 'white heat of the scientific and 
technological revolution'. 
The tension between the liberal and technocratic moments of 
Fabianism was reflected in the debate between Crossman and Crosland, 
and articulated different responses to the contradiction between 
value and use-value on which the Fabian planner-state was premised. 
Grossman and Crosland were both ultimately concerned with the 
problem of abstraction. Crossman was concerned with the democratic 
representation of labour within the abstract order, while Crosland 
was directly concerned with the application of capitalist 
managerialism to the crisis of the technocratic planner-state. 
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3.4. a. Planning For Freedom? Richard Crossman 
and the Integration of Labour Within the 
Technocratic Planner-State. 
The debate between Crossman and Crosland during the 1950s was 
premised on the form of control that would allow the technocratic 
state to be harnessed for socialism. Richard Crossman argued for the 
democratisation of the technocratic-state. Powerful technocrats were 
to be made accountable to workers' councils and Parliament. The 
essence of Crossman's argument was that while Keynes had undermined 
the 'economic' arguments for socialism, the appalling waste of human 
and natural resources and the gross injustices that continued 
unabated in the 'new capitalism', left the 'political' and 'moral' case 
for socialism undiminished. Waste and injustice would be eliminated 
through the extension of political democracy to the economic sphere. 
The main feature of the immediate post-war phase of capitalist 
development was the emergence of an irresponsible and unaccountable 
managerial oligarchy in the public and private sectors of industry. 
The problem for socialists was to enlarge individual freedom by 
making oligopolists the servants rather than the masters of the 
nation; a socialist strategy that was to extend freedom by planning 
for freedom (Crossman, 1956: 63-5). 
The large-scale nature of primary and utility industries 
provided the economic rationale for the extension of public 
ownership; a development that would simultaneously curb oligopoly and 
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increase efficiency. The argument for socialism was premised on both 
the economic argument that it would increase productivity and 
therefore living standards, and the political argument that socialist 
planning would provide a defence of personal freedom and 
responsibility in an increasingly managerial society. The planning 
Leviathan was a necessary evil, and this highlighted the importance 
of ensuring that government departments and nationalised industries 
were brought under effective democratic control. 
Nationalisation did not ensure the responsiveness of industries 
to the community. Crossman alluded to the ineffectiveness of 
Consumers' Councils, and claimed that the only effective defence for 
consumers was through their elected representatives in local and 
central government. Consumption needed to be mediated by the 
planner-state in order to ensure its mediated abstraction and this 
introduced the problem of Labour into Crossman's schema. Crossman was 
primarily concerned to defend and extend the 'political' and 'economic' 
rights of labour within the abstract order. As a consequence, 
socialism was presented as a project that would make economic power 
responsive to the community (consumers) and to workers in particular 
industries (producers). Labour would be co-opted within the 
mechanisms of the planner-state and produce use-values to the level 
of social need as defined by central and municipal democratic 
agencies of the state. 
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The co-option of labour was unproblematical for Grossman owing 
to his contention that labour had already won the class war 
(Grossman, Ibid. - 67-70). The balance of class forces had been reduced 
to a technical problem that could be mediated and redressed through 
the democratic institutions of Parliament. The economic wing of the 
labour movement was now superfluous in the struggle for socialism; 
the power of labour exercised through the trade unions being an 
element of the technical problem that was to be mediated through 
democratic planning. There was a serious tension between the 
sectional interests represented by trade unions and the national 
interest represented by a Labour Government. Trade unions occupied a 
powerful if not essential place in the modern mixed economy; holding 
a level of bargaining power at least as powerful as the managerial 
class. Trade union leaders were an important locus of economic power, 
and for Grossman it was a first principle of socialism that those who 
hold economic power must be held responsible to the elected 
representatives of the people. 
The inefficiency and inequality that were manifestations of the 
crisis of the planner-state were resolved into a technical problem 
that would be solved through the democratic control of technology: a 
problem premised on the lack of planning mechanisms to coordinate 
the increasingly centralised and socialised nature of production. 
Crossman argued that the massive growth in state intervention and 
planning during the post-war period was a necessary corollary of the 
increasingly rapid development of science and technology. The 
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increasing rapidity of technological change was detonating a social 
explosion in an unplanned society. The consequences of this social 
explosion had added a new scientific case to the traditional moral 
and political case for socialist planning. New technologies and 
scientific discoveries were having disasterous consequences on an 
unplanned society that was unwilling and unprepared to receive them. 
The problem would be resolved through the development of planning 
mechanisms that would make it possible to be 'the masters, not the 
slaves of technological change' (Grossman, ibid. 139-40). 
The development of a technocratic state required fundamental 
constitutional and administrative reforms that would bring scientists, 
technologists and other experts into the centre of the British 
establishment: Scientists in Whitehall as Crossman entitled a Fabian 
lecture delivered in 1963 (Crossman, ibid: 141-3). The pace of 
technological change facing Britain in the early 1960s necessitated 
the development and scientific application of a system of indicative 
planning similar to that applied during the Second World War. This 
required an interchange of personnel between the universities, 
industry and Whitehall which would facilitate the solving of social 
problems through the appointment of committees of relevant experts. 
However, the crisis of the technocratic/planner state was not a 
crisis of the uncoordinated nature of production and distribution, but 
a crisis premised on the contradiction between value and use-value. 
The 'white heat' of Harold Wilson's revolution was not premised on 
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the democratic idealism of Crossman, but the technocracy of Anthony 
Crosland: Crosland advocating the introduction of managerialism and 
market proxies into the institutional mechanisms of the state in an 
attempt to counteract the emergent fiscal crisis of the planner- 
state. 
3.4. b. Fabianism and the Crisis of the 
Planner-State: Anthony Crosland and the 
Development of "Managerialism". 
The internal decomposition of the Fabian planner-state was 
articulated by the technocratic Fabianism of Anthony Crosland. The 
way in which Crosland legitimated the re-application of the 
(mediated) law of money to the state on the basis of socialist 
development was through his argument that the shift from laissez- 
faire to the state control associated with the Keynesian Welfare 
State (KWSJ had resulted in a society qualitatively distinct from both 
capitalism and socialism - statism (Crosland, 1952). Statism rendered 
the traditional tenets of socialist (Marxist) theory irrelevant, The 
increasing strength of socialist parties and trade unions made it 
increasingly difficult for any political party to win elections 
without promising to reform the worst excesses of liberal capitalism. 
The self-confidence of the capitalist class had been drained by the 
deflation and stagnation of the 1930s, and in the context of the 
centralisation of production and the separation of ownership and 
control, the concerns of the business classes had shifted from an 
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ideological defence of the market and the absolute rights of 
property, to a technical concern with how to maintain profits and 
technical efficiency. 
The essence of statism was the transformation of the structure 
and function of the state that had been wrought by a fundamental 
shift in the locus of economic and social power. The separation of 
ownership and control had made the socialisation of production 
unnecessary. With the growth in joint stock companies, individual 
property rights were no longer the essential locus of economic and 
social power. Power had been transferred to salaried managers and 
executives. As a consequence, the pursuit of higher dividends had 
become a less important impetus to expansion, and the employing class 
had become far less hostile to the state and far more likely to co- 
operate with Government economic and industrial policy. The state had 
developed into an 'independent intermediate power, dominating the 
economic life of the country', and a fundamental feature of capitalism 
had disappeared: viz, the absolute autonomy of economic life 
(Crosland, ibid: 39). 
The emergence of the state as an increasingly powerful and 
independent force dominating the economic sphere of society was an 
inevitable feature of post-capitalist society. The expansion in the 
level of spending on social services demanded by progressive forces 
in order to remove the insecurity and inequality of laissez-faire and 
to encourage social harmony required a vast increase in the marginal 
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rate of tax paid by the rich. Furthermore, the political 
unacceptability of unemployment following the experience of the 
1930s, and the development by Keynes of effective technical 
mechanisms to maintain aggregate demand and aggregate supply at full 
employment levels, required the state to maintain demand via 
progressive fiscal measures that transferred income from savings to 
consumption through an increase in the level and spread of welfare 
benefits and an increase in social investment. The dominant 
ideological discourse had become concerned with the duties of the 
state and how the duties of the state were to be financed. The crisis 
of the planner-state led Crosland to the problem of labour; but in 
contrast to Crossman, the crisis was to be resolved through the 
direct (unmediated) intensification and repression of labour by the 
state. 
The discourse of statism allowed Crosland to present the 
(re)imposition of abstraction as progressive. While statism did not 
constitute socialism, it did mark an important advance for socialists. 
The constitution of statism had transformed the socialist agenda, and 
the main issue had become the problem of inequality. The statist 
society of the 1950s remained blighted by marked inequalities in the 
areas of education, access to the professions, and living standards. 
These problems would be solved by increasing the efficiency of the 
economy. The central problem and inspiration for the left was the 
organisation and structure of industry (Crosland, ibid: 65). The 
problems of industry were premised on production rather than 
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consumption. The weakness of the price mechanism had been resolved 
through the development of competition policies in the private sector 
and effective pricing policies in the nationalised sector. The problem 
of industry was the problem of labour: specifically, 'industrial 
relations psychology and the general tone and atmosphere in industry' 
- the irrationality of labour. Statism had increased the bargaining 
position of the worker without either increasing her social status or 
curing the class hostility emanating from her exclusion from rights 
and participation. 
The work of Crosland articulated and rationalised the internal 
decomposition of the planner-state, and the problem of labour became 
an increasing concern of the state during the 1960s and 1970s: 
specifically, the need to reduce unofficial stoppages and to link 
wage-increases to increases in productivity [5] (Nyman, 1989: 203-12). 
The problem of labour also found concrete expression in the 
managerialisation of the state sector during the early 1970s. The 
Fabians had assimilated and developed the utopian conceptualisation 
of capital articulated by Keynesianism, and rationalised the 
oppressive and repressive edifice of the planner-state as a part of 
the progressive and harmonious movement towards socialism. The 
socialistic and democratic legitimation of the planner-state was 
increasingly undermined by the technocratic and bureaucratic reforms 
developed in response to the contradictions of the planner-state. 
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The planner-state was actually determined through the movement 
of the contradiction between value and use-value to the centre of 
the state apparatus. The Fabian ideology of the planner-state as 
progressive was increasingly undermined by the state maintenance of 
abstraction in the context of increasing working class demands for 
use-values. The state attempted to contain the emergent 'fiscal' 
crisis through the further rationalisation of production, and this 
formed the material basis of the Fabian technocracy of the post-war 
period. The generalisation of the crisis during the 1960s and 1970s 
heightened the contradictions within the state and the resulting 
managerialisation ruptured the democratic logic of the planner-state 
from within, and laid the basis for the neo-liberal project of re- 
establishing the autonomous social power of money. 
3.5. Ti-ze Fiscal 
P] rirz r--State 
'"MrincLger1 1isat iori" 
Sndust ry. 
Crisis of t11 e 
and t I-IC3 
of tia43 Water 
The fiscal crisis of the state was manifested through the 
increasing inability of the water industry to deliver the use-values 
commensurate with actual and projected levels of population growth 
and industrial development during the post-war period. The growth of 
the industry had been on the basis of ad hoc and piecemeal reforms 
that had attempted to impose centralised coordination and control on 
the (democratic) municipal provision of water services: reforms that 
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had resulted in institutional paralysis as neither central nor 
municipal authorities had been able to raise the finance that would 
allow the effective coordination and operation of the industry. While 
the management of the post-war water industry was indeed marked by 
an increasingly technocratic and systematic approach to the 
augmentation and conservation of water resources, the divergence of 
interests at different stages of the 'water cycle' and the increasing 
need to control the public sector borrowing requirement [PSBR] 
undermined the operational effectiveness of the industry. This 
institutional paralysis provided the context for the managerialisation 
of the water industry in 1973. 
3.5. a. The Contradictions of Fabian Planning 
and the Rationalisation of the Post-War Water 
Industry. 
The crisis of planner-state regulation of water was perceived 
as a technical problem emanating from the fragmentary nature of the 
industry. The problem of fragmentation of the water industry and the 
diversity of interests concerned with water regulation, had been a 
concern of successive governments throughout the post-war period. 
Prior to the 1973 reorganisation, the water sector comprised the 
following diversity of interests: 198 statutory water undertakers, 
1300 sewerage authorities, 29 river authorities, local authorities, 
the Water Resources Board, the British Waterways Board, the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, industrial companies, agriculturalists 
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and water amenity groups. The diversity of interests and the number 
of undertakers clearly illustrated the failure of the explicit policy 
set out in the 1944 White Paper A National Water Policy (HMSO, 1944),. 
and incorporated within the 1945 Water Act. With regard to water 
supply, the paper was concerned with the way in which the number of 
statutory undertakings inhibited the promotion of major capital 
projects and the employment of expert staff. 
The 1945 Water Act established machinery in order to facilitate 
the re-grouping of water supply undertakings on the basis of larger 
'water areas' that had been specified by the Department of the 
Environment's Engineering Inspectorate on the basis of 'hydrological 
integration'. The process resulted in the number of undertakers being 
reduced to 198 by 1971. These comprised local authorities, joint 
boards and SWCs. Sewerage and sewage disposal authorities also 
remained fragmented. In 1971 there were 1300 county borough and 
county district councils operating under the 1936 Public Health Act. 
The problem with respect to the design and development of major 
sewerage schemes was that they were constrained by natural 
watersheds that seldom coincided with local authority boundaries. In 
order to prevent the gross pollution of rivers from such a 
fragmented system, ministers had powers under the 1936 Public Health 
Act (as amended and strengthened by the 1951 Rivers [Prevention of 
Pollution] Act) to create joint boards; although this power had seldom 
been used, and the majority of the joint boards existing in 1971 were 
created before 1914. 
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The 1945 Water Act failed to provide an effective mechanism for 
the planning of water resources. The need for such a system was 
highlighted by the Report of the Proudman Committee that was 
established by the CAWC in 1955 in order to consider anticipated 
increases in the demand for water and the problems associated with 
meeting expected increases in demand. The Committee reported in 1962, 
and projected that on the basis of an increase in demand of 2.4% per 
year between 1955 and 1960, the demand for water would double by 
2000. Moreover, rainfall was heaviest in the North and West of 
England and in Wales and demand was projected to grow most rapidly 
in South and East England. The projected increase in demand therefore 
required the development and conservation of existing resources and 
the movement of water over long distances. The recommendations of 
the Committee for 'comprehensive new authorities' to manage the 
overall resources of a river basin and the need for a national water 
policy were incorporated within the 1963 Water Resources Act with 
respect to the creation of 29 hydrologically-based river authorities 
and the Water Resources Board EWRB]. 
The WRB was established in order to provide a national agency 
for the collection of data, research and planning, and was intended to 
act as an advisory body to river authorities and the Government. The 
members of the board were appointed on the basis of their scientific 
expertise in the field of sanitary engineering or chemistry, and were 
expected to provide technical assistance in the area of the 
development of major hydrometric schemes. The WRB undertook a series 
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of influential hydrological surveys which highlighted the need to 
plan water resources over increasingly large areas (Water Resources 
Board, 1973a). With data supplied by river authorities and water 
undertakers, the WRB undertook a survey of the projected resource 
requirements of England and Wales that highlighted the increasing 
need to undertake major hydrological projects such as the transfer of 
water between river basins, the regulation of river flows and a 
series of complex and expensive capital projects in South East 
England and Lincolnshire - most notably a plan to build a huge tidal 
barrage across The Wash. 
The 1963 Water Resources Act was an explicit attempt to develop 
a more systematic and technically efficient framework for planning 
water resources. The new river authorities were based on natural 
watersheds, and were given responsibility for land drainage, 
fisheries, the control of pollution and water conservation. The 
majority of the members of the new river authorities were however 
representatives of local government - who were also concerned with 
the cheap disposal of sewage effluent. The function of controlling 
pollution had been taken from the 'inefficient' local authorities by 
the 1948 River Board Act, and successive legislation had given river 
boards the power to impose increasingly rigorous 'consents'. The 1960 
Clean Rivers [Estuaries and Tidal] Act gave river authorities the 
power to control all significant new discharges into estuaries, and 
the Secretary of State had the power to make orders under the Rivers 
! Prevention of Pollution] Acts concerning existing discharges. Given 
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the make-up of the river authorities, the increasingly rigorous 
consents were not exercised in any meaningful way, and no orders or 
consents were issued for any of the major estuaries in the post-war 
period. 
The perceived failure of the 1963 reforms resulted in the CAWC 
being re-convened in September 1969 in order to consider 'how in the 
light of..... technological and other developments the functions 
relating to water conservation, management of water resources, water 
supply, sewerage, sewage disposal and the prevention of pollution..... 
can best be organised' (Department of the Environment, 1971: 1) 161. 
The Committee reflected the conflict between competing users of 
water resources at different stages of the water cycle, and in 
particular the conflict between organisations with an interest in 
augmenting public water supplies in order to meet anticipated 
increased demand for drinking water and organisations with an 
interest in using water resources as an industrial raw material or as 
a conduit for the disposal of sewage and industrial waste. 
The political context of the reorganisation of the water 
industry in 1973 was the publication of an influential report by the 
Royal Commission on Local Government in England (the Redcliffe-Maud 
Report). The Report argued that water services should remain the 
responsibility of local authorities, but it was widely felt among 
ministers and senior civil servants that Redcliffe-Maud had failed to 
give sufficient consideration to the technical issues that had been 
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highlighted by the CAWC sub-committee on The Growing Demand for 
Water (the Proudman Committee). In 1962 Proudman reported that on 
the basis of projected trends, the demand for water was likely to 
double by 2000, and that given the diversity of interests involved in 
the management of water resources, the increased demand would not be 
met without the development of an overall system of planning. The 
1971 Report by the CAWC highlighted the way in which Government 
'loan sanctions' had effectively blocked the 'consents' that required 
the construction of new sewerage works. The report resulted in the 
1973 Water Act which attempted to re-impose (mediated) abstraction 
on the water industry through managerialism 
3.5. b. Institutional Paralysis, Technical 
Rationalisation and the Origins of 
"Managerialism". 
The 1973 Water Act removed water services from the control of 
elected municipal authorities and facilitated the development of more 
technical and bureaucratic mechanisms of interest mediation and 
planning based on integrated river basin management by large multi- 
function regional water authorities [RWAs3. The CAWC report was 
central to the genesis of the 1973 Act as it provided the scientific 
and technological justification for managerialism, and legitimated the 
removal of water and sewerage services from local democratic 
accountability and control. A series of reports by the WRB had 
highlighted to both senior civil servants within the Ministry for 
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Housing and Local Government [MHLG] and water industry professionals, 
the importance of developing an efficient framework for resource 
planning and capital investment. Contrary to Redcliffe-Maud, the 
senior civil servants at the MHLG had developed the opinion that 
managerialism rather than participation was the most effective mode 
of regulation for water: a working party of civil servants reported 
in 1969 that water services were a technological matter with little 
scope for democratic participation (Jordon et al., 1977: 325). The 
Report of the CAWC and the subsequent 1973 Water Act was to reflect 
these concerns with planning and finance 
The 1971 CAWC Report highlighted the extent to which the 
projected increase in the demand for water was likely to increase the 
importance of water quality: that is, that projected increases in 
demand would be most efficiently met through the extensive and 
systematic re-use of water resources. Traditional upland sources were 
becoming increasingly difficult to exploit: economically, as the costs 
of transportation had become increasingly prohibitive; politically, as 
'public opinion' had become increasingly hostile to the siting of 
reservoirs in areas of outstanding natural beauty. In order to meet 
anticipated increases in demand resources for water supply, water 
would increasingly have to be drawn form the lower reaches of rivers 
which involved the re-use of diluted sewage effluent as drinking 
water. The CAWC outlined several obstacles to the successful 
development of an integrated system of planning for water resources. 
The problem of augmenting raw water supplies of suitable quality, 
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quantity and cost was perceived as an administrative rather than a 
technical problem. 
The most serious administrative problem resulted from the 
conflict of interest associated with the procurement of new resources 
for water supply. A serious rigidity in the regulatory framework 
resulted from the clauses of local acts that restricted the transfer 
of resources between undertakers. Furthermore, while the 1945 Water 
Act obliged water undertakers, inter alte, to procure adequate 
supplies in order to provide a wholesome and continuous supply for 
domestic purpose, the 1963 Water Resources Act also obliged 
undertakers to obtain a licence to abstract water from the relevant 
river authority who were given a duty to take actions for 
'conserving, redistributing..... or augmenting water resources in their 
area'. While river authorities needed to have regard to the duty of 
undertakers to provide water for domestic purposes, there was a 
strain between the conservation interests of the river authority and 
the financial and quality concerns of the undertakers. 
The fragmented nature of the water industry inhibited the 
effective application of the joint and national hydrometric schemes 
that had been developed by the WRB. Schemes involved more than one 
authority, and given the way in which costs and benefits would 
necessarily apply to the river basin as a whole, and the way in which 
the balance of costs and benefits might change at some future date, 
the apportionment of costs between authorities and agencies was 
-161- 
highly complex and increasingly problematic. The conflict of interest 
was particularly acute between sewerage authorities discharging 
effluent into a river and water supply undertakers wanting to 
abstract water for drinking water farther down stream. Higher 
expenditure on sewerage treatment would only benefit authorities and 
agencies farther downstream. In the River Trent Basin the upper 
reaches of the river is a conduit for the disposal of sewage and 
other effluent from Stoke-on-Trent, Birmingham (via the River Tame) 
and Leicester (via the River Sour). The WRB were concerned with 
projected shortages of water in the North Nottinghamshire area of the 
basin that would only be met by using the lower reaches of the River 
Trent as a source of drinking water. The WRB developed an 
econometric model to achieve the rational apportionment of costs and 
benefits for the basin as a whole (Water Resources Board, 1973b: 1- 
6>. 
The conclusion of the 1971 CAWC Report was that these 
conflicts, and others involving land-use and the siting of industry in 
catchment areas, could only be effectively mediated through the 
development of effective and comprehensive mechanisms of planning. 
Water management was a problem for, and a benefit to, the whole 
river basin, and what was needed was a framework that would allow 
the equation of costs and benefits in naturally determined 
hydrological areas. The CAWC argued that a comprehensive 'water 
management plan' should be developed for every river basin, and that 
this required fundamental organisational and financial reforms to the 
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existing regulatory framework. The Report recommended that the water 
industry should be restructured in order to facilitate effective 
coordination and planning: specifically, mechanisms that would 
facilitate coordination between national plans and priorities and the 
implementation of plans and policies at regional level by newly 
created regional water authorities [RWAs]. 
The RWAs were to be responsible for the development of 'Action 
Plans' that would establish the short and medium term priorities vis 
ä vis the implementation of a 'National Plan'. The 'Action Plan' would 
specify the amount of finance (aggregate value) that Central 
Government had decided to commit to projects in the regions. This 
amount was to be calculated on the basis of the projected future 
demand for water and the current state of the economy. In addition to 
the development of Action Plans, the RWAs were to develop long-term 
'Regional Plans' that would project and interpolate the National Plan 
with future Action Plans on the basis of the projected growth in 
population and industrial activity. The CAWC, however, stressed the 
enduring 'public service' conception of water services: that provision 
should adapt in accordance with other factors and authorities 
(Department of the Environment, op cit: 45) 
In order to facilitate effective planning the CAWC argued that 
the RWAs should fulfil the following criteria. First, RWAs should be 
organised on the basis of function, and therefore based on a river 
basin or group of river basins. Second, RWAs should be reasonably 
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self-sufficient for resources in order to keep bulk transfers to a 
minimum. Third, RWAs should be large enough to attract and retain 
staff of sufficient expertise and calibre to enable the efficient 
undertaking of planning and operational functions. In essence, the 
CAWC recommended that the RWAs should be the smallest areas that 
satisfied the criteria for effective planning, and the CAWC 
recommendation of 10 was subsequently incorporated into the 1973 
Water Act. 
Senior civil servants in the MHLG and the DoE had a firm 
commitment to multi-function RWAs prior to the Report of the CAWC 
(Jordon et al. op cit: 318-320; Tordon & Richardson, 1977: 45). The 
legitimacy of the Report and the resulting reorganisation, however, 
was dependent on wide consultation and participation, and many of the 
members of the CAWC represented entrenched and powerful local 
government interests opposed to the removal of water services from 
municipal authorities. The Report was necessarily inconclusive with 
respect to the regulatory framework of the future water industry: 
outlining two alternative models based on either multi-purpose 
authorities with both planning and operational functions or a 
regulatory planning body with operational functions being undertaken 
by single-purpose operational agencies. The power of senior state 
personnel resulted in the former model being adopted; but not without 
important concessions that were to have a fundamental impact on the 
operational effectiveness of the post-1973 industry. 
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3. S. c. The 1 973 Water Act and the 
Contradictory Determination of 
"Managerialism". 
The 1973 Water Act restructured the water industry on the basis 
of 'Integrated River Basin Management' by which ten new RWAs were 
made responsible for all aspects of the water cycle within their 
naturally determined hydrological areas. The RWAs took over the 
assets of local authorities, joint boards and river authorities, and 
were to act as public utilities operating within commercial criteria 
and financial objectives laid down by the Secretary of State. In order 
that the new RWAs would be able to efficiently manage the 
anticipated capital investment programme, the 1973 Act laid the basis 
for the development of charging systems that enabled the full value 
of water resources to be realised: in particular, the Act laid the 
basis for the development of 'investment appraisal' mechanisms in 
order to prevent 'over investment'. The economic and financial 
objectives of the new RWAs were: 
1. The development of charging systems which ensure 
that the demand for services (and hence 
investment) is not exaggerated by the supply of 
services at prices which are too low in relation 
to the value of the resources used. Charges should 
not- be seen as a way of getting the necessary 
revenue and allocating the cost fairly among 
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different users of the service, but to ensure the 
optimum use of available resources by making 
users aware of the cost of supplying the water 
which they use. The best way of ensuring this is 
to relate the charge for the water used directly 
to the cost of that water. To develop the 
metering of domestic properties - while having 
due regard to the balance between 'economic' 
benefits and the 'social' costs to public health. 
2. The development of techniques of investment 
appraisal which ensure that demand is met in the 
most efficient way with due regard to the timing 
of investment. 
3. To ensure that revenue is sufficient to balance 
recurrent expenditure over a period of years. Like 
the nationalised industries, the RWAs will require 
target rates of return on capital (Department of 
the Environment, 1973: 31). 
The entrenched power of local authority representatives on the 
CAWC resulted in a series of concessions and compromises, and the 
post-1973 water industry deviated from the model envisaged by the 
CAWC in several fundamental ways. The CAWC Report envisaged an 
organisational structure that comprised a chairman appointed by the 
Secretary of State on the basis of his (sic) proven ability in guiding 
complex organisations and a board of 10 to 15 appointed by the 
- 166 - 
Secretary of State on the basis of technical expertise or membership 
of major local authorities. The majority of the members appointed to 
the RWA boards were local government nominees, and rather than the 
small boards envisaged by the CAWC, large and cumbersome boards of 
up to 50 members were established. Furthermore, the maintenance of 
sewage distribution systems remained with local authorities who were 
to act as the agents of the RWAs (Jordon et al, op cit. 330-1). The 
enduring strength of labour prevented exclusion, but in the context 
of managerialisation, the representation of labour within the state 
had become essentially meaningless. The emerging weakness of labour 
was manifested by the Government's refusal to follow the 
recommendations of the CAWC and develop a 'national water authority': 
planning functions being retained within government departments, 
while the National Water Council [NWC] was established in order to 
provide a consultative and advisory body at national level. 
The reforms of the 1970s resulted in the manq&erlalisa Lion of 
the water industry. The industry was removed from local 
democratically elected bodies in order to resolve the crisis through 
rational planning and administration. The existing regulatory 
framework was considered inadequate with respect to the coordination 
and financing of the massive programme of capital investment that 
was considered necessary in order to meet anticipated increases in 
the demand for water. The crisis was resolved through the 
development of 'integrated river basin management' that would focus 
on the re-use of existing resources rather than developing more 
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costly new resources: an attempt to solve the fiscal crisis of the 
state through technical and scientific planning. 
The focus shifted from a concern with water quantity to a 
concern with water quality. It did so, however, in an attempt to re- 
apply the law of money through the regulation of the production of 
use-values through a mediated law of value. Managerialisation was 
legitimated on the basis of 'public service', and the increasingly 
strict financial targets imposed on the water industry further 
inhibited the effective production of use-values and further 
undermined the rationality of the planner-state. This provided the 
basis for the development and legitimation of the neo-liberal state. 
3.6. Tl-ie Contradictions of 
'1Mcxncxg4ari3L3_ism"" grid t11 "Fiscal 
Crisis" of tii4Et State. 
Managerialisation removed the water industry from democratic 
control and subjected the industry to bureaucratic rationality. The 
fiscal crisis of the state was to be resolved through the 
bureaucratic and technocratic reform of the regulatory and 
administrative mechanisms of the state. The planner-state was 
premised on the political-democratic determination of use-values. The 
removal of democratic control implied the removal of the rational 
basis for decisions on finance- Managerialism precipitated heightened 
- 168 - 
levels of fiscal Inflation and increasingly stringent bureaucratic 
controls on finance in order to ameliorate the fiscal crisis of the 
state. The contradictions of managerialism resulted in serious cuts 
in public spending and the managerialist water industry became 
increasingly unable to produce either values or use-values. The 
bureaucratic control associated with managerialism did however 
facilitate the (re)imposition of (mediated) abstraction on the 
mechanisms through which water services were produced and consumed. 
3.6. a. The Contradictions of "Managerial ism" 
and the Re-imposition of the "Law of Money". 
The managerialisation of the water industry associated with 
crisis of the public service planner-state was marked by an 
increasing concern to re-impose the law of money on the regulative 
mechanisms of the water industry. During the period following 1973 
the reforms were marked by the introduction of increasingly rigorous 
financial controls over the RWAs. Between 1974 and 1983 the RWAs 
were subject to a system of controls through capital allocations, and 
in 1983 these controls were tightened through the introduction of 
External Finance Limits [EFLs] which limited the amount of external 
finance that RWAs were permitted to procure per annum l7I. EFLs 
contained an inbuilt tendency for entitlements to be underspent as 
the RWAs needed to pay due regard to the way in which changes in 
the financial climate could increase borrowing requirements and 
result in the EFL being overshot. In 1982/3 these controls resulted 
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in a capital allocation for the water industry in England and Wales 
being under-utilised by £193M: only £219M of a total EFL of £412M 
being utilised (National Water Council, 1983: 19). The overall impact 
of this measure was to reduce both the borrowing and capital 
investment of water authorities during the early to mid-80s. 
The RWAs were subjected to further financial controls through 
the development of 'financial targets'. In 1981 the Government 
announced that RWAs should be earning a rate of return on the net 
value of their assets of at least 1.25% by 1983/84 (Water Authorities 
[Return on Assets] Order 1981). By 1986 this figure had been 
increased to 1.95% -a near doubling of water industry profitability 
in five years. The main mechanism by which this was achieved was 
through the introduction of 'performance aims': a Government imposed 
target for 'efficiency' improvement in order to ensure that financial 
targets were not met simply through the introduction of higher 
charges or reductions in service. The introduction of 'current cost 
accounting' in line with the above Order, in place of 'historic cost 
accounting' which was the traditional method of accounting in the 
public sector, reduced the levels of profitability by taking into 
account the cost of renewing assets at current prices. 
The re-imposition of the law of money required fundamental 
changes to the institutional structure of the water industry: most 
fundamentally, the marginalisation or exclusion of labour at the 
micro and macro levels of the industry. The appointment of 
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sympathetic people to the boards of nationalised industries has been 
central to the neo-liberal project of 'Thatcherism' (Gamble, 1988: 
103-4): this facilitating the 'de-politicisation' of the state sector, 
and the breaking of the micro-corporatist structures associated with 
the KWS [8]. In the Water industry the boards of the RWAs were 
increasingly constituted by businessmen, accountants and supporters 
of the neo-liberal project of 'Thatcherism'. Within the management 
structures of the RWAs, entrepreneurial skills became increasingly 
important and engineers were increasingly replaced by accountants and 
professional managers (Severn Trent Water, 1986: 31-2; 1987: 28-9; 
1988: 28-31; 1989: 6-9). The 1983 Water Act resulted in the abolition 
of local authority and trade union representation on the boards of 
water authorities and the abolition of the macro-corporatist 
arrangements associated with the NWC. 
3.6. b. The Contradictions of "Managerial ism" 
and the Re-imposition of the "Law of Labour". 
In capitalist society the production of commodities is 
simultaneously a labour process and a valorisation process. The 
reimposition of the law of money required the recommodification of 
labour, and undermining the power of organized labour has thus been 
a central feature of the neo-liberal project (Gamble, 1979: 15-7). The 
1983 Water Act coincided with a serious confrontation between the 
state and organised labour in the water industry. The dispute 
demonstrated the extent to which labour in the state sector 
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presented an important obstacle to neo-liberal restructuring. The 
1983 waterworkers' strike involved a claim by manual workers for a 
pay settlement that would restore their earnings to the 'upper 
quartile' of manual worker earnings. The claim was rejected on the 
grounds that such an increase could not be conceded without 
commensurate increases in productivity, and that comparisons with the 
gas and electricity industry were unfair given the higher levels of 
skilled workers in these industries. 
The NWC played a key r81e in the dispute [9]: providing a 
'national focus for information'; setting out the employers' case in 
the national press; arranging media briefings; coordinating a national 
campaign to conserve supplies; and commissioning an opinion poll of 
the attitudes of the 'general public' in order to augment the 
argument of the employers that their offer should be accepted 
(National Water Council, op cit. 25). The abolition of the NWC by the 
1983 Water Act weakened the structures of national collective 
bargaining and devolved most meaningful issues to individual RWA. 
National negotiating mechanisms were subsequently abolished with the 
privatisation of the water industry in 1989 [10]. 
The development of managerialism resolved the crisis of the 
planner-state through the exclusion of labour from the institutional 
mechanisms of the state and the re-imposition of the law of money. 
The culmination of this process was the 1989 Water Act which 
transferred the RWAs into the private sector and established OFWAT 
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as the neo-liberal state regulator. The planner-state had been 
legitimated on the basis of 'public service' and this allowed the neo- 
liberal project to be similarly legitimated on the basis of 'public 
service' to the (abstract) consumer. The dynamic of managerialism 
facilitated the re-imposition of the logic of capital, and the neo- 
liberal restructuring of the water industry has resulted in the 
reconstitution of water-capital on a national and international scale. 
Managerialism constituted a transitional form of state regulation 
that developed through the contradictions of the planner-state, and 
which articulated a dynamic inherent in Fabian social theory: 
managerialism constituting an attempt to resolve the fiscal crisis of 
the state through the application of capitalist rationality to the 
institutional mechanisms of the state. Managerialism facilitated 
therefore the reconvergence of the state and capital 
3,6, c, "Managerial ism" and the Recrudescence 
of "Water Capital". 
The neo-liberal restructuring and privatisation of the water 
industry has facilitated the development of a major programme of 
capital spending. In 1990 the projected investment programme for the 
water industry to 2000 was £28B including capital spending in excess 
of £2.5B in each of the years 1991 to 1994. These levels of capital 
spending involved at least a doubling of capital spending for all the 
companies following privatisation (OFWAT, 1991: 15). Managerialism 
created large efficient entities capable of operating as capital in 
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the context of surplus capital looking for investment. The 
restructuring and privatisation of industries such as water has had a 
significant impact on UK and international capital markets, and 
utilities are becoming an increasingly important sector of the UK 
stock market. In 1987/8, it would have represented 8.5% of turnover, 
13.7% of pre-tax profit and 18.57. of quoted UK PLC; ranking second 
only to the oil industry with regard to turnover and pre-tax profit 
(£42B and £6.3B), and having the largest operating capital of any 
sector (L47.5B). The UK Water Industry employed operating capital of 
£8.4B in the year to March 1988; ranking the industry alongside 
medium-sized sectors such as conglomerates and electronics. 
There are important international perspectives to the neo- 
liberal restructuring of the water industry in Britain: the Morgan 
Stanley Index ranking utilities as the largest non-financial sector 
with 6.3% of global capitalisation (Buchanan and Clapham, 1988: 1,12- 
4). Two large French multi-nationals, Generale des Eaux and Lyonnaise 
des Eaux have increasingly constituted a growing international water 
sector. These companies have interests in over 150 companies world- 
wide; including 50% of General Waterworks Corporation, the USA's 
second largest operator, and Saudi Arabia's water and waste system. 
These companies have launched joint ventures with large UK multi- 
nationals such as : lohn Laing and Trafalgar House; accruing large 
stakes in the UK's statutory water companies [SWCs], and by 1989 
French multi-nationals owned 12 out of the 29 SWCs and had 
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substantial interests in a further six (Financial Weekly, 30-11-88; 
Financial Times, 04-11-89). 
3.7. Summclry arid Coriclusiori. 
The analysis of the development and crisis of the planner 
water-state has important implications with respect to the debate 
concerning the origins and nature of the neo-liberal project 
associated with 'monetarism' or 'Thatcherism'. The most influential 
'Marxist' analyses have presented neo-liberal state projects in terms 
of external responses to economic crisis from projects constructed 
and legitimated at the political (Gamble, 1988; Jessop et al., 1988) 
and ideological (Hall, 1983,1988) levels of reality. The crisis of the 
planner-state regulation of water illustrates the weakness and 
inadequacy of these approaches. The crisis of the planner-state was a 
crisis of the capital relation: the planner-state decomposed from 
within owing to the simultaneous decomposition of the economic, 
political and ideological rationality on which it was premised. The 
crisis of the planner-state water industry was ultimately a moment 
in a wider and more fundamental crisis of 'over-accumulation' that 
resulted from the contradictory determination of capitalist 
development on a global scale (Clarke, op cit! 287-341). 
The planner-state was ideologically legitimated through the 
discourse of 'public service'. The idealism of Fabian Socialism 
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resulted in a series of state forms, with different implications for 
the determination of labour, all being legitimated on the basis of 
'public service'. The contradictory interests of producers and 
consumers could not be resolved within the institutional mechanisms 
of the planner-state, and the neo-liberal industry emerged in order 
to reconstitute the industry on the basis of the utility-maximising 
customer of neo-liberal economic theory: the (re)subordination of 
use-value to value, The legacy of Fabianism has allowed the re- 
domination of the water industry by capital to be legitimated and 
articulated through a discourse of 'public service'. The theoretical 
premise of public service has shifted from Fabian Socialism to the 
neo-liberal economic theory expounded by representatives of the New 
Right. This has been manifested politically through John Major's 
Citizen's Charter. In Chapter Four I explore the way in which the 
contradictions of the planner-state laid the ideological foundations 
for the emergence of neo-liberal forms of state regulation premised 
on the re-imposition of the water industry to the law of money - the 
law of money as public service. 
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Not Ea s 
1. The extent to which autonomy from capital necessitates the 
development of alternative forms of science and technology is 
discussed in Cleaver (1992), Dickson (1974) and Illich (1973). The 
'Lucas Plan' was a concrete manifestation of working class 
struggle premised on the development of alternative technology. 
For a discussion of the Lucas Plan see Cooley (1988) and 
Wainwright & Elliot (1982). 
2. Guild Socialism was centred around the National Guilds League and 
a monthly journal entitled The Guildsman. In addition to GDH Cole 
the main exponents of Guild Socialism were Bertrand Russell, 
RH Tawney, SG Hobson, AJ Plenty and AR Orage. The most important 
examples of Guild Socialist literature are listed in Cole (1980: 
217-8). 
3. The theoretical validity of Cole's interpretation of Rousseau is 
beyond the scope of my discussion here. An assessment of this 
issue is presented in Vernon (op ctt: xxi-xxxiv). 
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4. The attitude of Sidney and Beatrice Webb to the Soviet Union also 
illustrates this point. Soviet planning was Gas and Water 
Socialism taken to its logical conclusion. In a letter to Charles 
Sarolea in June 1924 Beatrice Webb wrote 'My Husband and I have 
always been against the Soviet System, and have regarded it as a 
repetition of Russian autocracy based on a creed -a very Eastern 
conception' (Mackenzie, 1978: 207; See also Webb & Webb, 1923: 
161-2, for a discussion of the early Webbian attitude to 
Bolshevism). However, following a trip to the Soviet Union in 1932, 
the failure of the 1924 and 1929 Labour Governments and the 
economic crisis of 1931, Sidney and Beatrice Webb became 
increasingly preoccupied with the Soviet Union as the 'New 
Civilisation' (Webb & Webb, 1937; See also the letters written by 
Beatrice Webb to Harold Laski, HG Wells and RH Tawney between 
November 1941 and July 1942 in Mackenzie, op cit: 452-60). 
5. A detailed analysis of the way in which the 'problem of labour' 
became manifest with respect to industrial disputes in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the response of the state to the crisis 
precipitated by the disputes can be found in Hyman (1989: 26-54, 
196-212). 
6. The composition of the CAWC and the organisations and individuals 
that were consulted by the committee in the preparation of 'The 
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Future Management of Water in England and Wales' are outlined in 
Department of the Environment, 1971). 
7. The imposition of EFLs was common to all nationalised industries. 
See Ferner (1985; 1987) for an assessment of the impact of the 
introduction of EFLs on British Rail. 
8. See Beynon & McMylor (1985) for a discussion of the way changes 
in the organisational structure of the NCB were used to smash the 
micro and macro settlements within the coal industry. 
9. See also Beynon & McMylor Cop cit) for a discussion of the role of 
the NCB in the 1984 Miners' Strike. 
10. See Sheldrake (1991) for an extended discussion of changes in 
water industry collective bargaining. More recent changes in the 
bargaining arrangements within the privatised water companies can 
be found in the Industrial Relations Review and Report (IRS 
Employment Trends: 469, August 1990; 516, Iuly 1992). 
- 179- 
Chapter Fo ur 
Abstrract Citizenship and ti-ie 
Contradictions of tl-ie Neo- 
Liberal State. 
The crisis of the planner-state and the development of neo- 
liberal forms of state regulation has resulted in a marked 
commercialisation of the social relations between public utility 
services and their consumers. Apologists of the Neo-liberal project 
have heralded this as a glorious New Age in which "We're all 
customers now! " (Edgar, 1991). The privatised utilities, with new 
regulatory bodies charged with championing the cause of the consumer, 
have empowered individual consumers at the expense of irresponsive 
bureaucrats and powerful and unrepresentative producer groups. The 
new quantitatively determined contractual relations between public 
services and consumers provides the latter with a marked extension 
of their rights as citizens (Mather, 1991). The new 'consumerism' 
constitutes an important extension to the social rights of 
individuals and therefore provides the basis for the development of a 
new citizenship - abstract citizenship 
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The development of abstract citizenship has allowed a 
redefinition of public service on the basis of neo-liberal social 
theory, and has provided the ideological legitimation for the 
development of neo-liberal forms of state regulation to replace the 
discredited institutional ruins of the planner-state. In this Chapter 
I assess the way in which the new citizenship has impinged on the 
neo-liberal regulation of the water industry. This will provide the 
context for a critical assessment of the way in which the crisis of 
the planner-state and the development of neo-liberal forms of state 
regulation have been rationalised by the post-Marxist and Fabian left 
as 'progressive'. The theoretical convergence between post-Marxism 
and neo-Weberian sociology demonstrates the abstract premises of the 
former and the devastating political implications of incorporating 
'abstract citizenship' within socialist political discourse and 
strategy. I present an alternative assessment of the neo-liberal 
state that posits abstract citizenship historically, in the context of 
the crisis of the planner-state, and logically, with respect to the 
re-imposition of abstraction on the institutional mechanisms of the 
state. 
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4.1. Neo-Liberal TI-Yeory, Citizer Flip 
and the Abstract Regulation of 
Utilities. 
The crisis of the planner-state has resulted in a fundamental 
reinterpretation of the meaning of 'citizenship' on the basis of neo- 
liberal social theory. The theoretical premises of 'public service' 
have shifted from Fabian Socialism to neo-liberal economic theory. 
The liberal revival has been concerned to demonstrate the extent to 
which (abstract) social rights emanate from the operation of property 
rights in regulated markets rather than from (concrete) entitlements 
to welfare state services, This has important implications with 
respect to the regulation of 'public goods' such as water. The 
rationale of the liberal project has been central to the development 
of neo-liberal forms of regulation: bodies such as the National 
Consumer Council [NCCI having been concerned to develop liberal forms 
of utility regulation premised on the interests of the abstract 
marginal maximiser. I will explore the neo-liberal premises of the 
1989 NCC Report In the Absence of Competition: A Consumer View of 
Public Utilities Regulation, the importance of the Report-being in the 
way in which it underpinned the subsequent concrete development of 
the neo-liberal regulation of water in the form of the Office of 
Water Services (OFWAT]. 
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4.1. a. Neo-Liberal Economics and the State: 
the Origins of Abstract Freedom. 
Neo-liberal economics is premised upon a conception of the 
individual as a rational utility-maximising consumer - the 
conceptualisation of social actors as abstract individuals The action 
of calculating utility-maximisers spontaneously and impersonally 
interacting in the market results in both individual liberty and 
economic efficiency: the market allowing individuals to incorporate 
all their consumption behaviour into a personal consumption plan that 
spontaneously produces the optimum allocation of social resources 
(Barry, 1987: 52-3). The denigration of this conception of the 
individual as a consumer provided the primary ideological 
justification for Keynesianism and the plethora of controls and 
regulation over production and consumption that prevented individuals 
being allocated resources that satisfied their own (subjectively 
determined) desires and needs. The primacy of the consumer has been 
central to the recent liberal renaissance: a renaissance concerned 
with demonstrating the necessary relationship between spontaneous 
(ie. unplanned) social development and individual freedom and 
sovereignty. 
The recent resurgence of liberal economics has been premised on 
the increasing importance of the 'logical positivist' school of 
philosophy, and the Humean notion that 'reason' is impotent in the 
construction and justification of political and moral value systems 
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(Weltangschauungen). The liberal analysis is based on 
'consequentialist' rather than 'moral' foundations 11], The Chicago 
School justify liberalism through the positivist method of empirical 
observation. All reasonable men agree that the most important human 
goals should be liberty and prosperity. Empirical observation 
demonstrates the extent to which liberty and prosperity are dependent 
on free markets and limited governments (Friedman, 1982). The public 
interest is constituted by state policies and institutions that 
promote the interests of each individual as an anonymous (abstract) 
member of the public. 
The economic freedom of individuals in the sphere of 
consumption constitutes the direct and most immediate form of 
freedom. Freedom is defined as freedom from coercion - freedom in 
the abstract. In modern society the scale of production results in 
only two forms of economic coordination being feasible: central state 
direction or voluntary cooperation through the market. The political 
coordination of economic affairs is necessarily coercive, Political 
channels of decision-making tend to force conformity as politicians 
are faced with a limited number of yes/no decisions. The market 
constitutes a form of economic proportional representation through 
which the unrestrained decisions of individuals lead to 'unanimity' 
without 'conformity'. The market allows voluntary cooperation between 
private individuals and prevents interference in the affairs of 
individuals through the separation of economic and political power. 
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4,1, b Technical Monopoly and State Regulation: 
From Milton Friedman to the National Consumer 
Council. 
The legitimate functions of the state are extremely limited in a 
'free' society. The state has a legitimate function as rule-maker and 
umpire with respect to maintaining property rights, ensuring that 
freely-entered contracts are enforced and to maintain zero inflation. 
The state has important 'economic' functions with respect to 
countering the effects of 'technical monopoly' and 'neighbourhood 
effects'. Technical monopoly relates to industries and services such 
as water where 'voluntary exchange' would be either exceedingly 
costly or practically impossible; technical and economic efficiency 
being best served by one producer or enterprise delivering the good 
(Friedman, ibid: 28). In the context of technical monopoly there are 
three alternative production/regulation configurations: public 
monopoly, public regulation and private monopoly. Private monopoly is 
the least distasteful of these unpalatable alternatives. In the 
context of rapid technological change the factors leading to technical 
monopoly are likely to be transient and a private monopoly is the 
most likely to be eliminated by technological development. Public 
monopoly or regulation should therefore be organised in a way that 
permits competition: either an industry is a technical monopoly and 
competition will fail or an industry is not a technical monopoly in 
which case the state should not be involved. 
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The logical positivism of the New Right provides an illustration 
and explanation of the way in which the planner-state had failed to 
deliver individual prosperity and freedom. The NCC Report was 
concerned to explore the threat to utility consumers constituted by 
undertakers that did not operate in freely competitive markets. 
Competitive markets ensure that the supplier's goal of maximising 
profits is dependent upon them providing better value for money than 
other suppliers. Competitive markets give considerable power to 
individual consumers and provide incentives for firms to innovate and 
operate efficiently. In a monopoly situation producers have 
considerable power over consumers and can behave in ways that would 
not be acceptable in a competitive market (National Consumer Council, 
op cat: 23). Competition ensures consumer sovereignty and allocative 
efficiency, while monopoly results in allocative inefficiency that is 
manifested in overcharging, low efficiency and poor quality. 
Nevertheless, monopoly may on occasions be advantageous to consumers: 
most notably, the 'equity' related to guaranteed supply and the 
production of 'public goods'. In this context it is important to 
develop state regulatory mechanisms to protect the interests of 
individual consumers. 
The political imperatives of the planner-state had resulted in 
forms of state regulation that undermined the interests of individual 
consumers. The essential nature of utility goods had resulted in 
'equity' being a major element in utility regulation. The utility 
commodities were presented as 'merit goods' that had a 'strategic' 
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r6le at the macro economic level. Utilities were used as instruments 
of social and economic policy. Statutory regulations obliged utilities 
to supply on demand through uniform tariff structures that divorced 
price from production costs (values) via the principle of 'cross- 
subsidisation'. There was a clear distinction between regulation and 
the representation and protection of consumer interests. The form of 
the industries attempted to solve the problem of natural monopoly 
through the development of a framework in which utilities had no 
incentive to abuse their monopoly position. The utility boards were a 
contradictory combination of 'business management' and 'public 
interest' charged with the mediocre objective of 'breaking even' 
(National Consumer Council, ibid: 9-11). 
4.1. c. The Market as the Constitution of 
Freedom and Efficiency. 
The premise that individual liberty and allocative efficiency are 
dependent on limited government and a free market has been central 
to the liberal revival. The Austrian School has attempted to 
demonstrate the 'epistemological absurdity' of a single institution 
such as the state having sufficient economic and social knowledge to 
enable it to 'fine-tune' the economy: state control of the money 
supply resulting in 'cheap money' and 'mal-investments' that move the 
allocation of resources away from the pattern of allocation that 
would most benefit an 'anonymous [abstract] society' (Hayek, 1944, 
1960). The Viginia School of 'public choice' liberals highlight the way 
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liberal democratic processes allow utility-maximising politicians to 
pursue their own rather than the 'public interest'. The micro-economic 
calculus is applied to public life in order to question the extent to 
which political actors behave in a 'public spirited' and benevolent 
way (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The operation of a plurality of 
interest groups in a corporatist framework destroys the interests of 
'anonymous individuals' and vitiates against the public interest 
(Olson, 1965,1982). 
The NCC was concerned with the contradictions and limitations of 
state-man erialism. The theoretical premises of neo-liberal 
economics provided the ideological legitimation for analyses concerned 
to illustrate not only that the planner-state had failed to deliver, 
but that the re-imposition of abstraction provided the only basis for 
freedom and efficiency. The Report argued that the contradiction 
between the development of a range of social and economic policy 
goals for the utilities, and the attempt to develop market-related 
tariff structures was never resolved. Commitment to policies such as 
'cross-subsidisation' led governments to promote monopoly rather than 
to promote competition 
, 
and thereby more truly reflect the 
requirements of consumers. The interests of consumers were 
undermined through the use of the pricing and investment structures 
as instruments of macro-economic policy. The views of 'consumer 
councils' on prices and costs were marginalised by the broader social 
and economic objectives of the state. 
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The planner-state form of the utility industries resulted in the 
exploitation of 'inefficiency opportunities' and the resultant over- 
manning and managerial slack legitimated the 'privatisation' project 
of the New Right. Private ownership would have important advantages 
for consumers as private sector managers would have the positive 
incentive to increase profits and the negative incentives of the 
threat of bankruptcy and takeover that were not present in the public 
sector. Different forms of ownership gave rise to different means and 
objectives for state intervention: private utilities minimising modes 
of intervention that serve the interests of the administration of the 
day at the expense of consumers - such as the promotion of 
uneconomic rural supplies for 'political' exigency rather than for the 
benefit of the (abstract) consumer. 
Neo-liberal theory has been concerned to develop a social theory 
on the individualist postulates of micro-economic theory and the 
postulates of micro-economic theory have provided the modus operandi 
of neo-liberal state regulation. The 'market' is central to this 
project as a result of its individualistic premises. The market has no 
ends or purposes and consequently resources are allocated on the 
basis of subjectively determined values through the competitive 
dynamic of supply and demand. The existence of imperfect competition 
in no way vitiates the efficacy of the market. Competition is not an 
'end state' but a 'process' through which the dynamic and rivalrous 
competition between transactors continually pushes the system 
towards a hypothetical equilibrium (Barry, op cat: 35). The dynamic of 
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competition results in the constant correction of imperfections in 
real-world markets: the dynamic operating in private monopolies 
through the constant threat of potential competition and takeover, 
The public benefit is maximised unintentionally through the 
actions of individual marginal-maximisers pursuing their own self- 
interest. The imperfections of real markets heightens the importance 
of 'property rights' which provide incentives for entrepreneurs to 
create profits through the location of price differences in real 
markets. The state lacks the knowledge that is available to 
decentralised entrepreneurs, and planned systems of provision 
therefore fail to deliver the optimum allocation of resources. Liberal 
social theory is thus premised on the utilitarian notion of 
'unanimity' and is critical of tendencies towards the politicisation 
of economic life. The 'public interest' is derived from the interests 
of autonomous and anonymous (abstract) individuals and (abstract) 
economic freedom constitutes the fundamental basis of social power. 
4.1. d. Property Rights in Regulated Markets: 
The NCC and the Origins of OFWAT. 
The most important consumer issue to arise from the 
privatisation of the utilities was the form of state regulation that 
was to be developed alongside the privatised utilities. The principal 
concern was the development of a regulatory mechanism that would 
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allow the operation of property rights in the water and electricity 
markets, The privatisation programme of the 1980s had treated the 
consumer as a 'residual to other policy considerations', inter alia, 
creating an 'enterprise culture', reducing the power of trade unions, 
and reducing government expenditure (National Consumer Council, op 
cit: 17-20). Consumers were presented as the 'implied beneficiaries'. 
Privatisation had 'normalised' the commodity status of the commodities 
and the resulting increases in efficiency benefitted the consumer 
through lower prices and improved quality. The NCC questioned the 
extent to which a unique 'consumer' interest coterminous with the 
'public interest' actually existed; particularly given the divergence 
of interest between different classes of consumers, viz, the 
divergence of interest between industrial-domestic, present-future, 
and urban-rural customers. 
These divergences highlighted the importance of the development 
of regulatory frameworks that were explicitly premised on the 
interests of 'real' (abstract) consumers. The monopoly status of 
utilities did not allow consumers to 'signal' their wishes through 
their buying power: the power of utilities over their markets giving 
them de facto powers of taxation. These powers provide the raison 
d'@tre for the establishment and operation of utility regulation: the 
role of regulation being to establish a market 'proxy' which would 
protect consumers from excessive prices and poor standards of 
service. Regulation needed to shift the focus from the workers and 
owners of an industry to those that use its products; to shift the 
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locus of social power from producers to consumers (NCC, ibid. 1-2). 
The NCC argued that competition or a suitable proxy was the most 
important element in the future structure and regulation of the 
utility industries. Regulation would only cover the monopolistic 
activities of a utility and the monopoly and competitive sectors of 
an industry would be separated. The effective collation of 
comparative information and the operation of proxy markets 
necessitated the breaking up of large monolithic utilities into a 
large number of small operating companies. 
Regulation required a distinction between the 'public interest' 
and the specific interests of the utility consumers; the regulator 
being unable to safeguard both interests simultaneously (National 
Consumer Council, ibid. - 3-4). Utility regulation required both 
regulatory bodies with clear objectives and considerable expertise of 
the industry, and mechanisms to enforce the public accountability of 
regulatory bodies on the basis of natural justice and common law. The 
latter tunction required executive or judicial powers and would be 
constituted by the Monopoly and Mergers Commission [MMC], which under 
the 1973 Fair Trading Act is required, inter alia, to safeguard the 
'public interest' through the promotion of competition and the 
protection of consumers with respect to purchase and use of goods 
and services. This highlights the abstract nature of neo-liberal 
regulation: the role of the state being premised above all on the 
maintenance of its own liberal premises - the state acting as both a 
form of quasi-market and as the guardian of universal abstraction. 
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The basic function of utility regulation was to ensure that 
monopolists did not charge unduly high prices, provide inappropriate 
levels of service, or operate inefficiently. Regulation was to be 
premised on the protection of the consumer from the 'exploitative' 
effects of a monopolistic market through the development of 
surrogate 'price signals'. Regulation needed to be concerned with both 
price and quality owing to the fact that companies operating in a 
competitive market would lose market share if they attempted to 
raise profit levels by either raising prices or reducing quality vis d 
vis their competitors. Companies would suffer financial penalties if 
they failed to deliver quality standards and the consumer would be 
compensated for any reduction in quality that he (sic) suffered: that 
is, 'compensation should reflect the value of the service forgone' 
(National Consumer Council, Ibid. 5-6). 
The NCC highlighted the deficiencies in the regulatory 
frameworks that had been developed for the gas and 
telecommunications industries; particularly the absence of quality 
controls and the retention of public sector institutional forms. The 
NCC criticism of these frameworks (National Consumer Council, Md. - 
68-90) were incorporated into the 1989 Water Act: manifested 
concretely through the development of OFWAT and the separation of 
the monopoly and competitive operations of the privatised water 
undertakings. The regulation of utilities in Britain attempted to 
avoid the problems associated with regulation on the basis of rates 
of return on capital investment which failed to link costs directly to 
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profits, and often resulted in unnecessary over-capitalisation. This 
form of regulation involved the regulator in the long-term planning 
of utility companies; made the regulatory process expensive and 
complex; and blurred the lines of responsibility between management 
and regulator [2]. The Government attempted to overcome these 
problems by providing internal incentives for companies to meet the 
previously specified objectives of the regulator. 
4,1, e1 OFWAT as the Market: Regulation and the 
unity of price, quality and service 
The prices charged by the privatised gas and telecommunications 
industries were regulated through price-capping. The regulator 
predicted an outcome premised on the achievement of a 'normal' rate 
of profit and the difference between prediction and reality provided 
incentives for increased efficiency and an incentive to reduce 
quality. In competitive markets consumers made judgements about, and 
traded off between, price, quality and services In a monopoly 
situation consumers could be exploited along all three dimensions, 
and regulation needed to be concerned with all three dimensions. 
Regulation needed to result in the establishment of specific quality 
standards in order to ensure that incentives for increased profits 
through greater efficiency were not offset by a reduction in quality. 
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The NCC was concerned that OFWAT would operate as a perfect 
market proxy. Quality standards would be set in advance, with 
penalties more onerous than cost savings if these were not met. An 
effective link would be established between the quality of service an 
individual received and the individual price they had to pay - with 
compensation being payable if standards were not met (National 
Consumer Council, ibid: 75-6). The ability of regulatory agencies to 
make reasonable and informed decisions was dependent upon the 
ability of the regulator to collect and process information. The 
ability of regulators to collate information would be improved 
through the restructuring of utility industries in a way that would 
facilitate comparative competition: providing examples of 'best 
practice' and helping to prevent regulators being 'captured' by the 
utility company. The NCC highlighted the danger that companies could 
be motivated by factors other than profit-maximisation; in particular 
employees and managers exploiting monopoly on their own behalf in 
terms of over-manning or higher wages and thereby increasing prices 
or reducing quality. The human resource aspects of utility operations 
also needed to be a legitimate concern of regulation (National 
Consumer Council, ibid: 81). 
In this section I have traced the development of OFWAT through 
the interplay of the crisis of the planner-state, the intellectual 
discourse of New Right liberalism and a political project concerned 
with perfecting the mechanisms through which the interests of 
abstract individuals are mediated with respect to 'natural' and 
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'technical' monopolies. I have demonstrated the way in which OFWAT 
was designed to be a market proxy par excellence: the mediated 
subsumption of concrete by abstract labour through the 
(re)unification of price and value. The main function of OFWAT would 
be to provide a mediated (re)unification of labour and valorisation 
processes. OFWAT was to ensure that the use-values produced by water 
undertakers were realised through their opposite - mediated 
exchange-values. The concept of 'public service' has thus been re- 
defined on the basis of the abstract individual: neo-liberal state 
regulation being premised upon upholding the interests of (real) 
abstract individuals in the context of generalised abstraction. I will 
now consider the regulatory role of OFWAT as quasi-market: the 
simultaneous regulation of price; quality and service imposing 
abstraction on the institutional mechanisms of the water industry. 
4.2. OFWAT and ti ae Rsgulatiori of 
Abstract ion. 
OFWAT was created by the 1989 Water Act, The Act privatised the 
existing 10 RWAs and enforced a separation between the 'core' 
monopoly functions of supplying water and disposing of sewage and 
other 'enterprise' functions. The environmental regulation functions 
of the former RWAs were made the responsibility of a new state 
regulatory agency constituted by the National Rivers Authority [NRA]. 
Section 60 of the Act established the Drinking Water Inspectorate 
[DWI] in order to assess and ensure that undertakers complied with 
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their duties concerning the quality and wholesomeness of drinking 
water. The 'core' business operations of the former RWAs and the 
existing SWCs were taken over by 'Water Supply P1cs' (WSPLCs] and 
were licenced to supply water and dispose of sewage by OFWAT. The 
licence established charging limits and performance standards and 
managers were left free within this framework to make profits while 
meeting quality standards; allowing managers to simultaneously 
satisfy the interests of shareholders and customers. The function of 
the regulator was to establish a framework that safeguarded the 
'public interest' whilst providing incentives to efficient management 
(HMSO, 1986: 16-7). 
OFWAT was to provide a proxy for the competitive market. The 
market proxy was constituted by the development of measurements of 
comparative competition and the threat of mergers and takeovers. 
OFWAT was given the function of establishing the licence conditions 
of the 39 WSPLCs and 'regulating' compliance with the licence 
conditions through the collection and application of data on 
operating and capital costs, levels of service and customer care. The 
data was to form the basis of the conditions laid out in licence 
agreements and would form the basis of the comparative competition 
through which 'the market' would assess the efficiency of water 
undertakers. The main regulatory activities of OFWAT conform to the 
three dimensions highlighted by the 1989 NCC Report, viz, price, 
quality and service 
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4,2, a, OFWAT and the Regulation of Prices. 
In the water industry price increases are regulated by a (RPI ± 
K) formula. The value of 'K' is a function of what a company needs to 
finance the provision of service to customers whilst taking into 
account the amount needed for capital expenditure and operating 
costs, offset by improvements in productivity and proceeds from the 
sale of land. In order to finance a proposed £25b investment 
programme in improved drinking water quality and reduced pollution in 
the 10 years following privatisation all water companies were 
initially awarded positive K values (an average of 5.5% for the first 
5 years and 4% for the second 5 years). The economic regulation of 
the post-privatised water industry is the function of the Charges 
Control Division of OFWAT. The Division is responsible for advising 
the DG on adjustments to 'K' either on an interim basis or via a 
periodic review. The Division undertakes the collection and analysis 
of financial information, encourages comparative competition, and 
undertakes periodic efficiency studies. The Division is responsible 
for developing OFWAT policy on mergers, 'inset' appointments and 
tariff structures. The Division monitors the performance of companies 
and the costs and benefits of changes in service standards; limiting 
'charges to those that would be charged by companies competing 
directly with each other' (OFWAT, 1990a: 13). 
The Charges Control Division of OFWAT is responsible for 
developing policy on tariff structures and charging methods. OFWAT 
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launched a consultation document in 1990, in consultation with the 
Customer Service Committees ECSCs] (infra: 196 et seq), in order to 
promote a debate on alternative charging methods. OFWAT was 
concerned to promote the advantageous, though economically 
prohibitive, method of metering which would provide customers with 'a 
sensible price message to enable them to affect their consumption 
pattern' (OFWAT, ibid. 16). The context of the exercise was a 
situation in which, owing to the need to finance improved quality 
standards, water charges are set to rise by between 22% and 122% by 
2000, and that the 1989 Water Act prohibited charging by rateable 
value on new properties immediately and on all properties after 2000. 
The determination of individual charges needed to be considered 
within the (RPI ± K) formula. The 1989 Act gave each WSPLC the power 
to fix charges for its services within (RPI t K) within the 
limitations of Licence Condition E by which they are required to 
ensure that no undue preference is shown to, and that there is no 
undue discrimination against, any class of customers or potential 
customers (OFWAT, 1990b, Annex 1: 1). 
The above legal framework highlighted the importance of 
developing a series of 'objectives' that charging policies should meet, 
viz fairness, incentives for economy, and simplicity. The objective of 
'fairness' would ensure that customers in similar circumstances paid 
similar charges and that differences in individual charges properly 
reflected relevant differences in circumstances. The 1989 Water Act 
prohibited the calculation of water charges on the basis of 'ability 
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to pay'. The balance between 'standing' and 'variable' elements of 
water bills was to follow consumption, as standing charges weighed 
heavily upon small properties with low consumption, and households 
that 'chose' to use large amounts of water needed to have this 
reflected in their water charges. The customer needed to be able 'to 
control his (sic) consumption and expenditure in the light of his 
needs and resources' (OFWAT, ibid. 9-10). 
The 'objective' of providing 'simple incentives' to customers and 
companies was 'to help ensure that the right level of service is 
provided at the right price.... to achieve improved economy and 
efficiency and to ensure that resources are well allocated'. Tariff 
structures needed to 'provide clear price messages which encourage 
companies to meet customers' demands, subject to achieving statutory 
environmental and health objectives, at the lowest price' (OFWAT, ibid: 
9-11). In order to provide incentives the tariff structure needed to 
be organized on the basis that if a customer changes the volume of 
water or sewage services demanded, the change in his (sic) bill would 
broadly reflect changes in both capital and environmental costs. 
The vast capital expenditure programmes required to meet 
increasingly rigorous environmental standards highlighted the 
relationship between the economic and environmental aspects of 
regulation (OFWAT, ibid, Annex 2: 1-5). Environmental considerations 
were central to decisions on future investment programmes, the 
structuring and monitoring of investment programmes and the nature 
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and implementation of charging systems. 'Economic efficiency' required 
that both the costs and benefits of environmental decisions should be 
a concern of the regulator. Customers both benefited from, and shared 
the costs of, environmental programmes and it was important that the 
costs of initiatives were presented in a way which indicated their 
implications for individual water bills. It was important to allow 
customers of water services to make judgements about the value they 
place on environmental benefits. Regulation needed to be premised 
upon an articulation between economic and environmental operations of 
the water industry. Decisions on new (environmental) obligations 
needed to be translated into investment programmes and prices, and 
implementation needed to be structured within a medium-term 
framework that gave customers certainty on their charges and the 
industry space to manage (and create values). 
The establishment of distinct roles for the NRA, OFWAT and 
WSPLCs made it important that prices reflected the environmental 
costs attributable to distinct stages in the use cycle (abstraction, 
treatment, discharge). Values needed to be placed on the services 
provided by natural environments and environmental costs needed to 
be incorporated into product prices in order to give producers and 
consumers proper incentives to balance environmental and other 
factors. Increasingly tight environmental standards necessarily 
implied higher charges -for customers. The Municipal Waste Water 
Directive [MWWD] required an end to the dumping of sludge at sea by 
1998, and the expansion of treatment to the sewage outflows that 
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flow into estuaries or the sea. Between 1991 and 1994 around £2.5b. 
per year was projected for water industry capital investment, and of 
this between £0.8b. and £1.25b. was required to meet existing and 
future environmental improvements. The costs spread unevenly across 
the 10 WSPLCs 131. Improvements were to be financed through the bills 
paid by customers as determined by (RPI ± K), and this needed to be 
reflected in the process of environmental planning and decision 
making. 
OFWAT has argued that customers would not welcome further 
price rises unless they were confident that (price increases) are 
justified and provided good value for money' (OFWAT, ibid: 15): new 
obligations needed to be reduced to prices before decisions on 
environmental improvements were taken. The objective of OFWAT was 
the development of a rational framework within which costs and 
benefits of environmental programmes could be evaluated in order to 
ensure that Ministers' decisions were translated into investment 
programmes with known consequences for prices. The action of quality 
regulators on new environmental initiatives, the costs and the 
differential impact upon the investment programmes of individual 
companies needed to be analysed in the context of the likely impact 
upon the bills of individual customers. The final decisions on 
proposals would fall on ministers who would need to balance the cost 
of making the improvements and the consequences for customers' bills 
against the environmental benefits. 
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The objective of 'simplicity' and 'comprehensibility' aimed to 
ensure that customers were clear about how their overall bill was 
made up and what they could do to influence it. There needed to be a 
balance between tariffs which were simple and cheap to operate and 
ones which were more complex but more closely tailored to the 
circumstances of individual customers (OFWAT, ibid. 9). The main 
concern was the development of tariff structures that adequately 
reflected the subjectively defined values placed on utility services 
by abstract individuals: the confirmation of abstraction through the 
imposition of the social power of money on the operational 
mechanisms of the water industry. The development of improvement 
programmes with respect to drinking water and sewage disposal has to 
be equated with the prices paid by individual consumers: concrete 
labour realised and mediated by its opposite in the price form of 
value. 
42. b. OFWAT and the Regulation of Quality. 
The 1989 Water Act placed a duty on OFWAT to promote 
competition and encourage efficiency and effectiveness through the 
mechanisms of 'inset' appointments, comparative competition and 
mergers. The licences of the WSPLCs lay down the detailed accounting 
information that is to be made available to OFWAT in its function of 
encouraging comparative competition. The annual accounts submitted to 
OFWAT must differentiate between water and sewage activities and 
activities undertaken in either non-core activities or by subsidiaries 
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in order to ensure that there is no cross-subsidy. Comparative 
competition allows OFWAT to 'form useful conclusions on the benefits 
to consumers' and allows the financial markets to make judgements 
about the different quoted companies. The Act obliges OFWAT to refer 
all mergers involving companies with assets exceeding £30m, to the 
MMC, although the Director General (DGl of OFWAT has stated that 
mergers will be encouraged where concentration of ownership results 
in more efficient management (OFWAT, 1990a: 17-8). 
The technical, engineering and scientific aspects of water 
company performance are monitored by the Engineering Intelligence 
Division. The Division reports on and certifies information submitted 
by WSPLCs. The Division is intended to establish a mechanism that 
ensures the development of the necessary reporting arrangements to 
enable OFWAT to monitor and compare a company operating performance, 
levels of service, and investment expenditure..... (and) to support 
planning for periodic reviews and the efficient and economic 
integration of new obligations (OFWAT, ibid: 21). The 1989 Act 
required WSPLCs to develop detailed, long-term 'Asset Management 
Plans', which together with investment and levels of service 
projections formed the basis of the K setting. The projections were 
designed to improve the service provided to water customers, and it 
is the function of OFWAT to ensure that projected developments are 
achieved on time and at the lowest acceptable cost to customers. 
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In order to balance arm's length regulation with an assurance 
that water customers' monies are being effectively and economically 
managed, OFWAT requires companies to submit an annual report. The 
Report provides 'a framework for the submission of the majority of 
information required to enable OFWAT to monitor progress and compare 
performance.... (enabling) the generation of time-series information 
and facilitating non-financial comparisons' (OFWAT, ibid: 22). 
Companies report on their medium term progress vis ä vis the 'Asset 
Management Plan'; investment procurement strategy; quantitative data 
on service 'outputs'; progress in meeting drinking water and sewage 
compliance programmes; an outline of the methodology and procedures 
adopted to enable the accurate representation of levels of service 
indicators. Outputs are measured and monitored by a series of 
quantitatively defined quality standards that are laid down by the 
operating licences [4]. The regulation of quality illustrates the 
imposition of abstraction on the operational form of the water 
industry. The performance indicators developed by OFWAT are designed 
to ensure that the production of use-values by the WSPLCs is 
subordinated to the production of value. The concrete performance of 
the WSFLCs is regulated through abstract measures that quantify 
quality and facilitate the reduction of use-values to prices and 
enable comparisons to be made on relative efficiency by international 
capital markets. 
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4.2. c. OFWAT and the Regulation of Service. 
The 1989 Water Act gave OFWAT particular duties with regard to 
existing and potential customers of the water industry. The Consumer 
Affairs Division is responsible for the development of policy vis d 
vis the consumer aspects of regulation. The 1989 Act requires OFWAT 
to establish and nationally coordinate CSCs, to protect the interests 
of rural, elderly and disabled customers, to investigate complaints, 
to approve and modify codes of practice and to establish 10 CSCs 
corresponding to areas of the former RWAs. The members of the CSCs 
are appointed on the basis of nominations invited from business, 
agriculture, local government, the voluntary sector and consumer 
organizations. The CSCs are independent of the water companies and 
have a statutory duty to 'keep under review matters of interest to 
customers and to consult and make representations to companies; to 
investigate customer complaints; and to advise and report to the 
Director General' (OFWAT, 1990: 28). 
The 1989 Water Act gave OFWAT and the CSCs a duty to 
investigate unresolved customer complaints. The licences under which 
WSPLCs operate stipulate that companies must have both a procedure 
for handling complaints and staff trained to deal effectively with 
complaints. WSPLCs are given an opportunity to respond to complaints 
prior to OFWAT becoming involved. Complaints are initially dealt with 
by the CSCs; though matters such as drinking water may be considered 
by the DG, who may forward them to the DWI. In the 6 months 
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following privatisation OFWAT received 541 complaints, a 'significant 
number' of which concerned drinking water quality. 
OFWAT pursues complaints on a 'case by case' basis to secure 
compensation or rebates where 'the product or service supplied is 
below the standard for which the customer has paid' (OFWAT, ibid: 29). 
Licence Conditions G, H, &I obliged the WSPLCs to submit to OFWAT 
three codes of practice: 
1. Relations with customers and CSCs. 
2. Guidance to customers that have difficulty paying 
their bills (procedure prior to disconnection). 
3. Leakage from metered supplies. 
These codes of practice were formulated jointly by the industry and 
OFWAT with important imput from the NCC. OFWAT is responsible for 
administering the Guaranteed Standards Scheme by which the failure 
of a company to meet certain prescribed standards entitles customers 
to a payment of £5 (or £5 per day for certain sustained failures). 
The regulation of service by OFWAT forms the basis of the new 
abstract citizenship Public service is redefined on the basis of the 
micro-economic postulates of neo-liberal economics: the function of 
regulation being to ensure that individual customers receive value 
for money. The regulator is the market: the state maintains the 
relationship between price and value in order to maintain the 
conditions for successful valorisation by the nascent water capital. 
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The function of neo-liberal regulation is above all the affirmation 
of the subordination of concrete by abstract labour. The issue that 
needs to be explored is the way in which this domination has been 
ideologically legitimated through a discourse of citizenship. The neo- 
liberal project is presented as having extended the social rights of 
individuals at the expense of irresponsible and unrepresentative 
producers, The fundamental paradox is that the discourse of abstract 
citizenship has been developed by both the Right and the post-Marxist 
and Fabian left. The crisis of the planner-state has evoked a crisis 
in the structuralist and voluntarist politics that were its primary 
ideological supports. 
4.3. Citizens2iip, Cori lmption and 
the Crisis of the British Left. 
The crisis of the planner-state has resulted in a convergence 
between left and right around the concept of citizenship The 
redefinition of 'citizenship' has been a central focus of neo- 
liberalism, and neo-liberal notions of citizenship have provided the 
institutional premise for neo-liberal state regulation and the neo- 
conservative political discourse focused upon the development of the 
'Citizens' Charter'. Paradoxically, a similar conflation of the politics 
of citizenship and consumerism is apparent with the post-Marxist 
left. The post-Marxist preoccupation with citizenship is an attempt 
to reconstitute the corporate citizenship of the planner-state on 
individualist neo-liberal premises. The crisis of the post-Marxist 
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left is inseparable from the crisis of the planner-state: the response 
to the crisis having been the increasing preoccupation with the 
pluralism, technological determinism and the normative subjectivism of 
bourgeois sociology and social philosophy. The concept of 'citizenship' 
has been central to this project. 
The crisis of the post-Marxist left reflects the legacy of 
Althusserian structuralism and neo-Gramscian voluntarism. The 
principal weakness of these approaches was the way in which they 
applied bourgeois sociological solutions to the theoretical 
limitations of 'Orthodox Marxism' (Clarke, 1991a: 70-86). In an 
attempt to demonstrate the 'relative autonomy' of the 'political' 
these approaches interposed 'civil society' between the state and 
social relations of production and thereby posited the sphere of 
exchange (civil society) as the locus of capital's domination over 
labour. This has important implications with respect to the theory of 
the state. The state is essentially neutral, while the political power 
of capital is derived from the control of resources in civil society: 
a conceptualisation derived from the eternalisation of capitalist 
relations of production presented by classical political economy and 
the reduction of production to a technical structure of material 
production independent of social relations. The political implication 
of this approach was the elimination of resistance to the capital 
relation and the direction of political activity to 'bourgeois state 
forms whose effectivity is subordinate to the domination of the 
capital relation' (Clarke, ibid: 80-1). 
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The crisis of neo-Marxian structuralism is the crisis of the 
planner-state. The discourse of citizenship is an attempt to 
legitimate a revisionism that is explicitly premised on neo-liberal 
abstraction: the project of socialism having been made congruent with 
the neo-liberal "New Times" of post-Fordism (Hall & Jacques, 1989). 
The development of a new sectoral socio-technical paradigm has 
heightened the crisis of the planner-state and confirmed the 
marginalisation of the 'working class' as an historical (le. 
sociological) actor. The state and the workplace have been 
marginalised as sites of social struggle, which is increasingly 
focused on demands for social rights within civil society. The decline 
of mass production and the development of 'flexible' new technology 
has reversed the Taylorite concern with the separation of conception 
and execution with a concern to develop an upskilled and polyvalent 
workforce (Piore & Sabel, 1984), while the break up of mass markets 
has heightened the importance of the sphere of consumption as the 
primary location of freedom and autonomy (Murray, 1989). 
4.3. a. Citizenship and Consumption in "Post- 
Capitalist" Society. 
The post-Marxist left has been concerned to demonstrate the way 
in which the demise of the proletariat as a 'political' Cie. 
sociological) agent of social change has resulted in social struggles 
transcending the law of value. New social movements [NSMs] have 
emerged that have attempted to create and defend autonomous spheres 
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of freedom and cultural meaning that straggle civil society and the 
state (Gorz, 1980; Offe, 1985a; Laclau, 1987). The emergence of NSMs 
is inseparable from the crisis of the planner-state and is premised 
upon a growing realisation among 'political' actors that the conflicts 
and contradictions can no longer be resolved on the basis of etatism, 
political regulation and bureaucratic control. The NSMs parallelled 
the New Right in arguing that there needed to be a reinterpretation 
of the legitimate spheres of political action in order to expunge the 
deleterious impact of state on civil society (Offe, op cit: 819-20). 
The NSMs were concerned to politicise the institutions of civil 
society in a way that was unconstrained by channels of 
representative-bureaucratic political institutions: to premise 
political action upon standards of rationality emanating from the 
intermediate sphere between the 'public' and 'private'. The emergence 
of NSMs reflected the emergence of a new political paradigm with 
political values, issues, actors and institutional practices that 
differed fundamentally from the 'old paradigm' associated with the 
planner-state. 
The development of the new political paradigm reflected a 
broadening of oppression and deprivation in advanced capitalist 
society and the development of new forms of deprivation that were no 
longer 'class specific'. The workplace was no longer the primary site 
of social conflict and the law of value was obsolete as the site of 
'primordal' conflict (Offe, ibid: 838-56). Conflict increasingly took 
place within, and was displacable between, a series of relatively 
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autonomous spheres. Individuals were oppressed and deprived as 
workers, citizens and consumers (Habermas, 1088), Oppression and 
deprivation had deepened through the increasing 'colonisation of the 
life-world' (Melucci, 1980): production having been replaced by the 
production of individual, biological and inter-personal identity. 
The new paradigm was constituted by new forms of non- 
institutional politics in which NSMs were the main actors, and 
challenged the institutional framework of the KWS that was premised 
upon the commitment of institutional corporate actors to economic 
growth and security. The new politics was concerned with the 
politicisation of themes and issues that went beyond the dichotomy 
between public and private through the universalistic struggles of 
alliances of groups for identity and autonomy. The alliance of groups 
comprised any groups to the exclusion only of actors implied by the 
law of value: a configuration constituted by a 'non-class of non- 
workers' (Gorz, op cit). The work of Gorz highlights the increasing 
post-Marxist concern with social struggle posited between the state 
and the material relations of production, and the premising of new 
forms of citizenship on technologically determinist models of social 
development. These themes were taken up by the British left in an 
attempt to analyse the 'political' success of the New Right project of 
'Thatcherism' in its onslaught against the corporatist mechanisms of 
the KWS. 
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The discourse of "New Times" (Hall & Jacques, op cit) was an 
explicit attempt to develop socialist renewal on the basis of 
Gramscian voluntarism, post-Marxist technological determinism and 
subjectivist notions of power and identity derived from the post- 
modernist project of lean Baudrillard and Michel Foucault. Central to 
this project are the concepts of citizenship (Mouffe, 1988; Hall & 
Held, 1989) and consumerism (Mort, 1989, Murray, op cit) and the way 
in which these need to be combined in the development of a new 
socialist citizenship (Leadbeater, 1988). The crisis of the planner- 
state and the development of 'Thatcherism' had been developed within 
the Poulantzian problematic of the 'relative autonomy of the state' 
(Jessop et al., 1988; Hall, 1983,1988): the political projects and 
ideological discourses generated within civil society by Thatcherism 
requiring new forms of progressive politics that articulated the new 
ideological and political forms in the context of an emergent post- 
Fordist technological paradigm (Jessop et al., 1990). The development 
of new abstract forms of citizenship are essential in order to defend 
the progressive remnants of the planner-state and to prepare a new 
socialist project appropriate to the emergent post-Fordist 
accumulation/regulation configuration associated with the "New Times" 
of post-Fordism. 
The Marxism Today/New Socialist axis of the British left became 
increasingly interested in the 'liberating' potential of consumption 
and the market throughout the 1980s. Thatcherism had successfully 
articulated popular ideologies of economics (Mort, op cit: 160-3). 
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During the 1980s Thatcherism was able to construct a strategy and a 
discourse that articulated this economic common sense. The consumer 
boom in the mid-1980s and the associated credit boom produced potent 
late-capitalist images of prosperity. Despite the later economic 
downturn these images have had a profound impact on popular culture 
which has been transformed into a 'manic compulsion to consume' and 
the 'hyper-eroticism of a trip to the shops'. Living with the 
instability of the 'economic wheel of fortune' had replaced the 'slow 
but upward gradualism of social democracy'. Thatcherism was able to 
orchestrate consumption in a way that channelled feelings of growing 
prosperity to its own brand of economic and political freedom. This 
had important implications with respect to political discourse and 
strategy; most notably, the need to premise the discourse and 
practice of socialism on the needs and aspirations of abstract 
citizens as consumers 
4.3. b. The Politics of Consumption and the 
'New Left' Politics of Abstraction. 
The main problem for the left was the over-identification of 
socialism with production. Consumption had been trivialised and 
relegated to the privatised 'feminine' sphere of the household or 
castigated as a moral evil. The left needed to recognise the way 
'lifestyle market segmentation' had reinforced the arguments of the 
NSMs with respect to the politics of identity. The old Fordist market 
blocs associated with fixed identity structures had broken down into 
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a diverse array of customer profiles. The 'new politics' needed to 
develop new styles of presentation and language in order to 
articulate the fluid and transient structures of identity associated 
with post-modernism. This required a collapsing of the distinction 
between politics and life. 
The political sphere reflected the political certainties of 
Fordism that were premised on the workplace and stable political 
institutions. The collapse of Fordism had resulted in an increasing 
disengagement of politics and life; a realisation that it is outside 
the formal spheres of work and politics that individuals have a sense 
of power, freedom and autonomy. Thatcherism aligned itself with this 
realisation by giving individuals the opportunity to buy out of a 
politics that was presented as restrictive and tiresome. The 
importance of consumption to political strategy was in the way it 
touched the lives of people where they felt most active and powerful. 
The relationship between production and consumption had been 
transformed by the new consumer culture and this needed to form the 
basis of a new socialist common sense: the meshing of localised 
points of consumption with social demands and aspirations. 
The post-Marxist concern with developing the 'social market' has 
been reflected in the policy developments of the Labour Party. The 
Labour Party has abandoned its historical commitment to the 
socialisation of the means of production in favour of the social 
regulation of markets, The 'new revisionism' and the 'market socialism' 
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adopted by the Labour Party is presented as a reflection of the new 
cultural significance of consuming and of economic life more 
generally in the 'popular imagination': the emergence of a new 
'economic populism', with potentially liberating themes - such as 
consumption as a source of power and pleasure - that needed to be 
incorporated into the socialist political project for "New Times" 
(Mort, op cit: 160). The new revisionism of the Labour Party has been 
concerned with the problem of the way in which the historical 
commitment to workers could be accommodated with its new found 
enthusiasm for markets and the interests of consumers. The Labour 
Party remains committed to returning the water industry to the state 
sector; although the 'public service' status of the other utilities 
would be ensured through the strengthening of regulatory frameworks. 
In the 'policy review' document Meet The Challenge - Make The Change 
published in 1989 the Labour Party made the commitment to consumers 
explicit: 
..... attention has in the past been focused more on 
rights and protection for people at work. In this 
report we seek to redress the balance - to make the 
priority that of empowering and protecting the 
consumer (Quoted in Beishon, 1989). 
The main features of the Labour Party proposals were the 
development of a Consumers' Charter implemented through a Department 
of Consumer Affairs and an enhanced role for the NCC. In respect of 
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local services, the Labour Party has recommended the introduction of 
'local quality audit teams' to monitor local authority performance, 
the granting of more power to consumers in the control and 
management of services and an increase in the regulation and 
monitoring of quality in the health and education services. The 
utilities would be subject to more rigorous regulation through the 
establishment of a Consumer Protection Commission that would cover 
all the utilities in both the public and private sectors and thus 
bring together and strengthen the present regulatory bodies. The high 
priests of consumerism have been mainly unimpressed with the Labour 
Party proposals; primarily over their failure to be sufficiently 
abstract in their definitions of consumerism and citizenship. The 
critique of the Labour Party position highlights the extent to which 
the neo-liberal citizenship implies no less than the complete and 
total subordination of producers to consumers. 
The Director of the Consumers' Association John Beishon (1989: 
16-7) has argued that the Labour Party definition of consumerism as 
'the aspiration of users and consumers for greater control over both 
their immediate environment - and the wider social and economic 
forces which shape it' confused consumerism and citizenship. Beishon 
questioned the extent to which consumers wanted to control services 
themselves. Consumer policy needed to be aimed at giving consumers 
power through their individual choices and protection through central 
and local government regulatory mechanisms. Beishon argued that forms 
of democratic control over public services were inferior to more 
- 217 - 
powerful regulatory bodies premised on openness and public 
accountability that set standards for public services and offered 
redress for consumers on default. The Labour Party were also still 
too concerned with the interests and problems of public service 
professionals such as teachers and health service workers. 
In order to understand the political significance of the 
development of 'abstract citizenship' it is necessary to undertake an 
assessment of the form and function of social power in capitalist 
society. I will begin by exploring the abstract premises of Weberian 
Sociology before moving on to consider the way in which this 
abstraction is articulated in the work of Neo-Weberians in their 
analyses of citizenship and the state in modern capitalist society. 
4.4. Websrian Sociology, Neo- 
Liberal Economics rid the Problem 
of Abstract ion. 
The sociology of Max Weber developed alongside the 'Marginalist' 
revolution in economics. Marginalism emerged in order to 
conceptualise the possibility and limits of social reform. The 
'objective' basis of social class associated with classical political 
economy was replaced by an individualist theory of economic 
relations, as the classical cost theory of value was replaced by a 
'subjective' theory of value. The resulting reformulation of 'social 
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power' posited 'class' and 'class conflict' at a lower level of 
abstraction as sociological classes premised upon exchange relations 
and constituted by free associations of individuals organised on the 
basis of their perception of common interest vis 6 vis the exchange 
of commodities (Clarke, 1991b: 235-7). Class conflict was removed as 
an endemic feature of the capitalist system and became contingent 
upon disturbances to the competitive market system. The 'formal' and 
'substantive' rationality of capitalism could be separated in order to 
define both the limits of reformism and the functions of modern 
sociology. 
The methodological approach of Weber was an elaboration and 
refinement of the work of the marginalist Karl Menger (Clarke, ibid: 
248-50). Following Menger, Weber was concerned with the necessarily 
abstract status of social theory and the development of 'ideal types' 
that had a non-necessary correspondence with empirical reality. Weber 
departed from Menger, however, on the issue of the 'universality' of 
capitalist rationality. Marginalist economics provided an adequate 
theory of economic 'action' and institutions as embodiments of 
economic rationality: the task of sociology was to develop a 
'typology' of 'value-orientations' and 'social action' in order to place 
marginalist economics in a broader context. Sociology situated 
economic theory within the concrete framework of social life: 
economics provided the 'formal' framework that sociology would fill 
with 'social consent' (Clarke, ibid. 268). A theory of social action 
required both an account of rational orientations of self-interest 
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and an account of the formation of, and the orientation to, 
'legitimate' orders of social organisation. 
Economic, political and legal organisations were premised upon 
typical orientations of action and constituted different forms of 
'domination': domination by the market, bureaucracy, religion and so 
on. The cultural unity of capitalist society was defined by the 
typically rational value-orientations of social action: the rationality 
of 'instrumental' rationality (zweckrationalität) independent of its 
economic form. The rationality of forms of action was not gauged 
against the subjective orientations of actors, but the extent to 
which social institutions had been subordinated to 'instrumental' or 
'formal' rationality, Instrumental or formal rationality corresponded 
to the degree of abstraction of procedures or the degree to which 
regulation was predictable and impersonal The rationality of these 
abstract forms of regulation can, however, be derived only from the 
objective rationality of competitive forms of economic regulation and 
Weber's formal rationality can be reduced to the economic rationality 
of marginalism (Clarke, ibid: 280). 
The coherence of Weberian sociology rests on the objective 
rationality of the capitalist economic system. Weber defined economic 
rationality as a purely formal concept. The economic institutions of 
capitalist society were abstracted from capitalist social relations. 
The 'naturalisation' of the social relations of marginal economics 
thus resulted in the mutable social constraints which define the 
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limits of the subjective rationality of "formally rational" economic 
action being fetished as immutable natural and technological 
constraints - the contradictions of capitalism appearing as the 
unavoidable fate of humanity (Clarke, ibid. 283). Weber recognised the 
substantive irrationality of capitalism, but presented this as a 
necessary concomitant of the generalisation of 'formal rationality'. 
The fragmentation of modern capitalist society and the 
rationalisation of the separate spheres resulted in the development 
of an 'iron cage' that imposed rationality on the action of 
individuals in each of the separate spheres. Market competition thus 
imposed rational behaviour on participants in economic life and 
bureaucratic rules and procedures impose bureaucratic rationality on 
bureaucrats. 
4.4. a. Weberian Sociology, Citizenship and the 
State. 
The emergent relationship between citizenship and consumption 
has been developed by Weberian sociologists in an attempt to 
demonstrate the way in which private property and 'regulated market 
provision' constitute an important focus of 'modern social citizenship' 
(Harrison, 1991: 213). The bureaucratisation of productive enterprises 
and the state has rendered the sphere of consumption the primary 
location of freedom and autonomy (Saunders, 1985,1990; Saunders & 
Harris 1991). Neo-Weberian analyses have attempted to demonstrate the 
theoretical and political naivete of reformist left attempts to 
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appropriate citizenship as a defence against the neo-liberal 
onslaught on the institutions of social welfare. The attempt by the 
left to develop the social citizenship of TH Marshall in the defence 
of collective welfare (Hall & Held, op cit: 19) is seriously flawed as 
it fails to adequately problematise the 'contemporary complexities 
between citizenship entitlements and the economic structure of 
capitalist society (Turner, 1990: 190). 
The development of global capitalism and the spatial 
reorganisation of the 'working class' together with the collapse of 
corporatism and the emergence of NSMs have combined to make it 
increasingly difficult for the state to mediate between capital and 
labour in the period of 'disorganised capitalism (Lash & Urry, 1987; 
Offe, 1985b). Citizenship does not have a unitary character but is 
dependent upon the divergent normative interpretations of public life 
associated with divergent patterns of social development. The work of 
Marshall was useful as it provided a theoretical perspective on a 
deeper conception of social membership expressed through the welfare 
state being itself the embodiment of certain social rights and claims. 
The global shifts in the nature of capitalism make Marshall's 
conception of citizenship obsolete, and the concept is currently 
undergoing a process of change and development in the context of a 
contradictory process of regional autonomy and globalism. There has 
been a redefinition of citizenship at both the regional and national 
levels: the development of a new citizenship premised on the politics 
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of status rather than corporate politics of class that marked the 
period of 'organised capitalism'. 
Turner has been criticised for understating the importance of 
material circumstances to the status of citizenship: the way in which 
status politics involves conflict over resources and the relative 
position of groups vis S vis state actions that extend or limit 
citizenship (Harrison, op cit: 210-2). Harrison has questioned the 
extent to which neo-liberal attacks on the institutional structures 
of public welfare necessarily imply an attack on social citizenship. 
He suggests that it is an unfortunate consequence of the Marxian 
legacy that scholars 'downgrade the role of private property both as 
a focus for rights claims and as a stake in the struggles between 
grass roots interests and corporate power' (Harrison, ibid: 213). It is 
feasible to assume, he suggests, that privatised forms of social 
provision and access to choices in markets amount to a modern form 
of social citizenship. This is illustrated with respect to the owner 
occupation of housing (Saunders, 1990) and the state provision of tax 
subsidies on privatised forms of welfare and regulated market 
provisions 
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4.4. b. The Water Industry as an "Iron Cage" of 
Coercion. 
The initial concern of Saunders was the mediation of 'interests' 
by the state and the articulation of 'non-class' cleavages in state 
representation and provision. The problem of the 'relative autonomy 
of the state', which had formed a blockage in 'Marxist' state theory, 
would be resolved through a Weberian methodology that examined the 
form and function of the state through the construction and 
application of a series of 'ideal types' which corresponded to 
different state functions at different levels of the state (Cawson & 
Saunders, 1983) [53. There was a non-necessary correspondence between 
'economic' and 'political' struggle which could be resolved into 
struggles organised around the 'production' and 'consumption' 
functions of the state. 
The production and consumption functions of the state were 
delivered through different modes of interest mediation at different 
levels of state provision. The production function of the state was 
grounded in the ideology of 'profit' and 'private property' and 
involved the determination of exchange-value through 'corporate' 
modes of interest mediation at national and regional level. The 
productive function of the state was thus determined through class 
struggle. The consumption function of the state was grounded in the 
ideology of 'need' and involved the determination of use-value 
through 'competitive' modes of interest determination at local level. 
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The consumption function of the state was thus determined through 
the struggle between status groups The framework was applied to the 
study of interest mediation within the regional state institutions of 
the water industry (Saunders, 1984) [6]. 
The form of the regional state allowed the interests of 
'producers' to predominate over the interests of 'consumers' within 
the RWAs. These 'producer' interests were the corporate interests of 
capital [7]. The unelected and undemocratic nature of RWAs allowed 
the interests of 'producer' groups such as the CBI, NFU and NF{BF to be 
mediated through corporate modes of interest mediation at regional 
level; which together with the professional interests of water 
industry managers constituted a form of urban managerialism (Pahl, 
1975). The form and scale of RWAs made the representation of 
organised consumer interests difficult beyond local level. The 
abolition of local authority representation on the boards of RWAs had 
therefore resulted in an amalgam of managerialist and corporatist 
forms of interest mediation. The imposition of spending restrictions 
on RWAs heightened the marginalisation of consumers to managers and 
producer groups. The democratic vacuum within RWAs therefore 
resulted in the professional and non-accountable bureaucratic 
domination of the water industry; the problem was to find ways of 
increasing the influence of consumers at the expense of producers. 
Saunders has been unable to solve the problem of how to 
increase the influence of water industry consumers within the 
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abstract premises of Weberian Sociology. The centralised, bureaucratic 
and technocratic nature of capitalist production and the state 
imposed an 'iron cage' of coercion on workers and consumers in the 
sphere of production. The sphere of consumption by contrast provided 
the basis for individual freedom and autonomy; but only with respect 
to the consumption of 'use-values' through which individuals are able 
to express their identity and autonomy. The 'libertarian' values of 
the New Right together with the marginal redistribution of property 
rights to ensure universal participation in the market provides the 
only means to ensure individual freedom and autonomy in advanced 
capitalist society. Socialism was obsolete as a political project as 
its 'collectivist' premises were unable to articulate demands for 
individual freedom and autonomy in the market. Where the means of 
consumption are provided by the state in the form of education, 
health care or housing the development of individual freedom and 
autonomy requires a shift in power from producers to consumers; 
transforming passive clients into active customers. The empowerment 
of consumers in the market for the means of consumption, therefore, 
provides individuals with freedom and control over 'the central and 
most important aspect of everyday life' (Saunders, 1985: 67-8). 
The 'marketisation' of the state provision of consumption 
services such as education, health care and housing provided the 
opportunity for individual freedom and autonomy that was absent in 
the 'privatisation' of utilities such as water. Privatisation is only 
significant when it empowers consumers (Saunders & Harris, 1990). The 
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sale of council housing, for example, provided control over a 'use- 
value' through which individuals could express their autonomy and 
identity. The sale of shares in utilities provided individuals with 
'exchange-values' that had little sociological significance given the 
intrinsically alienating scale and form of utility industries. The 
impact of the 'privatisation' of the water industry could therefore be 
measured empirically through an assessment of the subjective 
orientations of consumers. Saunders has argued that while the 
restructuring and privatisation of the water industry has had a 
fundamental impact on workers and managers within the industry, 
these 'economic' developments have had few sociological concomitants. 
In particular privatisation has failed to fulfil the explicit 
sociological objective of the Government with respect to the 
development of 'popular capitalism' and an 'enterprise culture' 
(Saunders, 1991). 
4,4, c, Weberian Sociology. Class Struggle and 
the Imposition of Abstraction. 
Weberian sociology abstracts from the substantive contradictions 
of capitalist society and Weber was thereby unable to locate the 
roots of the contradiction in alienated forms of social labour as 
these forms were presented as rational. The abstract premises of 
Weberfan sociology have also been evident with respect to the work 
of neo-Weberian writers concerned to demonstrate the way in which 
neo-liberal restructuring has resulted in a new form of citizenship 
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premised on the social rights of individuals in regulated markets. 
The work of neo-Weberians such as Peter Saunders, Bryan Turner and 
M. L. Harrison is confused, confusing and contradictory, but as I will 
demonstrate this results from the abstract premises of Weberian 
social theory. The analysis of the neo-liberal restructuring presented 
above has demonstrated the extent to which changes in social power 
have been premised on changes in the social determination of' labour: 
the subordination of concrete to abstract labour through which the 
production and distribution of use-values has been subordinated to 
the production of value Neo- Weberian sociology abstracts from these 
rather inconvenient 'economic' developments, and argues that the 
disappearance of the 'working class' as a corporate interest group in 
the sphere of exchange has rung the death knell of socialism as a 
political project, and highlighted the extent to which the market is 
the primary location of freedom and autonomy in 'late' capitalist 
society. 
The work of Saunders on the water industry is breathtaking in 
its simplistic naivete. The 'sociological' importance of water 
privatisation can be gauged by the subjective orientations of water 
consumers to their exchange relations as consumers, shareholders and 
voters. The analysis therefore abstracts from the fundamental 
'economic' changes associated with neo-liberal restructuring: the 
development of commercial management, the marginalisation of trade 
unions and imposition of competition by a neo-liberal state agency. 
The neo-liberal state and water industry are part of the inexorable 
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development of 'instrumental rationality' and form an 'iron cage' 
impenetrable by subjective rationality. Through this methodological 
procedure Saunders concludes that privatisation has been 
insignificant. The limits of the new abstract citizenship are 
therefore determined by the unfettered logic of capital accumulation 
in the fetished forms of natural and technological constraints. The 
abstract citizen re-emerges as the abstract marginal-maximiser of 
neo-liberal economic theory. 'Public service' has been redefined into 
the maintenance of this abstraction. These are the intellectual and 
political premises of the post-Marxist, post-Fabian and post- 
modernist left! 
It is evident from my analysis of the crisis of the planner- 
state and the development of neo-liberal forms of state regulation 
and utility provision that there have been fundamental changes in the 
way in which use-values are produced and distributed by the water 
industry in Britain. The abstract power of capital in the form of the 
rule of money has been re-imposed on to the institutional mechanisms 
of provision and regulation. The rule of money has been imposed 
through the struggle between concrete and abstract labour - that is, 
between labour and capital. In order to fully comprehend the 
importance of neo-liberal restructuring to the way in which labour is 
determined in contemporary capitalist society it is necessary to 
focus on the institutional mechanisms through which use-values are 
produced and distributed. The unity between labour and valorisation 
processes implies the unity of abstract citizenship and abstract 
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management. The analysis of 'abstract management' will demonstrate 
the enduring importance of the law of value as the locus of 
contradiction and struggle in capitalist society and the vacuous 
naibetO of left-wing theorists who premise their analyses on the 
abstract theoretical premises of bourgeois sociology and neo-liberal 
economics. 
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Not oat *-, 
1. The most important exception to the predominantly 
'consequentialist' approach of the New Right is Robert Nozick, who 
in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) premises his argument for 
libertarian individualism on an explicitly moral basis. 
2. This is the predominant form of utility regulation in the USA. 
See Littlechild (1986) for a neo-liberal assessment of the 
weaknesses of the USA mode of regulation and the importance of 
competition in capital markets with respect to the operating 
efficiency of water undertakings. The arguments of Littlechild 
formed the basis of a Government White Paper Economic Regulation 
of the Privatised Water Authorities published in 1986. The 
extent to which the discipline of capital markets ensured the 
operating efficiency of water undertakings was questioned by 
Hughes (1989) and expanded on in the 1989 Report by the National 
Consumer Council In the Absence of Competition: A Consumer View 
of Public Utilities Regulation. I have indicated the importance of 
the NCC Report to the provisions of the 1989 Water Act. 
Professor Littlechild was subsequently appointed as the Director 
General of the electricity regulator OFFER. 
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3. Costs have fallen heaviest on WSPLCs with long tracts of 
coastline. The percentage increase in investment required to meet 
MWWD is South West over 35%; Southern, Welsh, North West, 
Northumbrian 15-20%; Yorkshire, Anglian 10-15%; and Severn Trent, 
Thames, Wessex less than 10% (OFWAT, 1991: 16). 
4. The four sets of outputs (use-values) with which OFWAT are 
concerned are set out below: 
1. 'Condition J' levels of service indicators 
DGl. Raw water availability - number of customers 
whose water resource availability is below 
reference standard. 
DG2, Pressure of water mains - number of customers 
with water main pressure below reference 
standard. 
DG3 Interruptions to water supplies - number of 
customers that have had interruptions to supply 
without warning for longer than the reference 
period. 
DDG4 Hosepipe restriction - number of customers 
notified of hosepipe restrictions. 
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DG5. Flooding incidents from sewers - number of 
customers properties where flooding from sewers 
has occurred more frequently than the reference 
period. 
DG6. Response to billing queries - number and banded 
response times for meaningful responses to 
customer queries. 
DG7. Response to written complaints - number and 
banded response time for meaningful response. 
DGB. Response to development control consultations. 
With regard to DG2, DG3 & DG5 companies have to demonstrate both 
short and medium term improvements and the way in which they relate 
to investment programmes. The reference standards for DG 1,2,3,5 have 
where possible been set by consensus with the industry, or where this 
was not possible the by the DG after consideration of appropriate 
measures and definitions. 
2. Other Performance Indicgtqm These relate to the water and 
environmental quality aspects regulated by the DWI and the PARA. OFWAT 
is developing mechanisms by which information on performance and 
projected improvements in quality can be made available for 
monitoring company performance. 
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3. Levels of Activity This is a long-term measure that is intended to 
provide a cross-check between level of service indicators, other 
performance indicators and investment in underground assets. It takes 
the form of an indicator of the length of water mains/sewer renewed. 
4. Armset Condition Indicators Standard classifications for structural 
and hydrolic capacity. 
5. An extended exposition of the neo-Weberian approach to interest 
mediation and the state is to be found in Cawson (1986: passim). 
6. This resume of Saunders approach to the analysis of the regional 
state is taken from research carried out by Saunders on the 
impact of the 1983 Water Act on modes of interest mediation at 
Southern Water Authority. The findings of this research together 
with research focusing on South East Thames Regional Health 
Authority are presented in Saunders (1984). 
7. Saunders does not consider the way in which the regional state 
mediates the interests of labour. The r6le of trade unions in 
determining and limiting the formulation of policy is ignored by 
Saunders, which is particularly surprising given his focus on the 
way in which engineers were being replaced by professional 
managers at Southern Water. 
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Part Two 
State Regulation and the 
Determination of Management Form. 
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Introduction to Part Two. - 
In Chapter Four I demonstrated the way in which the regulatory 
regime that was created by the 1989 Water Act developed through the 
crisis of managerialism and articulated the abstract theoretical 
premises of neo-liberal social and economic theory. The Act 
rigorously imposed the law of money on to the regulatory and 
operational mechanisms of the water industry. The economic regulation 
of the industry was entrusted to OFWAT which was constituted as a 
'market proxy' that would impose the law of value on the services 
provided by water undertakers. The Act privatised the 10 RWAs and 
made provision for the SWCs to convert to PLC status, The WSPLCs 
were restructured in order to separate 'core' monopoly functions that 
were to be the subject of regulation and other 'enterprise' functions: 
the WSPLCs constituting a public 'group' holding company with water 
supply and sewerage functions being undertaken by subsidiary 
'service' companies and other functions such as engineering and 
training by subsidiary 'enterprise' companies. The Act also created 
the NRA and DWI to regulate river quality and drinking water 
respectively. 
The transitory state form constituted by managerialism 
facilitated the development of large efficient entities qua RWAs 
- 236 - 
capable of operating as capital. The dynamic of managerialism 
developed in the context of a global crisis of over-accumulation and 
the privatisation of the RWAs has facilitated the development of a 
£25B. programme of capital investment. Similarly, the SWCs have either 
been transferred to Plc status or been incorporated into large MNCs 
in order to facilitate their operating as capital. The neo-liberal 
regulation constituted by OFWAT is premised on subjecting the 
operational activities of water undertakers to the abstract power of 
money as capital. In capitalist society production is the unity of 
labour process and valorisation process implied by the commodity 
being the immediate unity of value and use-value. The valorisation of 
water capital has therefore fundamental implications for the 
organisation of the labour processes through which water use-values 
are produced: abstract regulation necessary implies abstract 
management. 
In Part Two I explore the way in which the neo-liberal state 
restructuring of the water industry has imposed abstraction on the 
economic, political and ideological forms of water industry 
management. I approached the problem through a series of semi- 
structured 'key informant' interviews with water industry managers 
and personnel directly involved with state regulation. I also 
interviewed the representatives of concrete labour qua trade union 
officers and officials at local, regional and national level in an 
attempt to elicit the response of concrete to abstract labour. The 
fieldwork involved interviewing managers and personnel from four 
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water companies. The companies share the characteristics of having 
pursued 'quality management' strategies, developed new IT management 
information systems following the pressures of regulation, the 
commercialisation of employment relations and the marginalisation of 
engineers and trade unions. Two of the companies were former RWAs 
involved in water supply and sewage disposal and two were former 
SWCs involved in water supply only. 
The companies do however have some defining features. Western 
Water [WWL] was a former RWA privatised by the 1989 Water Act. The 
Company has focused on the development of 'quality management' and 
has established a special department to facilitate the development of 
'quality management' throughout group activities. The company has 
pursued an aggressive 'industrial relations' strategy and has replaced 
the bargaining and negotiatory arrangements with trade unions with a 
'company council' arrangement. Eastern Water [EWL] was also a former 
RWA and has focused on the application of IT to the development of 
'quality management' and the development of a polyvalent and flexible 
workforce. City Water [CWL] was one of the larger SWCs and supplies a 
large urban area with water. The company transferred to PLC status 
following the 1989 Water Act and in the context of pressure from the 
City has undertaken a major restructuring exercise involving the 
commercialisation of relations between different departments and 
functions within the company. Shire Water [SWL] was one of the 
smaller SWCs supplying water to a predominantly rural area. The 
company is a subsidiary of a large MNC and the parent company has 
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provided the dynamic for a major restructuring of the company's 
operations. The company has drastically reduced staffing levels and 
has attempted to replace technical/bureaucratic forms of management 
with commercial management. 
In undertaking the fieldwork I was concerned to investigate the 
way in which abstraction had been (re)imposed on the operational 
mechanisms of the water industry by the new regulatory framework. In 
Chapter Five I explore the way in which the new IT management 
information systems developed through the demands of the new 
regulatory framework have heightened management control over the 
labour process. In Chapter Six I examine the determination of the 
specific form of managerial control facilitated through the neo- 
liberal state qua the domination of concrete by abstract labour. In 
Chapter Seven I assess the implications of 'abstract management' with 
respect to the determination of concrete labour within the 
institutional mechanisms of the water industry. I consider the way in 
which the domination of concrete by abstract labour has resulted in 
the determination of new forms of abstract trade unionism. In Part 
Three I address the contradictions of abstraction and explore the 




State Regu1 LcDrz rid ManagQrial 
Contr-o1: Tics Contradictions of 
Abstrract Control Systems. 
The regulatory regime established by the 1989 Water Act has put 
increasing pressure on water undertakers to develop systems for the 
measurement and monitoring of levels of service and standards. The 
efficiency of water companies is measured by a series of operational 
targets that are defined and set by OFWAT, and which form the basis 
of the (RPI t K) formula. The formula determines the amount water 
companies are allowed to charge for their services in order to cover 
projected capital investment and therefore the values imposed by the 
formula impact directly on marginal rates of profit. The (RPI ± K) 
formula has an inbuilt element of efficiency improvement. The 
information is required by OFWAT in order to measure the performance 
of companies against a series of pre-determined targets in key areas; 
the data providing the basis for the comparative competition by which 
capital markets are able to assess the efficiency of water companies. 
The systems developed in order to collect, monitor and report this 
information have had a marked impact on the operational and 
managerial structures of control within water companies. The 
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collection and monitoring of regulatory information has resulted in 
the development of new management information systems and the 
establishment of new departments and posts which relate directly to 
the processes of regulation. 
In this Chapter I examine the way in which the development of 
the new information technology systems associated with regulation 
have facilitated an important shift in the locus of control within 
water companies. The development of the new systems has been part of 
the process through which concrete labour has been subordinated to 
the abstract control of the law of money. I explore this process 
through an examination of the way in which the development of new 
information systems associated with regulation have intensified 
management control; the way in which the intensification of control 
has been manifested in the increasing importance of the 'customer 
care' function; and the way in which the shift in the locus of control 
has been 'generalised' to non-operational areas such as the 
management of health and safety. 
5.1. Neo-Libcar- a1 Regulation and the 
Moriitor-ing of Quality Standards. 
In order to satisfy the new regulatory regime, water companies 
are required to collect and process vast amounts of information 
relating to the performance indicators. The main impact of the new 
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regulatory regime has been the introduction and development of 
increasingly sophisticated management information systems. Within the 
new regulatory framework, companies have to present a detailed 
account of their performance to OFWAT each year through the 'July 
Return'. The preparation of this document has imposed a significant 
new workload on water companies, and has had a significant impact on 
staff and resources. The RWAs had faced detailed operational 
regulation by the Department of the Environment [DoE] since 1979, and 
the measures used by the DoE have been adopted by OFWAT. The 
regulation of SWCs by statute was concerned with the level of 
dividends paid to shareholders rather than the quality of the water 
they supplied; although they were subject to the Public Health Acts, 
and in the post-war period the SWCs had duties under the 1945 Water 
Act to provide clean and wholesome water at adequate pressure. The 
impact of regulation has therefore been particularly marked with 
respect to the SWCs. 
5.1a. OFWAT, Abstract Information and the 
Determination of Abstract Control, 
The main consideration in the development of new information 
systems has been the need to produce data that is quantitatively 
commensurable and auditable. This has been reflected at CWL where 
the Company has been obliged to develop new management information 
systems in order to produce the information required by OFWAT. The 
Company has had to devote a considerable amount of money to the 
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engagement of systems analysis consultants in order to develop 
methodologies that would enable the development of repeatable and 
auditable information. The result has been that the Company's IT 
systems have been re-written, adapted and expanded in order to 
incorporate the OFWAT measures into the Company's systems and 
procedures. 
The systems produced in response to the pressures of regulation 
have provided an important stimulus to the attainment of quality 
management accreditation. CWL has decided to obtain BS 5750 in order 
to demonstrate the quality of the systems and procedures that have 
been developed. The principles underlying the development of the new 
systems can be illustrated with respect to the 'Customer Enquiry 
System'. The new system is designed to replace the old 'Complaints 
System': the old system failed to reflect the extent to which the 
Company received both complaints and enquiries. The new system 
resulted in a four-fold increase in the number of staff that had 
access to the system and were required to access data into the 
system. These staff have undergone training by the Company and are 
required to work to standards and procedures. The central feature of 
BS 5750 is consistency of approach and the new system guarantees a 
uniform approach by all staff accessing information across the 
various departments and functions of the Company. 
The importance of traceability is illustrated with respect to 
the information system developed at WWL. The most important 
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consideration in the development of the new system was the need to 
have a vigorous 'audit trail': that is, the need for all information, 
whether for internal purposes or for OFWAT, to be traceable to where 
it originated. For an area such as 'interruption of supplies' 
(Condition J Level of Service Indicator D03), a document exists which 
specifies the staff that have responsibility in this area and what 
those responsibilities are. Within the system, it is possible to 
identify from where and from whom information is originating. This 
information is now mostly held on computer data bases, and for each 
Condition J Indicator it is possible to trace the origins of the 
information via the system to the individual files in which it is 
held. 
The systems were developed in response to the pressures of 
regulation. However, the new systems have fundamentally increased the 
level and type of information continually available to senior 
managers: managers are able to constantly monitor the production of 
use-values and relate this to corporate policy and the reward and 
appraisal of managers and staff. The OFWAT performance indicators and 
the new systems that have been developed in order to monitor these 
standards are, therefore, central to the project of imposing 
abstraction on the neo-liberal water industry. 
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S, 1. b. Performance Monitoring and the 
Contradictions of Abstract Control. 
The Condition J and other OFWAT Performance indicators have 
been incorporated into the corporate and managerial strategies of 
water companies. This is reflected at WWL where the level of service 
indicators feature in the 'key results' of the business, and the 
ability of managers to monitor performance against the indicators is 
considered vitally important. The new systems have increased the 
information available to senior managers and enabled them to more 
effectively monitor the performance of subordinate managers and 
staff. The new systems have thus provided the basis for the 
restructuring of strategic asset and labour power allocation and 
planning. 
The Business Systems Controller at WWL is Richard Dawson. He is 
responsible for collating information from the various areas of the 
Company, and compiling a 'consolidated report' for the 'Senior 
Executive Team'. He suggests that the new systems will both increase 
the availability of operational information to senior managers and 
embed the procedures by which this information is collated within the 
technical and bureaucratic structure of the Company. The new systems 
have facilitated and contributed to fundamental changes in the 
managerial structures of water companies. Richard Dawson identifies a 
trend towards reducing the number of managerial levels in order to 
make the managerial function more 'hands-on-work' and to encourage 
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'managers to manage'. In essence, the new management ethos has 
involved pushing the locus of managerial responsibility further 'down 
the line'. The new approach utilises the skill and expertise of the 
staff directly involved in the operation of water distribution and 
sewerage systems, rather than relying on a hierarchy of (Fabian) 
'experts'. While such changes were considered to be inevitable by 
managers such as Richard Dawson, he suggests that the new systems 
have an important part to play in the development of the new 
managerial ethos. 
The new IT systems have given managers speedy access to the 
information that is required in order to monitor the line-managers 
and foreman to whom responsibility for operational effectiveness has 
been increasingly delegated. The development of the IT for this 
function has not been unproblematic: information has been either too 
'high-level' (abstract) or too 'detailed' (concrete). The development of 
abstract information systems has intensified the contradiction 
between value and use-value. There are two contradictory trends at 
work within WWL. Functional managers have been given greater 
autonomy and responsibility in the production of use-values in an 
attempt to introduce 'hands-on management' within the Company. On the 
other hand, the development of management information systems has 
increased the ability of senior management executives to monitor and 
control middle and line-managers. However, the information has not 
enabled senior executives to effectively control the production of 
use-values. The contradiction between value and use-value is not 
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resolvable by senior executives, but is lived by managers (Nichols & 
Beynon, 1977: 31). The contradiction has been mediated through the 
subjection of managers to the law of money. 
The subjection of managers to the law of money is illustrated 
with respect to the new systems of control developed at WWL. Richard 
Dawson is a line manager with responsibility for the development and 
operation of management information systems. He suggests that the 
Company has attempted to address the contradiction through the 
setting and monitoring of objectives and criteria through which 
managers are expected to manage, whilst leaving managers responsible 
for day-to-day operational effectiveness. Richard Dawson gives an 
example of the objectives and criteria to which managers are expected 
to conform: the need to ensure a positive public perception of the 
Company, whilst working within a strictly-set financial budget. 
Managers are given the autonomy to operate within the constraints 
imposed by the law of money - managerial trust is ultimately 
structured through the law of money: 
If you set down certain criteria by which you expect 
a manager to manage, and one of them might be we 
don't want to see WWL's name dragged through the 
press. But at the same time you've got a financial 
budget to work to..... So by setting appropriate 
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objectives and targets and monitoring those, you 
needn't monitor every single decision. 
The imposition of the law of money on the operational structure 
of the water industry is perceived by managers working within the 
industry in terms of an increasing focus on finance Andrew Harris is 
the Business and Customer Services Director at CWL. He suggests that 
an inevitable result of recession (crisis) is that 'the accountant 
comes to the top'. In the former SWC sector this has been compounded 
by the transfer of many companies to PLC status. This has resulted in 
a fundamental change in the relationship between water companies and 
the City. When companies such as CWL were SWCs, investors could add 
CWL shares to their portfolios in the expectation of a low but fixed 
return. As a result, the City had little interest in the performance 
of the Company. The transition to PLC status has totally transformed 
this relationship. The City now scrutinises the performance of the 
Company in great detail, and this has increased the focus on finance 
at every level. The impact has been particularly sharp with respect 
to line managers and supervisors, and as Andrew Harris suggests, 
between concrete and abstract labour: 
It's helped focus on costs and things like that. There 
are the endless clashes between "I'm an engineer and 
what I say is right "' and "I don't care who you are 
you're not having the money to spend! ". So there have 
been the fairly classic arguments, differences of 
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opinion, whatever way you wish to express it. So r 
think it's just part of that general trend. But there 
is an increasing concentration on cost, and that 
makes life increasingly difficult for the line 
managers, and that in itself brings some tensions. 
Some which are quite creative and good for the 
Company and some of which can be distractive. 
The intensification of the law of money has been manifested at 
SWL through a shift in the emphasis of the Company. The primary 
focus of the Company has shifted from the product to the customer. 
The new regulatory framework has had a profound impact on the 
organisational structure and culture of the Company. Helen Webster is 
'Customer Services Manager' at SWL. She suggests that the main impact 
of regulation has been a marked shift in the cultural orientation of 
the Company: a shift from an emphasis on the 'product' to an emphasis 
on the 'customer'. SWL was formerly a company dominated by engineers 
concerned only with the production of use-values. The new regulatory 
framework required the production of abstract values: 
This company was product orientated. We were 
concerned about the water. And if we got the water 
out of the ground, and we got it pushed out to 
people's taps, that was our job done. We didn't really 
believe that the end-user, the person that paid the 
bill had got any right to ask any questions and 
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anything else. We were run by engineers, the 
engineers filled all the top slots, and, therefore, 
they were totally product-orientated. When it came to 
customer service, "Well, what service do they want? " 
It was that kind of operation. The regulation that 
came with privatisation made a dramatic difference. 
Because all of a sudden we had to start counting 
things and collecting information. And it was a major 
shock to the company's culture. 
The restructuring of SWL has involved a shift in the locus of 
power between engineers concerned with the production of concrete 
use-values and managers concerned with the production of abstract 
values. The pressure to 'count things' and 'collect information' was a 
direct result of state-imposed pressure to improve efficiency. This 
was facilitated through the built-in efficiency improvements that 
OFWAT and the DoE have built into the Company's K profile. The 
pressure has resulted in a fundamental restructuring and 
rationalisation of the Company's operations. Immediately following the 
introduction of the new framework, the Company employed a team of 
management consultants to look at the scope for reducing staffing 
levels either through rationalisation or through increasing the use 
of sub-contractors. The result of this was a 30% reduction in the 
workforce through a voluntary redundancy programme that drastically 
reduced the age-profile of the Company. 
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The restructuring programme had a 'marked benefit' for SWL with 
respect to the removal of staff with entrenched 'concretist' 
attitudes. However, the constitution of the (Fabian) managerialist 
labour process rendered the removal of these staff extremely 
problematical with respect to the operational effectiveness of the 
company. A major feature of the managerialist form of the company 
was that 'nobody wrote anything down', and the result of the 
voluntary redundancy scheme was the disposal of a vast amount of 
experience 'tied up in employees' heads'. The immediate impact of the 
scheme was therefore operational ineffectiveness and heightened 
levels of unrest and disquiet among the remaining staff. The primary 
management strategy for dealing with this situation has been the 
development of new (quality) management systems that codify 
operations within formal procedural systems. 
The development of the new managerial information systems has 
been part of the process through which abstraction has been imposed 
on the operational activity of the water industry. The systems have 
heightened the contradiction between value and use-value within 
water companies: abstract monitoring has failed to facilitate the 
effective (abstract) control of concrete labour. The new systems have 
had important implications with respect to the deskilling of staff 
and the knowledge of managers and staff have been increasingly 
objectified in the bureaucratic structures of water companies. The 
(concrete) bureaucratic mechanisms developed in order to ensure the 
effective production of use-values are ultimately subordinated to the 
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abstract control constituted by the law of money. The most 
fundamental manifestation of the process of abstraction has been the 
'commercialisation' of management control systems and labour 
processes. 
S. I. C. Abstract Management and the 
Commercialisation of Social Relations. 
The new mechanisms of abstract control have been legitimated 
through the discourse of consumerism: 'customer care' legitimating the 
'commercialisation' of social relations within water companies and 
between water companies and their consumers 111. The OFWAT 
performance measures have been embedded in the bureaucratic 
structures of water companies. The DG measures are considered to 
have facilitated greater efficiency through the way in which the new 
control systems allow the production of use-values to be mediated 
through the abstract control of money. The DG measures have been 
incorporated into the managerial ethos and the rewards system of 
water companies. Andrew Harris at CWL suggests that the measures 
have been incorporated into the managerial ethos of the Company, and 
have allowed to the Company to focus on areas such as 'response to 
written correspondence' where the company's performance was less 
efficient than senior managers had imagined: 
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In some cases we were not properly measuring some of 
the things, and so it's concentrated our minds, and 
the classic is response to written correspondence. 
Where you think you are doing quite well, but if you 
do a year-on-year audit, and you're doing not quite 
as well as you thought. So they have now become part 
of the management ethos. Most senior managers in 
this company now work on performance-related 
payments, they have a contract, and these measures 
are included in those performance-related contracts. 
And we monitor them on a monthly basis, we have a 
monthly performance summary for the attention of the 
board and that includes a large chunk covering all 
the Director General's measures. 
The introduction of the new regulatory regime introduced 
through OFWAT has had an important impact on the mode and ethos of 
management at CWL. Most importantly, the development of a new ethos 
of 'monitoring'. OFWAT has provided an important dynamic to the 
development of abstract management. As Andrew Harris suggests, the 
existence of an outside regulator has acted as an important stimulus 
to increasing levels of monitoring within the Company: developing a 
managerial ethos of 'monitoring' that has subsequently been extended 
into areas not covered by the DG measures. The extent to which the 
increasing importance of monitoring has been legitimated through the 
discourse of 'customer care' is illustrated through the impact of the 
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DG measures on managerial control systems and labour processes at 
SWL. 
The DG performance indicators have had an important impact on 
the organisational structure and culture at SWL. The indicators in 
respect of dealing with complaints and billing queries have become an 
important element in the Company's culture; staff working in these 
areas are fully aware of the time-frames and constraints attendant 
on them with respect to the Regulator, and indeed, these constraints 
and time-frames have been built into the new IT systems. The Company 
has developed a system that automatically sends out warnings to 
customers in respect of interruptions to supply (Condition I Level of 
Service Indicator DG3). The Company has established a special unit 
with the exclusive function of maintaining and monitoring adequate 
pressure (Condition I Level of Service Indicator DG2). The most 
important impact, however, has been with respect to the establishment 
of the 'Customer Service Unit'; a unit that has provided an important 
catalyst in increasing the importance of customer care throughout the 
organisation. 
5.2. Abstr-act Regulation and tkze 
Coritradictiorns of "Customer Cr". ae 
The determination of 'customer care' as a management form is 
constituted by the need to deliver the administratively determined 
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use-values constituted by the DG Measures whilst maintaining the 
valorisation of capital. This is the contradiction of the form of 
state regulation constituted by OFWAT. The function of OFWAT is to 
encourage 'comparative competition' between companies with respect to 
levels of service. The (RPI ± K) formula ensures that companies 
achieve the standards at least cost. The valorisation imperatives of 
the neo-liberal water industry have had a fundamental impact on 
forms of management and labour processes manifested in the 
increasing domination of the customer cure function. The 'customer 
care' function is premised on the abstract customer of neo-liberal 
social and economic theory, and this articulates the fundamental 
contradiction of neo-liberal state regulation. 
S. 2. a. Abstract Competition and the "Marks- 
and-Spencerisation" of the Neo-Liberal Water 
Industry. 
The operational performance of companies is measured through 
the application of a number of 'level of service' performance 
indicators. While the definitions are clear and unambiguous, the way 
in which they have been interpreted by undertakers following 
privatisation has resulted in a number of problems with respect to 
the regulation of the industry. OFWAT inherited the performance 
indicators from the DoE, and has since attempted to tighten up and 
amend the definitions in order to ensure that they provide a uniform 
and reliable measure of the performance of water companies. In 
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addition to the annual audit of company performance, OFWAT 
undertakes an annual audit of the methodology on the basis of which 
the audit return is constructed. Individual companies have to satisfy 
OFWAT that operational information is collected and presented 
according to a uniform formula: a vital pre-requisite for the 
introduction and development of 'comparative competition' between 
companies. 
The main impact of the 'comparative competition' developed by 
OFWAT has been with regard to providing a dynamic to the development 
of abstract management systems and to the improvement of efficiency. 
The comparability of water companies is vitally important for OFWAT 
as it provides the basis of its neo-liberal function as a market 
proxy. The task of balancing the concrete specificity within which a 
company operates with the need to produce information on performance 
according to uniform and abstract formulae is perceived as a critical 
problem by managers. The problems of interpretation, and the enduring 
specificity of the problems faced by individual companies, in addition 
to the increasingly diverse manner in which companies deal with 
issues and problems, have combined to highlight the enduring problem 
of achieving uniformity. 
The comparative data suggested that CWL was performing poorly 
with respect to written customer complaints (Condition I Level of 
Service Indicator DG7). The pressure from OFWAT was the primary 
dynamic in the development of the new 'Customer Services Centre'. 
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While Andrew Harris recognises that the inter-company comparisons 
are useful initiators of customer care developments, the way in which 
the information is compiled results in the absolute measures of 
performance being of questionable validity. Companies employ their 
own independent auditors, and the latter are given very little 
guidance by OFWAT on the methodology through which the 'July Return' 
is prepared. Indeed, research carried out by CWL suggests that the 
absolute levels of performance developed by OFWAT are highly 
questionable: 
Some confidential work we've done with other water 
companies..... (has) compared the way in which 
certifiers have dealt with us, and we are fairly sure 
that while the certifier year-on-year deals with 
their own company in a fair way, we don't believe 
there is total compatibility between the way one 
certifier is treating one company and one the other. 
So we don't believe the absolute values coming out of 
it. 
The competition between water companies is constituted by 
abstract competition. This is illustrated with respect to the impact 
of comparative competition at SWL. The data generated by OFWAT has 
had a limited impact on the operational effectiveness of the Company, 
but for Helen Webster, OFWAT has had an important competitive effect 
on the Company with respect to the K profile imposed on the Company, 
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particularly with respect to the price SWL charges for water in 
comparison with neighbouring companies. The K profile imposed on SWL 
is very skewed with rapid increases in the first five years, followed 
by increasingly lower and eventually a negative K in the following 
five years. The companies on SWL's borders have been given a more 
constant K. The divergent K values have resulted in a series of 
'public relations' problems for managers at SWL. Senior managers at 
SWL have been involved in a continuous process of attempting to 
renegotiate K with OFWAT; highlighting the extent to which (abstract) 
competition with respect to price predominates over (concrete) 
competition in respect of operational performance. 
The systems developed in response to the new regulatory 
framework have therefore facilitated a tightening of abstract 
managerial control within water companies. The market proxy 
constituted by OFWAT cannot measure and make comparisons on the 
basis of the concrete performance of water companies: on the 
contrary, the regulator both reflects and articulates the increasing 
domination of the water industry by abstract management. The 
domination of abstract management is perceived by managers working 
in the industry as 'competition'; an abstract dynamic that demands an 
ever-increasing emphasis on 'customer service'. The competitors are 
increasingly seen as the exemplars of the UK private sector, the 
comparative competition of OFWAT ever-more marginal: water companies 
compete with Marks and Spencer and Boots rather than each other. The 
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principal managerial objective has increasingly become the 'Marks-and- 
Spencerisation' of the water industry. 
How is this competitive pressure perceived by managers working 
within the industry, and what has been its impact on the operational 
and managerial structure of the industry? Richard Dawson at WWL is 
in front-line contact with OFWAT, and he suggests that the role of 
OFWAT in facilitating comparative competition is simply one element 
in the increasingly competitive social context in which the water 
industry operates. OFWAT has had a marked impact with respect to the 
pressure to develop increasingly complex management information 
systems and audit trails. The notion of competition however extends 
far beyond the pressures exerted by OFWAT: 
I think (the pressure of comparative competition) is 
in there, amongst several other aspects, whether its 
competition against Marks and Spencer, or whatever. I 
think there are aspects of customer service which 
aren't necessarily unique to the water industry. 
Therefore, if it's a question of how quickly you 
respond to a telephone call, or whether it's the 
appearance of the inspector when he arrives on your 
doorstep, a matter of keeping an appointment, then I 
think the comparisons are legitimate outside of the 
water industry. I was aware last week when my wife 
rung up and the dishwasher had broken down. The lass 
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on the other end of the phone said "We'll be around 
tomorrow morning". That was something that was 
beyond my expectation. But that is your competition. 
The development of abstract management in the former SWCs has 
lagged behind companies that were formerly in the state sector. At 
CWL therefore the introduction of the new regulatory framework, and 
the concomitant transformation of the Company from SWC to PLC has 
had a fundamental impact upon the organisation of the Company. This 
has been particularly evident with the form of management through 
which the Company is constituted: a shift from concrete to abstract 
management. Andrew Harris contrasts the two forms of management: 
As a statutory company it was engineering-driven and 
potentially concretist. Everything had to be "Don't 
bother me with these management concepts, get on 
with it lad! Get out there and if you've got a 
problem just keep throwing staff and money at it 
until it goes away". We have now shifted towards 
something that says "Hang on! The whole purpose of 
running this business is to supply that customer out 
there with what they want. L, et's spend a bit more 
time understanding that, and then we'll come back 
through and that will be the driver of all the 
systems". 
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The shift from concrete to abstract management has been 
accompanied by a shift in the form of competition: the comparative 
'concrete' competition developed through OFWAT is considered marginal 
to social trends and attitudes that expect heightened levels of 
customer service. Andrew Harris describes the way in which he 
perceives these trends: 
There's been a general shift in the country, that it 
won't accept as much paternalism, it won't accept "I 
know what's best for you! " It will say, "Why should I 
accept that? Why should I accept shoddy service? 
Marks and Spencers don't give it to me! " Well why 
don't we do it? We need to find the water equivalent 
of that. People now expect you to be open all hours, 
they expect they can go shopping any day of the 
week, so why can't they ring you up on any day of 
the week? Why can't I have an appointment at 7 0' 
clock at night? It seems to us that its the whole 
social pattern. Its no good often going to people in 
the day time, because there would be no one at home, 
most houses are empty. So the pattern of people has 
changed and they are expecting the companies to 
change to match that pattern. 
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Andrew Harris argues that the idea that water companies compete 
against each other is ludicrous. Customers only deal with one 
Company, and the diverse specificity of the (concrete) situations of 
individual companies make comparisons between companies as developed 
by OFWAT 'irrelevant' as far as the individual customer is concerned. 
Customers look to the 'big market place' and compare companies with 
Marks and Spencer and with the other utilities: 
That is what they compare you with because that is 
what they know. They don't get served by two water 
companies so they can say "Its much better on 
Tuesday! " They know you, so they compare you with 
your market place, which is the big market place...... 
It would be wrong to suggest that all companies 
should provide the same service. Quite wrong, 
completely. You're dealing with different areas, 
you're dealing with different waters, different 
things, different expenses. Similarly you get a 
different service from TESCO, Marks and Spencers, 
Sainsbury's. But you have a choice between the 
service of Sainsbury and Marks and Spencers. So we 
must live with that sort of comparability. 
It is through these perceived changes in the 'outside world' 
that managers theorise the increasing Importance of abstract 
management and abstract competition. The development of abstract 
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management in the water industry highlights the importance of the 
state in the restructuring process. Management is abstracted from the 
particular use-values that it is concerned with producing. The 
fundamental feature of the Marks-and-Spencerisation of the water 
industry is the increasing importance of the (abstract) customer care 
function. Abstract regulation and abstract management have been 
legitimated through the discourse of 'consumerism': managerial 
strategies and labour processes subordinated to the interests of the 
abstract marginal-maximising customer of neo-liberal economic theory. 
I will now explore the specificity of the way in which the 
development of abstract regulation and abstract management have 
impacted on social relations within water companies. 
5,2, b. Case Study One: The Internal Market and 
the Development of "Customer Service Teams" at 
WWL. 
The process of collecting and monitoring of levels of service 
information has had a marked impact on the organisational structure 
of WWL primarily through the development of 'Customer Service 
Teams'. Within each operating area of the Company a 'Business 
Services' Department' has been established in order to coordinate all 
the functions that are not directly concerned with the treatment, 
supply and distribution of water, the treatment of sewage, or plant 
and buildings maintenance. The departments thus coordinate the 
administration, finance and planning functions. The Business Services 
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Department is headed by a Business Services Manager to whom three 
section heads report: namely, the heads of Office Administration, 
Customer Services and Management Information. 
The Customer Service Teams have direct first-line contact with 
customers, and operate the 'Customer Services System' through which 
every contact with a customer is logged and can therefore be traced 
and audited. The 'Management Information Group' is concerned with 
both the dissemination of information from the centre and the 
collection of performance data from within areas of the Company. The 
Group is responsible for gathering information on levels of service 
and comparing performance against performance targets. The 
information is transmitted to the centre and forms the basis of the 
Monthly Report to the Managing Director. The Report contains basic 
financial data, reports from all the executive directors to the 
Managing Director, and in summary detail all the levels of 
performance which are presented in both aggregate form and broken 
down by (operational and geographical) area. 
The structure of management accountability and control 
associated with the Business Services Department represents an 
important, if not fundamental, change in the organisational structure 
of the Company. The team leaders within the Business Services 
Department report directly to the Business Services Manager, who is 
responsible directly to an area manager, who in turn reports directly 
to the Operations Director. The main dynamic for the establishment of 
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the new structure was to acquire consistency and coordination in the 
way in which the Company dealt with information relating to 
customers. The functions that are now contained within the Business 
Services Department have always existed in some form, but the new 
system brings them all together under one manager. Prior to 
restructuring, the management information and finance functions would 
have reported to the Divisional Accountant, the customer services 
function to the Distribution Manager (who dealt mainly with water), 
and the administrative function would have reported to the Personnel 
Manager. 
The customer service function is an important element in 
developing the company into a 'quality organisation' that delivers a 
'quality product'. For Richard Dawson, the Customer Service Teams are 
able to act as a catalyst for infusing the culture of 'customer care' 
throughout the organisation: 
I think the fundamental issue associated with how 
well we treat the customer, is how well do we treat 
each other internally. What I think is that the 
Customer Service Team have the need to speak to 
everybody, because they don't know what the next 
customer call is going to be about.... and therefore, 
they have the need to speak to everyone in an area. 
It's from the comments of our Customer Service Teams, 
that you learn what's going wrong with these internal 
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communications..... and things like the continuous 
improvement programmes that are currently underway 
there is a lot that the Customer Service Team are 
able to put into that. 
The production of a customer-conscious, quality organization has 
resulted in the breaking down of functional rigidities within the 
Company. This has been particularly marked with respect to the area 
of company-customer interface. The Customer Service Teams have 
provided an important catalyst for change. The comments and concerns 
of staff working in the Customer Service Teams have been used to 
develop and define company policy on customer service and standards, 
and these have been incorporated into quality management procedures. 
Richard Dawson describes the main concerns which underpinned the 
establishment of customer service procedures: 
What we want to get away from is people trying to 
persuade, cajole, beg or whatever, somebody in another 
department to do something. There should be clearly 
defined company standards in these respects. I think 
the Company desire to achieve that sort of quality 
product has looked at what is available and the best 
way forward, who's got the experience, who's got the 
good ideas based on sound experience, and it's 
inevitable that the Customer Service Teams have gone 
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along with it eventually to develop the whole gamut 
of customer services into a quality product. 
The development of quality management, and the concomitant 
development of the Customer Service Department, represent important 
changes to the organisational structure and culture of WWL. Managers 
such as Richard Dawson do not, however, perceive the changes as the 
product of a conscious strategy or initiative. The changes were 
happening, and would happen, and the quality initiatives merely helped 
to focus upon the results of a more fundamental and ubiquitous 
process: 
The main dynamic I think is the culture of this 
country, I would broaden it out to that extent. I 
think that these days because of things like the 
Citizens' Charter, because of increased competition 
and the desire to achieve greater market share 
through improving customer service, through the 
pressure from the Customer Services Committee, 
through all sorts of different reasons, I think there 
is a culture and an expectation there on the part of 
customers, that they expect certain standards of 
service. 
- 267 - 
The dynamic to which Richard Dawson alludes is the states The 
state articulates the social forms through which the company is 
constituted in its neo-liberal form. This form articulates the 
contradiction between value and use-value in its neo-liberal 
determination. Hence, for Richard Dawson it is important to balance 
the ever-growing expectations of customers with the ultimate 
constraint of the market: 
It would be unfair to say as a result of all that 
we're being dragged, its a matter of actually staying 
at the pace or keeping ahead of that sort of level of 
expectation. So I think that any company would be 
foolish to necessarily "jump off the cliff", and say 
"Yes I'll spend whatever it takes! ". Everyone's got 
their budget as to what they can afford, and you've 
got to achieve a balance. But that balance is 
achieved only by being aware of the world around, and 
what that world demands. 
5,2. c. Case Study Two: Managerial Control and 
"Customer Care" at SWL. 
The development of abstract regulation has resulted in an 
increasing focus on 'customer care' at SWL. This has been manifested 
through the development of the 'Customer Service Unit' [CSU]. The unit 
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is staffed by two women selected on the basis of their experience of 
many aspects of the Company's business, and has the function of 
dealing with any 'customer problems' that are referred to it. The unit 
has the objective of ensuring the satisfaction of the customer; of 
pursuing problems through the relevant department or departments 
until they are resolved, and then reporting back to the customer. The 
unit is part of an initiative within the Company to focus awareness 
on 'customer care' issues: to pervade 'customer care' into all aspects 
of the Company's structure and culture. Helen Webster is Customer 
Services Manager at SWL, and she suggests that 'customer care isn't 
just about those people that speak to the customer, it's about all 
the things that we do in the organisation'. Thus, every member of 
staff at SWL has undergone between 4 and 6 days 'customer care 
training'. The programme highlights the importance of keeping 
customers 'informed'; of highlighting the extent to which most 
complaints arise from a lack of information rather than poor 
performance. 
Helen Webster describes the way this approach was employed in a 
serious mains burst, through which 12,000 properties were without 
water for 15 hours, and contrasts this with the old 'concretist' 
approach: 
In the bad old days, what we'd have done is we'd have 
gone flat out to get the water main repaired, that 
would have been all we were concerned about. We 
-269- 
might have sent a van round, just to warn people that 
the water was off, which was a bit pointless because 
they could already tell that by just turning on their 
taps. What we did this time was that one part of the 
organisation still went flat out to get the water 
main repaired, but the rest of the organisation, and 
that was mainly the office-based people who weren't 
directly involved in the repair, they took on board 
the customer relations aspect. We were actually using 
some of our other non-operational staff simply 
driving round the area talking to people, to see as 
many people as they could - not necessarily knocking 
on every door, but they'd call at the local post 
office, and say, "Well this is the situation! ". The 
result of that was that we didn't have one single 
written complaint from those customers. Simply 
because they knew what was happening. They knew it 
was a mains burst and they knew we were working flat 
out to repair it. 
The 'customer care' function at SWL is comprised of three 
elements: the development of the CSU, heightening the awareness of 
'customer care' and improving the way customers are kept informed. 
The CSU has played a central role in the latter two developments by 
making managers from across the organisation focus on the issue of 
'customer care'. The main function of the unit is dealing with written 
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complaints; although it also deals with overspill from the telephonist 
and other departments with any 'nasty' calls received by the Company. 
The CSU also deals with OFWAT on a day-to-day basis. Incoming 
complaints are logged on to a computer system and passed to the 
appropriate head of department. The system is a continuous auditing 
system, and there has to be a file in existence for every complaint 
number that is logged. This allows the system to be audited each 
year for OFWAT. The system develops an audit trail for every 
complaint; making it possible to account for every complaint. The 
system highlights unresolved complaints and complaints where the 
customer has not been reported back to within the specified time- 
frame. The CSU continuously monitor the system, and have the function 
of chasing-up outstanding complaints with managers and heads of 
department. 
This has had an important impact with respect to managerial 
control within the Company. On a day-to-day basis, the complaints 
received by the Company (for example, poor water quality or pressure) 
were previously assigned to the inspectors and mostly 'left to drift', 
with nobody following the complaint up unless the consumer re- 
contacted the Company with respect to the complaint. With the 
introduction of the new systems, the complaint is logged on and 
assigned a number, following which it is assigned to an individual 
inspector who receives a print out of the complaint, and who has the 
responsibility of reporting back on the complaint. If the complaint is 
not 'signed off' by the inspector it is followed up by the CSU. 
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Margaret Jones works in the CSU at SWL, and she suggests that 
the unit has provided an important discipline with respect to 
instilling 'customer care' into managers and staff within the Company. 
The unit has 'improved' the realisation among staff that there is a 
'consumer at the end of the line' - particularly among departments 
which have little or no customer contact. The new IT systems have 
played a central r6le in this process; allowing the CSU access to the 
performance of managers across the organisation. Initially the CSU 
met with a great deal of hostility and suspicion. People in the 
organisation were not used to being 'answerable' to anyone; which for 
Margaret Jones allowed complaints to fester away. These unresolved 
complaints constituted the raw material which was developed by the 
press in order to give the Company a bad name. Staff initially failed 
to recognise that the increased monitoring and control of their 
activities was in fact a process designed to make the Company more 
efficient on behalf of the company and the customer: 
When we first started to tighten up on it, people 
kind of felt that we were looking over their 
shoulders to see what they were doing. Instead of 
looking out for the Company and the customer 
interest. And it's all for your PR at the end of the 
day, if you give good service then you get good 
reports. 
- 272 - 
The 'customer care' function has played an important role in 
respect of both the intensification of the labour process and the 
tightening up of management control structures. Through the 
introduction of dedicated new systems of information technology the 
CSU has acted as a catalyst for the increasing domination of abstract 
management within the company; together with the concomitant 
restructuring of all aspects of management, employee and customer 
relations within the Company. The 'customer care' function has 
however heightened the contradiction between value and use-value 
within the regulatory and operational structures of the water 
industry: heightening the expectations of consumers whilst 
simultaneously mediating the provision of water services through the 
abstract power of money. 
S. 2. d. Abstract State Regulation and the 
Contradictions of "Customer Care". 
The regulatory framework constituted by OFWAT has heightened 
the demands of consumers for use-values whilst regulating the 
provision of water services through the law of money. These are the 
contradictory determinations of 'customer care'. The regulatory 
framework constituted by OFWAT has heightened the expectations of 
consumers. The function of management within the water industry has 
become the mediation of these demands through the establishment and 
maintenance of financial constraints. These developments have 
heightened the importance of 'customer care' and corporate image and 
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identity. It has become increasingly important for water companies to 
demonstrate the extent to which they deliver value for money. 
This has been reflected at WWL where the Company has had to 
respond to a pressure from customers for ever-increasing standards 
of customer service. The pressure for ever-increasing levels of 
service has had a fundamental impact on the culture of the Company. 
Richard Dawson suggests that water companies have become more aware 
of both competition and all aspects of service provision. This has 
resulted in the increasing operational effectiveness of the industry, 
and highlighted the importance of presenting a good image of the 
Company and its operations. The new framework has made WWL more 
'customer conscious' with regard to service provisions that impinge 
directly on the customer; highlighting the importance of 'image' and 
(abstract) corporate identity in the neo-liberal industry. Richard 
Dawson gives the following example: 
Reservoirs are typically a hundred years old, if there 
was a delapidated stone wall or an old rusty gate, 
the feeling would have been "Well, it doesn't really 
matter, it's not doing anyone any harm". But it is a 
significant point of contact. People will be going out 
and enjoying their picnic at the weekend (and) they 
are much more likely to form a good or bad view of 
the company as a result of what they see and what 
they experience in a situation like that than they 
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used to. Therefore, I think it's awakening the company 
to all the various influences on its image and 
reputation. 
The water industry in its post-1989 form is marked from its 
earlier form primarily with regard to an increasing focus on finance 
and an increased emphasis and focus on the importance of 'customer 
care'. Senior managers are somewhat ambiguous with regard to 
isolating the main dynamic to account for the latter development. 
Andrew Harris at CWL, for example, suggests that the main dynamic has 
been a marked cultural shift within British society that has resulted 
in a heightened level of consumer consciousness among ordinary 
people. He describes the way he perceives the new culture and the 
way it has impacted upon the Company in terms of increasing numbers 
of complaints and enquiries: 
There is no doubt that the level of complaints does 
go up and up and up and up. But it is also true that 
we are doing very few things differently now, in fact 
we are doing most things better than we were thirty 
years ago. My own belief is that there just a general 
cultural shift within the nation and that people will 
complain, or they will enquire or they will ask. I 
mean even four years ago, we sent the bills out - no 
trouble! Now an increasing number of people ring up 
just to check, or just ask or want more information. 
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Now I don't think that's anything to do with OFWAT, 
that's just that people look at the bill and think 
"Perhaps I ought to ring up and ask about that". So I 
think that is the bigger drive. 
Similarly, Richard Dawson, at WWL feels that the changes 
facilitated by the new regulatory framework would to a large extent 
have happened whether the new framework had been developed or not. 
The culture of the country has undergone a profound change towards 
'consumerism', and the increasing demands and expectations of 
consumers would have forced the industry to raise the profile of 
customers whatever the system of ownership or regulation: 
I see that the current system has quite definitely 
raised the profile of the customer. But the only 
caveat that I would put on that is whether it would 
have happened anyway, given the shifting culture of 
the country and the Government through things like 
the Citizens' Charter.... But it has raised the profile 
of the customer, and the significance of customer 
needs and expectations is very very much higher now 
than it was ten years ago. 
The contradictory premises of OFWAT are perceived by managers 
working within the water industry in terms of the 'unrealism' of the 
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Regulator. Richard Dawson projects that the levels of service 
indicators will become increasingly important, and further, that the 
regulation of the industry will become increasingly difficult unless 
OFWAT become more realistic and practical in their interpretation of 
the indicators. In the neo-liberal production/consumption 
configuration, the state will increasingly reflect the exigencies of 
the labour process; the extent to which this exigency is not met 
being reflected in struggle between state and industry; between the 
state ensuring the production of use-values and the water industry 
ensuring the successful valorisation of capital. Richard Dawson 
highlights the 'unrealism' of OFWAT: 
You feel that with the Director General this is his 
extreme..... because to stop at his extreme is just so 
unrealistic, it's beyond belief. An example of that 
would be when the Customer Service Committee started 
talking about timed appointments..... While on the face 
of it that's great we all like to make appointments, 
given the very nature of the workload where you're 
coping with the unexpected, mains bursts and all the 
rest of it, we feel that it's appropriate at this 
stage to say "Well, we'll see you on Tuesday 
morning..... " But to home in on eleven o'clock, and to 
be penalised if you're a minute late or a minute 
early seems a bit harsh. 
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As a neo-liberal state form, OFWAT cannot move beyond the 
limits imposed by its contradictory determination. Richard Dawson 
suggests that the way in which water companies go about the business 
of supplying water and disposing of sewage has not changed: use- 
values continue to be produced in the same way as before. The major 
changes and developments have been concerned with the attitude and 
manner of the company and its staff - the development of abstract 
management: 
If you look at the basic operations on the part of 
the workforce, and the basic methods and systems 
that they employ, there's been no change at all. I 
think that like any other industry, if you get the 
person at the sharp end actually doing the work, 
digging the hole, or whatever, that privatisation, or 
regulation hasn't actually made any difference to 
them, I wouldn't say in the way they do it, but 
certainly in what they do, it hasn't changed. What I 
would suggest, however, is that the way in which they 
do it, and the attitude and manner in which they do 
it, is changing. 
The state has been central in the development of abstract 
management; and this demonstrates the enduring contradiction of the 
capitalist state in its neo-liberal form. The state being 
simultaneously involved in the administrative determination of use- 
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values and the regulation of these use-values through abstraction. 
The rille of the state in the development of abstract management is 
highlighted by Helen Webster of SWL who questions the inevitability 
of change, and highlights the importance of OFWAT (the state) as a 
catalyst for change: 
I think they would have changed anyway, but over a 
lot longer period, a great deal longer. I think we are 
probably talking about ten or twenty years. I mean 
already in the 1980s customer power had started to 
come to the fore, but there was no compulsion on the 
water industry to actually do anything about it. But 
the regulation actually brought in this compulsory 
aspect to things and it forced the companies to 
change. I just don't believe that they would have 
changed in anything like the same time scale, I 
really don't. In fact I suspect that some of them may 
never have changed at all. 
In general senior managers feel that the existence of an 
outside regulator is a healthy and positive situation; particularly 
the way in which the regulator has helped companies to focus on 
'customer care' and 'performance' issues. Senior managers are, however, 
critical of the regulator in respect of the negative image that OFWAT 
develops of the industry in public statements. Andrew Harris at CWL 
feels that the industry must learn to manage the regulator better. 
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OFWAT is felt to have a great potential in helping customers to 
'understand' the arguments concerning the costs and benefits of 
capital spending projects. The criticism of OFWAT is that it 
highlights deficiencies in service without accompanying this with an 
assessment of remedied costs. The depoliticisation of the industry 
implies that capital spending is met from either revenue or 
borrowing, and both options result in higher water charges. It is 
here that OFWAT is failing to fulfil its potential as a truly neo- 
liberal state form: 
(OFWAT) seems to be operating at a fairly low level 
at the moment, and it doesn't seem to be doing much 
in terms of public understanding of the industry. It 
tends to help The Sun with its next banner headline. 
The banner headline has a case, but only one side of 
the case. I don't think it's helping in the 
construction of the debate about some of those other 
things. Now, I appreciate that it's immensely 
difficult, (but) you should never under-estimate the 
stupidity of the customer. To get general debates 
over the question of water is very difficult. 
Similarly, I think that most people are intelligent 
enough to understand the basic arguments, and I think 
that's where OFWAT has a big role to play. 
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Andrew Harris outlines two examples where the water industry 
and the regulator could work together in order to temper the 
voracious appetites of consumers for greater quantities and 
increasingly effective use values: 
There are areas where the regulator should be 
working more closely with the industry to help the 
customer. For example, a lot of the stuff about 
leakage, a lot of the stuff about water quality. Yes, 
you could improve the water quality! Yes, you could 
reduce the leakage levels! The awareness argument is 
"Oh my God, 30% of this is wasting away and it's 
costing £500M". It would be helpful for us to debate, 
well if it's costing £500M for it to leak away, but it 
may cost you £15000M to put it right. So that is 
where I think OFWAT can help the industry. It doesn't 
have to be an apologist for it, (but) I think it can 
help because it will make it possible for the public 
to understand and make some choices, because it is 
truly independent. Similarly, the things about water 
quality, you know "It's terrible! Lead in the water! 
Must reduce it! " But one person has their life 
shortened by ten minutes because of a lead pipe. Is 
it better to spend another £5B getting lead out of 
the system or would you be better putting an extra 
crash barrier on the M1 or whatever. It's that sort 
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of thing we're thinking. Probably the regulator fails 
the public, that's where it hasn't helped, and those 
are the areas where I think it should go into. 
The development of abstract management has re-imposed the law 
of money on the bureaucratic structures of control developed through 
managerialism. The contradictory determination of state regulation 
and operational management has precipitated 'customer care' as the 
principal ideological form through which the contradiction between 
value and use-value is mediated. The contradictions of 'customer care' 
are manifested in the struggle between OFWAT and water companies 
over the level of abstraction at which the interests of consumers are 
to be considered. The development of abstract management is part of 
the process through which concrete labour has been increasingly 
subordinated to abstract labour within the water industry. I will now 
move on to demonstrate the fundamental nature of these developments 
through a consideration of the way in which the health and safety of 
concrete labourers within the water industry has become increasingly 
subordinated to the abstract power of the law of money. 
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5.3. State RqBgulation aril th 
Coritradict ions of Abstract Health 
and Safety MQxntigemernt. 
The principal feature of the regulation and management of 
'service' in the neo-liberal water industry has been an increasing 
emphasis on finance and 'customer care'. These developments have 
resulted in the refocussing of managerial responsibility at 
increasingly low levels, and resulted in a concomitant increase in the 
development of new technology to monitor and control the line 
managers and foremen to whom control has been delegated. The 
development of abstract control has also become increasingly 
important with respect to the management of the health and safety 
function. The imposition of the law of money on the water industry 
has shifted the locus of control between concrete and abstract labour 
across all levels and functions of water industry operations. The 
management of health and safety has, therefore, become increasingly 
abstract: the health and safety of labourers within the water 
industry subordinated to the valorisation imperatives of abstract 
management. 
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5.3. a. State Regulation and the Abstraction of 
Health and Safety Management. 
The neo-liberal restructuring of the water industry has had a 
marked impact on the regulation and management of health and safety. 
The disaggregation of the industry has resulted in a situation in 
which the water industry no longer meets as an industry in order to 
discuss health and safety issues. The state regulation and 
administration of health and safety is the function of the Health and 
Safety Executive IHSE]. The neo-liberal restructuring of the water 
industry has transformed the relationship between the HSE and the 
water industry. Following privatisation, the 11SE consults with water 
companies individually prior to the introduction of new standards. 
The privatisation of the water industry has resulted in the 
disaggregation of safety management and development. The 
disaggregation is legitimated by senior managers in terms of the way 
in which it allows individual companies to develop safety policy in 
the context of their own individual circumstances and problems. 
David Morris is a Divisional Personnel Manager at EWL, and is 
the member of the senior management team with special responsibility 
for safety, Water companies, he suggests, are now constituted as 
separate and independent limited companies and this is reflected in 
the form of communication between the water industry and state 
agencies such as the HSE. Companies have a diverse range of material 
(financial) and cultural exigencies, and increasingly adopt different 
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positions with regard to new legislation. The HSE, therefore, approach 
companies individually for comments on draft proposals; and the 
response to these are drafted either with exclusive reference to the 
environment of individual companies, or occasionally through informal 
contacts and liason between two or more companies at safety officer 
level. 
A key feature of the restructuring of safety management has 
been an attempt to shift the locus of responsibility for safety from 
'expert' senior managers to line managers and supervisors. There had, 
according to Peter Williams the safety manager at WWL, been a 
'reliance on the centre', and the new culture of the company, together 
with the demands of the new COSHH legislation [Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health] which have important implications for the water 
industry, have made it important for Safety to be managed 'out there' 
in the company rather than from the office of the health and safety 
manager. In particular, legislation pertaining to both COSHH and 
'manual handling' place greater responsibility for safety on line 
managers and supervisors in the assessment of safe systems of work; 
and it is at this level that the HSE will increasingly focus following 
an incident. Legislation and the HSE have thus served an important 
r6le in redefining the relationship between senior and line managers. 
Peter Williams suggests that the new legislation is saying to line 
managers and supervisors: 
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"You've got to assess the job, the characteristics of 
the people". All that comes down to the people who 
are in charge of the job effectively on a day-to-day 
basis. But we've got to get it across to them that 
they are the people that are actually going to have 
to do it. So that when we come to a new job at a 
roadside, the supervisor is aware of the fact that 
there is a lifting task involved, and he's got to 
carry out some form of assessment. Because if 
something goes wrong, he's the one that's going to 
have to satisfy the HSE that he has done the 
assessment. 
The neo-liberal form of the HSE has played a pivotal role in 
restructuring the locus of control for health and safety within water 
companies. The importance of the state is further reflected in the 
way in which safety policy is formulated in response to legislation 
emanating from the HSE and the EC. At EWL, health and safety policy 
is contained in a series of safety procedures and safe systems of 
work that follow the HSE headings where particular standards have 
been set. The safety manual in which the standards are contained has 
existed since 1974 and was common to the whole water industry; 
although on privatisation the manual has been 'transformed into 
something a little more Eastern Water'. The extent to which water 
companies are now keen to develop their own individual systems and 
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standards has been the most important impact of privatisation on the 
management of health and safety. 
The way in which health and safety standards and procedures are 
now developed at EWL can be illustrated with regard to the recent EC 
directive on 'VDU Work Stations'. The HSE developed a draft code of 
practice on the directive and invited comments and recommendations 
for amendment. Companies drafted their response either individually 
or through networks of informal contacts; at EWL the Company's 
response was drafted by the specialist safety team of divisional 
safety officers and their assistants. Following consultation, the HSE 
issued a code of practice on the impending EC directive, and the 
safety team at EWL have responded by developing a set of procedures 
in order to ensure compliance with the directive; drawing out the 
salient issues of the directive as they apply to EWL, and issuing 
procedures and guidance to managers on the 'ergonomical logic of the 
work station'. 
The first stage of the implementation of a new health and 
safety policy directive within EWL is that the directive together 
with user-friendly guidance notes prepared by the safety team are 
issued to all managers within the Company. The guidance notes are 
then transformed into procedures: the EC directive on VDU Work 
Stations makes specifications regarding screens and furniture, and 
these are incorporated into a company procedure that is inserted into 
the company safety manual. This is followed by a series of seminars 
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at which managers affected by the directive are given detailed 
guidance and the opportunity to raise questions and issues regarding 
the implementation of the procedures in their departments. This 
procedure is considered to be vitally important given the direction 
of the new managerial culture at EWL. The new culture is concerned 
with shifting the locus of managerial responsibility from senior to 
middle managers and supervisors. The result has been that 
responsibility for the safety function has been transferred from 
specialist senior managers to functional line-managers. David Morris 
outlines the way in which new procedures are communicated within the 
company, and the way in which this impinges on managerial 
responsibility: 
The main manager is in charge of making sure that 
his team are all aware. For making him actually 
responsible for up-dating, which is not just an 
administrative task, but that actually focusses the 
attention of the senior or area manager to make sure 
that all his team are aware that there is now a 
changing health and safety regulation that impinges 
on them. That's the important thing as far as we're 
concerned, which is management accountability for 
health and safety in the workplace. It's not the 
safety specialist's accountability, it's the managers 
knowing what the rules are in a clear fashion, and 
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also to know where to go to get help and support to 
make sure they do their check, 
S. 3. b, Case Study Three: The Development of 
Integrated Management Systems and the 
Management of Health and Safety at EWL. 
The management of health and safety at EWL demonstrates the 
way in which the Company has attempted to redefine and restructure 
the rille, structure and culture of management within the Company. 
Management, including the management of safety, is now premised upon 
a 'culture of empowerment': a culture that is set out in the Company's 
vision and mission statements and the Company's 'Partnership 
Agreement'. The central feature of the new culture is that through 
the dismantling of hierarchical and bureaucratic structures within 
the Company, managers are 'empowered' and develop a sense of 
'ownership' towards their responsibilities. Managers can then be 
'trusted' to deliver to pre-determined standards without there being 
a hierarchical structure with the functions of 'directing' and 
'ensuring'. Managers have been empowered to deliver health and safety, 
and because they own this responsibility they can be trusted to 
deliver to the standards and procedure laid out in the Company's 
safety procedures. 
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The ideal manager is abstracted from the contradictions that 
mark the capitalist mode of production. The real manager has to live 
the contradiction and the trust and empowerment of managers is 
necessarily complemented by control This is reflected at EWL where a 
computerised safety audit system is being developed alongside the 
new managerial culture; although the new system is legitimated 
through the 'consumerist' discourse of trust and empowerment. While 
the new systems are premised upon the ideal manager, it is clear that 
she is an abstraction: 
In a perfect world we'd almost be able to say "We can 
forget health and safety now. We've got a whole bunch 
of empowered health and safety-conscious managers, 
who have got health and safety as a performance 
issue, and an accountable issue up there with all the 
rest - drinking water, sewage effluent, discharges 
and pollution, bathing beaches - all the major 
measures of performance, and up there with them is 
health and safety. That's fine, but we haven't got a 
perfect world, we don't have that scenario, and its 
reflected in the fact that some of our indices like 
accidents vary. So we want to address that issue, the 
developmental scene is in effect to bring something 
in that will help managers understand and deliver on 
their health and safety performance. 
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The gap between abstract and real managers has resulted in the 
development of a new computerised health and safety audit system at 
EWL. Given the managerial discourse of 'empowerment' and 'trust' 
within the Company, the audit system is defined in terms of its 
supportive role in helping managers to understand and deliver their 
health and safety responsibilities. The 'tool' is manager-user-friendly 
and self-auditing, with the facility for building in support analysis 
and control. An essential element of allowing managers to manage is 
that they manage themselves. Self-control and self-regulation have 
become key themes of the management approach at EWL. This has been 
facilitated by the development of the new management information 
systems within the Company. David Morris, outlines the relationship 
between control, trust and the development of the new IT systems 
within the Company: 
I use control as the last word, its not the word I 
would like to emphasise. We're looking for a system 
that will, given the culture of empowerment and 
ownership, and the awareness that goes with it. We 
want a system that will enhance that. But what we do 
think is needed is for managers to be able to have a 
tool, that they can use in a straightforward, easy 
way, that tells them how good they are doing on a 
particular performance index, which happens to be 
health and safety. Where they can see, by reviewing 
it themselves, that there are priority areas that are 
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perhaps not being addressed as well as they could be, 
and they can put the remedial action into effect 
themselves, without there being recourse to some 
other support body like the safety function or the 
management function. I mean these will ultimately 
exist, these facilities will be there - but as a 
support mode, to allow the manager himself to 
identify shortfalls in achievement and to do 
something about it. 
The key objective of the new system is thus to facilitate self- 
assessment and self-control, which is mediated by the ultimate 
sanctions of the intervention of the managerial support function and 
thus the non-renewal of fixed-term contracts or a reduction in the 
performance-related element of salary. In order for the system to 
function as a mechanism of self-assessment and control, the design of 
the software incorporated and reflected the functions and 
responsibilities of managers from a diversity of levels and locations 
across the Company. This is vital in order that managers develop a 
sense of 'ownership' towards the system. The system was trialed in a 
large urban area covered by EWL, and during the trial a series of 
'tailor-fit' audit questions were developed appropriate to various 
levels within the water, sewage, support and stores functions. In 
order to engender 'ownership', it was important that managers could 
relate to the questions they were being asked. The overall objective 
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is to develop a sense of managerial ownership towards the system, As 
David Morris explains: 
There will be a series of tailor-fit audit questions 
for each audit area, and even a similar operational 
function may have a different series of questions. 
Because we want to make sure that managers own it, 
and say "That's my system! It can help me! ", and if 
they say that I think we can make it work. So the 
process is about identifying the audit questions with 
the managers, and then following up with agreeing 
with those managers the appropriate weightings, 
prioritising - working them through. 
The aim of the Company is to integrate the health and safety 
auditing system into the Company's main management information 
system (IBIS [Integrated Business Information System]). This will give 
senior managers access to performance information over a range of 
indices (DG performance indicators, DWI indicators, internal 
performance measures, cost performance measures and health and 
safety). The System has the facility for producing performance 
information at company, divisional and area levels; and senior 
managers and directors are able to monitor divisional and area 
performance against the performance of the company as a whole. The 
integration of health and safety within the System is considered 
vital to raising the profile of safety within the Company; for 
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directors will then receive a summary of health and safety 
performance alongside the other measures every three months. This 
will also have an important impact of further developing the 
managerial culture. David Morris further defines the relationship 
between control and trust in the new company culture: 
As a sociologist, you'll know that the organisational 
dynamic is such that if your boss is interested, then 
the tendency is that you'll be interested. So there is 
a little bit of that in it, we'd be foolish to deny it. 
But also, if it's the bottom-up system that we want 
it to be, we'll actually have the managers saying 
"I've got nothing to be frightened of here! Where I'm 
addressing issues I'm addressing issues. Where there 
are low-priority matters they will not be dealt with, 
and there will be reasons for that, and I have no 
problems with MDs, or boards, or whatever seeing that 
in terms of how we're addressing the issue". That's 
how we want it to sit! 
The management of health and safety at EWL is to be structured 
around a computerised audit system 'owned' by managers. The new 
system and the new organisational culture of which it is part obviate 
the need for a planned and structured system of safety inspections 
within the Company. Planned inspections are only carried out following 
accidents and incidents. In the new managerial culture managers are 
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concerned with safety issues all the time and deal with issues and 
problems as they arise. This constitutes a significant move away from 
the old local government [Fabian] culture in which the health and 
safety expert played a pivotal role: a culture in which despite 
managers having health and safety procedures to follow, they 
invariably referred safety matters to the 'expert'. Managers are 
encouraged to manage health and safety themselves: to constantly 
implement and review procedures and to deal with problems and risks 
as they arise. There is therefore a significant contrast between the 
Fabian and neo-liberal cultures: as David Morris explains: 
(The old culture) is the culture that doesn't empower, 
that pushes things to the specialist..... Safety was a 
bit like that. Now we are saying, "No! ". There's a 
whole trend on the way that says that's not the 
scene any more - "That chap, that lady, works for you 
- not for a personnel officer, not for a safety 
officer. You are in charge of the whole of that 
persons working environment, and possibly a chunk of 
stuff that isn't their working environment" (without 
being paternalistic, of course) but by being 
supportive and interested. If there was an accident 
at home to one of your relatives, would you take an 
interest? Would you be concerned? Would you want to 
be seen to be doing all the right things? - answer, 
yes! Here's one of your employees, and he's had an 
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accident, same rules, perhaps not the same amount of 
emotions, but still the same interest, action, concern 
has got to be there. Not passing the ball off, for 
the safety man to come in and do something about it. 
So we've seen a change. Some more quickly than 
others, but everybody is moving into that mode. If 
you're not then you're really out of the game! I like 
to think that we more than most have adopted that 
culture. 
The role of the safety function in the new organisational 
culture will be to help and support managers to manage safety 
themselves. David Morris suggests that the new empowered managers 
will take great comfort from the knowledge that there is a safety 
man (sic) out there to help them; someone with an overall view who is 
able to highlight worrying trends that they may have overlooked. 
David Morris is however insistent that while the audit system does 
contain the facility for monitoring the performance of managers, it 
is not there not to check up on them but to help and 'support' them: 
We know they'll do it because they want to do it; 
because it's part of their accountability and 
responsibility and they've accepted this. We see it as 
a very positive step forward, and we've got the 
commitment of the Company behind them doing it, as a 
tool, as a supportive tool to managers. Just like if I 
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look on my screen there and I see an assets trend, or 
an overtime costs trend, or a payroll/manpower- 
related issue, I would feel quite happy about ringing 
the manager as low down as I could, to actually get 
hold of that individual supervisor and say: "Any 
problem there, I don't know whether you've spotted it 
but it looks a little bit dodgy? " To me that's 
healthy, and that's the sort of environment we want 
to be in with health and safety. Right the way 
across, the 'doing' function and the 'support' 
function; that's the kind of relationship we're trying 
to develop. 
Changes in the management of health and safety are part of a 
more fundamental re-interpretation and restructuring of the r6le and 
function of management at EWL. Central to this has been the need to 
monitor and control costs. Accidents and injuries impose costs, and 
the new IT systems monitor the performance of managers vis 6 vis the 
minimisation of health and safety costs. Managers and supervisors are 
trusted to deliver effective health and safety at least cost within 
the context of the abstract control constituted by performance- 
related-pay and fixed-term contracts. The differences in the approach 
of different water companies with respect to the management of 
health and safety is overlaid by the fundamental similarity 
constituted by the subordination of the health and safety function to 
the abstract control of money. This can be illustrated through a 
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consideration of the development of the manual safety audit system 
at WWL. 
5.3. c. Case Study Four: The Development of the 
Manual Health and Safety Audit at WWL. 
In order to monitor and audit safety management at WWL, the 
Company has introduced the International Safety Rating System [ISRS]; 
a health and safety management audit system developed by the 
International Loss Control Institute of Loganville, Georgia, USA. An 
important factor in the development of the new system is the 
pressure from the HSE who are considering the development of 
regulations requiring the adoption of formal management safety audits 
as a demonstration of compliance with the health and safety 
legislation in general and the forthcoming EC legislation in 
particular. The attitude of the HSE to the development of safety 
audit systems of this kind is set out in an internal Western Water 
report which summarised the findings of a recent study by the 
Accident Prevention Advisory Unit of the HSE: 
Any simple measurement of performance in terms of 
accident frequency rate or accident /incident rate is 
not seen as a reliable guide to the safety 
performance of an undertaking. The Report finds there 
is no clear correlation between such measurements 
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and the work conditions, in injury potential, or the 
severity of injuries that have occurred. A need 
exists for more accurate measurement so that a 
better assessment can be made of efforts to control 
foreseeable risks. It is suggested that more 
meaningful information would be obtained from 
systematic inspection and auditing of physical 
safeguards, systems of work, rules and procedures, 
and training methods than on data about accident 
experience alone (Internal WWL Report: 28-10-92). 
The ISRS audit covers twenty elements and requires a total of 
615 questions to be answered. It uses a weighted points scoring 
system in order to grade the audited operation up to five star 
awards in two award categories (standard and advanced). The Standard 
Programme prioritises five basic elements: Leadership and 
administration, planned inspection, accident/incident investigation, 
organisational rules and personal protective equipment. In order to 
achieve a higher award on the standard programme, a higher weighted 
score must be achieved on all these elements: while advancement to 
the Advanced Programme requires achievement on increasing numbers of 
the optional elements (a Five Star Award on the Advanced Programme 
requiring a minimum score score of 70% on all twenty elements with a 
minimum average score of 90%). When the system was initially 
introduced into WWL, the Company was not able to even achieve a One 
Star Award on the Standard Programme. The abstract from an internal 
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report discusses this failure together with the most urgent remedial 
action: 
At this point in time WWL is prevented from achieving 
a respectable base line award of three stars on the 
standard programme safety as a result of the lack of 
a planned programme of general safety inspection. The 
intention is to ensure that planned general safety 
inspections are conducted on a regular (at least 
every two months) basis with the primary 
responsibility being on the first line manager. 
Records of the inspections are to be maintained with 
a follow up system to ensure corrective actions are 
taken (Internal WWL Report, 28.10.92). 
The ISRS is a package and companies signing up to it have to 
comply with all the elements and requirements of the system. The 
application of the system has little immediate impact on day-to-day 
health and safety management. The most important impact of the new 
system has been that senior health and safety managers have to 
devote a large amount of time to collating and verifying information 
collected from around the Company. The implementation of the system 
is at a relatively early stage. The failure of WWL to carry out 
planned inspections either centrally or through supervision 
management resulted in the company not achieving even the 'One Star 
Award' on the 'Standard Programme'. Despite WWL's poor performance 
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Peter Williams, the Senior Health and Safety Advisor at WWL, feels 
that the development of the system has been successful; providing an 
excellent impetus for the development of more efficient safety 
management in the future. 
The development of the ISRS system has highlighted a major 
weakness in the management of health and safety at EWL: the failure 
of the Company to monitor the extent to which procedures and safe 
systems of work are being effectively applied and adhered to by 
managers and employees. The shift in the locus of responsibility for 
safety towards line managers and supervisors necessitates that 
monitoring at this level must itself be amenable to monitoring by 
senior managers. An important development has been the integration of 
planned inspections into the Company's quality management approach. 
Planned inspections will be carried out according to a written 
procedure and to pre-set standards. In preparation for this all staff 
have taken part in a training programme dealing with the procedures 
and standards associated with planned inspections. Staff have been 
made aware of what is expected of them and have accepted that the 
inspection of safety systems is a routine aspect of their work to be 
undertaken on a weekly or monthly basis. 
The application of ISRS and the performance of WWL against the 
system has not however been subject to external assessment and 
validation. It has been used as an internal indicator with which to 
measure improvement in health and safety management; the Company 
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considering external assessment and accreditation if the Company's 
rating were to improve to a more acceptable level. The present 
internal application of the system is felt to have an element of 
objectivity given the separation of the company into a series of 
subsidiaries within a group holding company. Legislation emanating 
from the HSE and the EC are, moreover, felt to have provided an 
important dynamic to the development of ISRS within WWL as many 
elements in ISRS (ie. task analysis) are the subject of recent 
legislation. 
The HSE has taken an increasing interest in systems such as 
ISRS. These systems allow the development of a 'true' measure of 
safety performance rather than the measurement of failure through 
simple accident records. The neo-liberal state regulation of health 
and safety has thus become increasingly concerned with the costs of 
health and safety. The abstract premises of the ISRS system are 
illustrated by Peter Williams who outlines the origins of the system 
in the financial exigencies of the US insurance industry: 
(The ISRS) effectively grew out of Frank Burn's 
experience within the American insurance industry. He 
was working for insurance companies carrying out 
studies in the companies they were covering. He 
looked at what was actually happening, and came up 
with conclusions that said "Well, if we're going to 
insure that company it needs to change its approach 
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altogether", and then said, "Well, we can devise a 
system that if they follow the insurers will be happy 
with, because they'll be able to see that there's a 
measure of improvement. " 
The ultimate value of ISRS is thus the facility for measuring 
the costs and benefits of safety. The development of ISRS obviously 
imposes costs; but Peter Williams envisages the costs will be minimal 
in comparison with anticipated benefits. The costs of safety staff 
are fixed and the costs of implementing ISRS are confined to the 
development of relevant procedures and documentation. The potential 
savings associated with ISRS are quite marked. Just one example given 
by Peter Williams concerned 'lost time' incidents at WWL in the 1991- 
2 financial year: WWL had 60 of these incidents in this time period, 
each one costing the Company 3 working days and approximately £300 
(an approximate total of £18,000). But the potential benefits are 
multiplied when the damage to constant capital from these incidents 
are considered; although Peter Williams appeared a little reticent in 
expressing his concern for dead labour (capital): 
Now, when you start, and I'm saying when you do 
because we certainly don't, if you started to think in 
terms of the cost of damage to equipment that must 
ensue with such an accident performance, I'm sure 
then that the cost element must be very much more 
noticeable. And whilst you would need to put in 
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procedures to measure that as well, it would fall out 
of the budget of a substantial company, anyway. You 
would be aware that the maintenance costs were being 
driven down by a greater margin than you would 
anticipate from the work being done by the 
maintenance group itself on the basis that they're 
not having to do it. So, yes, I can see that the 
benefits will show at some point in time. We will 
start to be looking at that, looking for it as a 
demonstration of the value of doing it. 
The disaggregation of the water industry has resulted in a 
variety of managerial strategies and approaches to the management of 
health and safety. The strategies share the common concern of 
subordinating the management of health and safety to the abstract 
power of money. The neo-liberal form of the HSE has played a 
fundamental role in this process: developing (concrete) administrative 
standards in the context of new (abstract) control systems. The 
management of health and safety in the water industry has indeed 
become more efficient and effective: accidents have been reduced and 
water companies take an increasingly proactive approach to the 
monitoring of health and safety policy. The dynamic underlying the 
reduction in accidents and injuries has been the increased focus on 
the costs and benefits of health and safety management. The 
development of health and safety procedures and standards has become 
formally subordinate to the valorisation of capital. 
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5- . 4. State 
Coritrol and 
Abstract ion. 
Regu Lt ion. Mcng3Lgement 
t1-1 Contradictic, r of 
The neo-liberal restructuring of the water industry has 
resulted in an increasing focus on finance and the domination of 
abstract over concrete labour. The managerial form of the water 
industry was ineffective and inefficient and was unable to deliver 
either values or use-values. This inefficiency and ineffectiveness was 
reflected in the management of health and safety through the 
determination of bureaucratic mechanisms of monitoring and 
consultation that were unable to operate effectively owing to the 
fiscal constraints on the industry. The contradictions of 
managerialism have been resolved through the development of abstract 
regulation and abstract management that have subordinated the 
production and distribution of use-values to the abstract power of 
money. 
The neo-liberal water industry is more effective and efficient 
than the managerialist water industry. The level and standard of 
service provided to consumers has been improved and there are fewer 
accidents and injuries. These developments have been facilitated 
through the re-unification of labour and valorisation processes: the 
development of abstract management has resulted in the concrete use- 
values produced by the water industry being mediated through 
(abstract) labour qua capital. The state has played a fundamental 
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role in this process through the establishment of administrative 
standards and targets (use-values) and the development of regulatory 
mechanisms that ensure that the production of these use-values is 
mediated by the abstract premises of the law of money (value). The 
bureaucratic domination and alienation associated with managerialism 
has been replaced by the subordination of human needs to the 
valorisation of capital. The neo-liberal regulation of the water 
industry has ultimately heightened the contradiction between value 
and use-value. 
In Chapter Six I explore in more detail the determination of 
abstract management as the contradiction between value and use- 
value. The development of abstract management has taken the 
ideological form of quality management. The imposition of abstraction 
on the water industry has highlighted the importance of abstract 
management skills over the concrete skills of engineers. The 
domination of concrete by abstract labour has been legitimated 
through the discourse of quality management which has attempted to 
reconstitute managerial legitimacy in terms of the production of 
abstract values. Quality management articulates the contradiction 
between the quality of management and the management of quality in 
the neo-liberal water industry. 
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motes. 
1. See O'Connell-Davidson (1990) for a further illustration of the way 
in which social relations within water companies have been 
'commercialised' following privatisation. 
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Chapter Six 
Statte Regulcxtion and Mc riagement 
"Form". "Quality IvI r-i merzt'' as tiie 
Managsment of Abstraction. 
In Chapter Five I demonstrated the way in which the new 
management information systems developed through the neo-liberal 
regulation of OFWAT and the HSE constitute an important moment in 
the process through which the locus of control has shifted from 
concrete to abstract labour. In this Chapter I will examine the 
specific form of abstract management that has been developed in the 
UK water sector by and through state regulation. I demonstrate the 
way in which abstract management has taken the form of quality 
management: a form precipitated by an emergent Japanisation- 
flexibility ideological discourse and mediated by and through the 
state into a mechanism for re-imposing abstraction on the 
bureaucratic structures of managerialism. 'Quality management' is 
simultaneously a moment in the crisis of managerialism and an 
attempt to overcome the crisis through the restructuring of the 
water industry on the basis of abstract forms of bureaucratic 
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control. 'Quality management' is a contradictory social form 
determined through the contradiction between value and use-value: 
constituted by a concern with the quality of management (abstract 
values) rather than the management of quality (concrete use-values). 
'Quality management' has reconstituted the contradictions of 
managerialism on fundamentally abstract premises. 
6.1. ''Quality Mancxgemsnt" rid the 
Managemerit of Abstract ion. 
The financial targets imposed by the managerialist state and 
the (RPI t K) regime imposed by OFWAT served to institutionalise the 
need for constant improvements in efficiency within the management 
control systems of the water industry. This provides the material 
basis for the articulation of ideological forms of management 
premised on 'quality management! The hallmark of 'quality management' 
is the striving for constant improvement. 'Quality management' is the 
ideological form taken by the abstract imperatives of the 
valorisation of capital in the neo-liberal water industry. The 
valorisation of capital has been legitimated through the way in which 
it liberates managers and workers from the stultifying and oppressive 
constraints and contradictions of managerialism. The need for 
flexibility and efficiency has thus been legitimated through the way 
in which 'quality management' facilitates the simultaneous development 
and improvement of both the individual manager and worker and the 
company. The abstract premises of 'quality management' are 
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demonstrated through the way in which its development has 
necessitated the expunging of the concretist-bureaucratic forms of 
management associated with managerialism. 
S. 1. a. Managers as Abstract Cultural 
Ambassadors: Expunging the Town Hall! 
The development of 'quality management' has been legitimated 
through the way in which the new culture it engenders unlocks the 
energy and potential of managers and employees in a context of 
continuous change and improvement. In developing 'quality management' 
within the water industry, senior managers have encountered the 
problem that organisational change is never an automatic process, but 
involves restructuring the composition of inter- and intra-class 
forces. In the water industry organisational change has been imposed 
by senior managers driven by the logic of abstraction. The process is 
articulated by David Morris, a senior management executive at EWL, 
who highlights the importance of addressing the influence of 
leadership in a context of organisational change: the imposition of 
the despotic control of capital (cf. Marx, 1954: 314). Organisational 
change begins at the top, and if the top fails to initiate change 
then it has to be replaced. This has been the pattern at EWL, and 
indeed the water industry more generally, and its importance is 
reflected in the entrenched attitudes of employees at lower levels of 
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the organisation; among whom the last vestiges of town hall culture 
have yet to be expunged: 
If reflects itself occasionally when a group of 
people say "No! We're not going to do that! ", when 
they're given something different or something new. A 
"What's in it for us? " - scenario. And to be fair, it 
is a bit much to expect the local government 
tradition to change in three years to something that 
is, not a Japanese mentality, but a new realism. 
The process of expunging the remnants of town hall culture at 
EWL has involved senior managers within the company taking on the 
r6le of cultural ambassadors. The role of cultural ambassador has 
been particularly important with respect to the 80 senior managers in 
the 'Senior Management Personal Contract Team', whose close proximity 
to the 'leader', and the abstract basis of their employment makes 
their cultural importance particularly significant. The development of 
the new organisational culture at EWL has involved an increasing 
focus on the 'quality of management'. Senior managers have developed 
a critical awareness that a manager who does not 'buy into' the new 
culture constitutes a serious 'logjam' within the organisation. A 
central feature in the process of becoming a 'quality organisation' 
has been the existence of an effective but supportive 'exit policy'; a 
vital element of the process which facilitates the disposal of the 
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old 'entrenched' managers that did not feel 'comfortable' with the new 
organisational culture. 
The obverse of the 'exit' process is development, coaching, 
career counselling and up-skilling. The impact of the 'exit policy' has 
been to significantly reduce the age-profile of management within the 
Company; a process that has prioritised the process of management 
development through the pinpointing of abstract management skills 
among younger employees. The Company has also become increasingly 
concerned with employee development more generally, and has developed 
a series of career development and self-development programmes 
through which the Company sponsors employees on training and 
education programmes. This process has been developed alongside a 
new managerial employment relation premised upon a formal appraisal 
system, fixed-term contracts and performance-related pay. The 
development of quality management has thus involved pinpointing the 
abstract potential of existing and potential managers whilst 
reconstituting management on fundamentally abstract premises. The 
form and function of management has been reconstituted on the basis 
of the valorisation imperatives of capital. 
The crisis of the managerial water industry has also proved to 
be the major dynamic in the development of abstract management 
systems at WWL. During the 1980s, senior managers at WWL pursued a 
conscious strategy that was designed to change the managerial 
culture of the company. The strategy initiated by the Chief Executive 
- 312 - 
and the Director of Human Resources, attempted to create a 'climate' 
in which the 'managerial' potential of individuals could be developed. 
This strategy was consciously divorced from the basic activities of 
the company - the way in which the company supplied water and 
treated sewage - to develop what Frank Watson, the Senior Personnel 
Manager at the Company, labels a 'growth culture'; a culture in which 
the personalities and skills of individuals are cultivated to 
encourage the growth of both the individual and the company. 
Frank Watson suggests that the genesis of the new culture can 
be traced back to 1979, when the newly-appointed Chief Executive 
declared that in future the company was to be operated as a 'well- 
run business'. The new Chief Executive was concerned to: 
Get away from the fat cat, have as many people as 
you want, spend as much money as you want, it all 
goes on the water rate. He wanted us to get rid of 
that, and he wanted us to be very efficient. He 
wanted us to be Lean and mean basically. 
The above statement was operationalised through a strategy that 
attempted to create a new 'climate' within the Company. The new 
climate was focused on a thorough re-assessment and re-orientation 
of the role and function of management. The strategy was quite 
explicitly an attempt to replace the town hall/public service approach 
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to management with a more dynamic and commercial type of management. 
Frank Watson suggests that the tide turned at WWL in 1982; there was 
a definite turn away from the 'local government, didn't matter how 
much it cost, slow, 'fat cat' type approach. Indeed, it became a 
veritable flood in the opposite direction. The 'fat cat' died in 1982. 
The Company has not only exorcised the spirit of the town hall, but 
has become an exemplar to the private sector of which it is now part: 
a leader in the technical, operational, scientific and people 
management fields; to which the leaders of private industry in the 
region flock to visit and view with awe and envy. 
I believe that many private companies look at us and 
think, crikey! We think we are a leader in so many 
other fields now. Very fast on our feet, and when we 
deal with private companies, very few of them now 
have anything to show us. We have a lot to show 
them, and many private companies come to see us..... 
to learn from us. 
The change in the ownership of the Company has not had a 
marked impact on the managerial culture of the Company, and while 
there have been changes since privatisation associated with the 
constraints of shareholders and regulation, Frank Watson suggests 
that much of what has happened was in the process of happening 
anyway. Indeed, Frank highlights this by stressing the way in which 
the tight financial and operational control developed during the 
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1980s, allowed the Company to tackle the bureaucratic trauma of 
privatisation with relative ease; the Company could be left to run 
itself as many senior and junior staff were seconded to deal with 
privatisation. The bureaucratic mechanisms of control developed 
through managerialism provided the perfect basis for the development 
of abstract management following privatisation. 
6.1. b. The Contradictions of Managerialism and 
the Development of Abstract Management 
Appraisal, 
The managerialisation of the water industry produced large 
efficient entities capable of operating as capital. In order to 
operate effectively as capital water companies have needed to subject 
the concrete bureaucratic procedures associated with managerialism to 
the logic of abstraction. This process has been particularly evident 
with respect to the selection, training and appraisal of managers. 
Managerialism made the water industry more efficient and effective 
without providing a rational and logical basis for assessing the 
effectiveness of managers. The neo-liberal water industry has 
overcome the contradictions of managerialism through the development 
of managerial appraisal systems that reward the abstract abilities of 
managers: the contribution made by managers to the valorisation of 
capital. 
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The process has been manifested at WWL through the concern to 
develop abstract managerial skills. The major component of the 
restructuring process at the Company was the attempt to heighten the 
importance and scope of generalised, abstract management within the 
Company. The tangible impact of this was felt through the way in 
which managers were appointed and promoted. In order to move away 
from the 'old solid line structures' that previously existed, the 
Company decided not to allow upward promotion without an individual 
having first been moved or promoted sideways. This was facilitated by 
a series of secondments in which 'key people' in 'key jobs' moved 
around the organisation in order to learn how the organization worked 
in toto. This 'cross-fertilisation' allowed staff to develop skills 
from different parts of the organisation: engineers learned about 
finance through their management of a finance section, accountants 
learned about engineering....., etc. 
The secondments were accompanied by a series of developments 
that were aimed at increasing and developing (abstract) managerial 
skills within the Company. The Company employed a team of human 
resource consultants in order to assess the skills that the Company 
needed to develop, and this led to the initiation of a series of 
management development programmes. This included the introduction of 
a carefully-structured 'Team Development Course'; a five day 
specialist course held at one of the Company's reservoirs which 
attempted to foster 'team membership' and 'leadership' skills in staff 
ranging from senior managers to clerical workers. The Company also 
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introduced a 'Management Development Programme' through which staff 
were encouraged to volunteer to be 'psychometrically tested', and 
were given feedback on their 'management potential' by a qualified 
psychologist. Staff that were felt to have management potential were 
informed and directed down appropriate training and development 
routes; while those with less potential were told that they would not 
aspire to a management position, but were guided down other training 
and development routes that would enable them to 'manage their 
limitations'. 
The Company was concerned to break the domination of engineers. 
This involved restructuring the company in abstraction from its 
operational functions, and re-constituting the role and function of 
management within the Company: Frank Watson describes the ideology 
behind the restructuring process: 
We kept away from basic things in any real detail. We 
thought that if we created the atmosphere, the 
climate, we created the spark, we created the seeds 
for the life, then it would grow - and it did. Rather 
than to be actually very specific on a particular job, 
particular people. We created a greenhouse, if you 
like, for people to grow - and that worked very 
well..... We look at people very much in the round. We 
used to, before 1979, employ people basically 
according to their experience as engineers. If they 
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were a good engineer then they ended up in a 
managerial job, and they might be lousy managers. And 
if the truth were known, 90% of their new job might 
demand man-management skills. 
The new approach prioritised the needs and specifications of 
abstract over concrete labour. For Frank Watson, the Company's 
attitude to the appointment (and the recent re-appointment) of 
managers is that technical and engineering qualifications are no 
longer preconditions for managerial positions. Rather, the approach is 
to examine carefully what the job really demanded, and to match 
individuals with the skills or potential skills demanded by the job. 
In the appointment and re-appointment of 'key' managerial staff, the 
Company employed 'manspecs' in order to determine an individual's 
'fit'. Equally important to training and qualifications in this fit 
were 'managerial skills', viz, leadership skills, team membership and 
leadership skills, interpersonal skills, presentational skills, 
motivational skills and organisational skills. The Company looked at 
which of these skills a position required and then looked for these 
skills among individual staff; or where the skills were absent but 
the potential was there, the Company initiated training and 
development. 
The way in which 'quality management' has overcome the 
contradictions of managerialism and constituted management appraisal 
on essentially abstract premises is also demonstrated through the 
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way in which the management appraisal system has developed at EWL. 
The Company made a conscious decision to limit the operation of the 
appraisal system to managers in recognition of their importance as 
cultural 'change agents'. The appraisal system was structured around 
an annual formal interview between a manager and her immediate 
superior, from which the latter was required to complete a mutt-page 
questionaire outlining the manager's performance against various 
measures. Senior managers at EWL feel that the appraisal system has 
'outlived its shelf-life'. The system did not fulfil the necessary 
(abstract) criteria of setting quantifiable objectives within realistic 
time-frames or allow the effective identification of constraints. The 
appraisal system did not provide an effective assessment of 
managerial performance, and in particular, failed to isolate managers 
that were performing badly. 
The system was a product of the' 'old culture' of top-down 
bureaucratic inertia: an essential part of the transitional 
'managerialist' form of management, and necessary for the isolation of 
abstract management skills, but ineffective with respect to rewarding 
their successful application. David Morris outlines the way in which 
the system operated and the contradictions inherent in the 
administrative quantification of abstract managerial performance: 
You don't pass down a multi-page questionaire and 
say "See the individuals once a year, and fill in this 
form! ". Even to the extent that they had a series of 
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boxes and you drew a line in, and if you drew the 
line all the way over then that individual was fully 
ok on that particular aspect or question..... 
Engineers, and we're an engineering business, would 
ring up and say "Can you give us some clearer 
guidance on this line? What does 50% mean in terms 
of the line? What does 25% mean? What does 10% 
mean? Can we draw in gradations so we can be 
absolutely precise about where the line is drawn? ". 
Which wasn't the objective of the whole damn thing 
anyway! So the company culture wasn't ready for the 
appraisal system. I'd say "Just give us an idea! " Had 
to be precise [concrete]. But the appraisal system 
itself was old culture, down from the top, "Fill in 
this form! ". 
The perceived weaknesses of the appraisal system have resulted 
in senior managers being concerned to develop a 'sharper tool' for 
the assessment of managerial performance; a tool more relevant to the 
empowering culture at EWL. The plan is to develop a bottom-up 
appraisal system owned by managers themselves. The manager will meet 
on a regular basis with her team in order to discuss individual 
performance, company performance and the way in which the two are 
related. The process is designed to facilitate a more effective 
assessment of the contribution of a manager to the overall mission 
and objectives of the company, and to relate to this an element of 
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the manager's pay. The assessment of managerial performance has 
therefore been reconstituted on abstract premises: the form and 
function of management subordinated to the abstract power of money. 
The abstraction of management has enabled the water industry to 
overcome the contradictions of managerialism, and facilitated the 
resolution of the fiscal crisis of the state which was the 
fundamental manifestation of the contradictions. 
6,1. c. "Quality Management" as Abstract 
"Public Service". 
The development of 'quality management' has resolved the 
contradictions of managerialism. The abstract premises of abstract 
'quality management' provide a rational basis for decisions concerning 
capital spending and levels of operational service. Senior managers 
perceive these developments as a fundamental change in organisational 
culture. David Morris at EWL suggests that the primary dynamic to the 
changes in organisational culture has been changes to the financial 
structure of the Company. The old culture reflected a situation in 
which the organisation was obliged to go to the Government for the 
funds it needed to finance important capital projects; money that was 
increasingly unavailable as the cuts in public expenditure began to 
bite from the late 1970s onwards. This contrasts with a situation in 
which the Company is now free, within the constraints of its K 
formula, to determine its own financial profile. Managers are now 
free to manage in a company that is a PLC; that is 'just like Marks 
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and Spencer or IBM'. Importantly, this 'opening out' of the Company's 
financial profile has had the effect of 'opening out' the lives of all 
the individuals within the organisation. People have been able to 
escape from a hierarchical and safe approach, to one of dealing with 
constant change and constant improvement. 
The new culture has unlocked the potential of individual 
employees and managers at EWL; potential that was previously stifled 
by the rigid and hierarchical structures of the managerialist form of 
the Company. The new culture of the Company has been both 
facilitated by, and in turn determined through, the development of 
new micro-technology (this has been particularly important with 
regard to the development of new management information systems and 
the increasing development of telemetry). The managerial culture and 
structure of the company has also been affected by the increasingly 
strict regulatory regime to which it is subject. Senior managers such 
as David Morris suggest that both these dynamics are independent of 
the 'political' strategy of privatising the Company. The dynamics are 
both reflections of the extent to which 'society' is demanding greater 
service and efficiency from public services: 
Irrespective of the political decision that changes 
the nature of the Company, it's a fair bet to say 
that customers would demand more and more and more 
and more, whether we were an authority or a PLC. 
Because that's society. That we are now more 
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conscious of health-related issues, performance- 
related issues, we want our money's worth, we want 
people to be accountable for making mistakes. All of 
that sort of thing is now society. So as a water 
authority you would have had those pressures upon 
us, from that end, the customer end, the regulator 
end, perhaps not in the way it happened, but we would 
still have had it. 
What is 'society'? It is clear from the way in which David 
Morris conceptualises the resolution of the contradictions of 
managerialism, that 'society' is constituted by the impersonal 
abstract power of capital. David Morris articulates with great 
precision the contradictions and limitations of the managerialist form 
of the water industry. The contradiction between rising consumers' 
expectations (for use values) in the context of the fiscal crisis of 
the state (value); and the way in which the contradiction is resolved 
through the imposition of the law of money. As a water company in 
the public sector, faced with increasing demands and expectations, 
EWL would have found its position increasingly problematical: 
We would have had a blockage at the other end, 
because how would we have been able to respond, if 
you take a recession and the Government says "No 
more money' You can't respond, so somewhere or 
another there would have been some sort of clash, 
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something would have to give. You would say to the 
customer "Forget it! We're not going to replace those 
old sewers..... " And it would even rock the Government: 
"You're rotten, give them more money! ". Which is what 
used to happen to a certain extent. But in the 1990s 
it would come out as an absolute shriek! The 
Greenpeaces of this world would really be going on. 
They'd be going to the Government, and we'd be a pawn 
- as a water authority in all that - whereas now 
we're the focus of it, the Government have deflected 
that because we're now a stand alone company, its up 
to you to perform. And we have got an out. We've got 
an out that says we put our charges up. We can go to 
the market and get more money. We can also say to 
the customer, "No, we're not going to do that! " - 
provided that we can get people on our side. 
The development of (abstract) 'quality management' has resolved 
the contradictions of managerialism. The determination of 'quality 
management' through the contradiction between value and use-value 
has, however, heightened the contradiction inherent in the form and 
function of management in capitalist society. In capitalist society 
managers live the contradiction which is manifested through the 
contradiction between trust and control. The imposition of abstraction 
on the water industry has resulted in the contradiction assuming an 
increasingly abstract form: managerial trust determined by the law of 
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money while control is embedded in abstract control systems qua 
'quality management'. This is the contradiction of abstract 
management: the determination of managerial performance in 
abstraction from the production of concrete use-values. I will now 
explore the forms of 'quality management' that have developed in the 
neo-liberal water industry in order to highlight the abstract 
premises of managerial control and legitimation. 
6.2. "Quality Mariagement"" as the 
Form of Abstract ion in t1-ie Mac>- 
Liberal Water- Iridustry. 
'Quality management' is the ideological form taken by abstract 
management in the neo-liberal water industry. In this section I 
explore the specific forms of 'quality management' developed in the 
UK water sector. The quality initiatives have been introduced through 
the pressures of the regulatory/financial regime that was created by 
the 1989 Water Act. The form taken by 'quality management' in the 
water industry has been determined by the way in which it has 
developed through the contradictions of managerialism. The quality 
systems have had a marked impact on management and labour processes 
within water companies through the de-skilling of technical and 
professional workers and the development of (abstract) bureaucratic 
management control systems. The restructuring of the water industry, 
therefore, illustrates the need to explore changes in the capitalist 
labour process in the context of the valorisation imperatives of 
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senior management executives. I will now consider the specific forms 
of quality management adopted within the water industry and their 
relationship to the changing 'financial' imperatives of water 
companies in the post-privatised environment. 
6.2. a. Case Study One: Privatisation and the 
Pressure to Adopt "Quality Management" Systems 
at Western Water Group. 
In the post-privatised Water Industry 'quality management' has 
become a dominant theme in management ideology and discourse. At 
WWL, the increasing focus on 'quality' was necessitated by changes in 
corporate structure following privatisation: namely, the creation of a 
corporate holding group (Western Water Group Plc [WWG]) which is 
comprised of Western Water Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary concerned 
with the 'core business' of water supply and sewerage services (90% 
of Group business) and 29 'enterprise companies'. The enterprise 
companies are either private companies or partnerships acquired by 
the Group or departments and functions transferred from the core 
business [engineering, chemical laboratories, etc. ]. These are divided 
under the four basic headings of 'waste management', 'asset 
management', 'environmental engineering' and 'corporate services'. 
Within this structure the Group has pursued a twin-tracked 
approach to quality: a formal process which has involved subsidiary 
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companies adopting systems in accordance with BS. 5750, and an 
informal approach that has attempted to develop 'total quality 
management' [TQM] or a 'continuous improvement programme' [CIP] within 
the Group. The decision to develop quality systems at WWG was taken 
by the board of directors, and Mike Edwards was appointed as 'Group 
Quality Manager', with a brief from the Chief Executive to 'facilitate, 
encourage and cajole' people through the process of developing 
quality systems. The strategy developed by Mike Edwards and 
sanctioned by the Board, has been to apply 'corporate encouragement' 
to the process of subsidiary companies developing quality systems 
appropriate to their market/regulatory position. 
The development of quality systems requires the development of 
procedures that outline both the functions for which particular 
departments and sections are responsible, and the members of staff 
responsible for particular elements and stages of the function. In 
the development of quality management at WWG, the drive to introduce 
quality systems has been far easier in the case of elements 
transferred from the former Western Water Authority [WWA] than in 
many of the enterprise companies that have been acquired since 
privatisation. Procedures that were central elements of the 
nationalised form of the company have been modified and transformed 
to form the basis of the bureaucratic structure of the neo-liberal 
form of the company. The bureaucratic procedures inherited from the 
managerialist form of the industry were, therefore, modified in line 
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with the commercially-driven imperatives of the neo-liberal water 
industry. 
The enterprise companies that have been acquired by the Group 
have diverse 'cultural' backgrounds. Several companies had developed 
quality systems, and indeed had attained BS. 5750; others had no 
quality systems in place. As a result, the Group decided not to 
develop a formal Group-wide quality policy; particularly when the 
markets of many companies did not require them to develop BS. 5750. 
The problem has been to bring the enterprise companies into WWG 
culture. Each of the subsidiary companies has been encouraged to set 
out its quality system 'needs' in its business plans; which are 
considered by the Group and resourced if they meet the WWG criteria 
and guidelines for the development of quality systems which were 
developed in order to guide subsidiary MDs. The development of 
quality systems was to be considered in the context of commercial 
advantage, increased customer service, regulatory pressures (core 
business), general business requirements and market sector 
requirements (where competitors had developed them). 
The development of 'quality management' within WWG has been an 
important if not fundamental aspect of management strategy in the 
post-privatised environment. Indeed, WWG has made the achievement or 
development of quality systems the major consideration with regard to 
the purchase of subsidiary companies. Enterprise companies that were 
previously departmental functions of WWG prior to privatisation 
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(environmental engineering, training, technology department 
[computers], etc. ) have already achieved BS, 5750; while in many other 
areas companies are in the process of achieving BS. 5750. This 
includes the 'core business' in which the BS. 5750 approach is being 
piloted within a large sewage works; while the 'spirit' and 'major 
components' of BS. 5750 (quality plans and procedures) are being 
applied to the process of developing the industry 'Asset Management 
Plan' that is required for OFWAT. 
This quality approach is divided into two complementary 
strategies: a formal strategy of striving for BS. 5750 within 
subsidiary companies, and an informal and more ubiquitous strategy of 
developing TQM or CIP throughout the organisation. The primary 
dynamic for the development of formal quality systems at WWG has 
been the business requirements and the competitive pressures on 
subsidiary companies. The pressure for the development of BS. 5750 
has been greatest with respect to the enterprise companies; companies 
in direct competition with other companies and not therefore the 
'core business' which operates via the proxy market mechanism of 
OFWAT. 
Level One of the formal quality structure at WWL is constituted 
by the 'Quality Manual'; a document that sets out and addresses every 
part of BS. 5750, The Manual contains the 'quality policy' and 
'objectives' of the Group, including how the senior management team 
will disseminate and develop the quality message throughout the 
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organisation and test for levels of understanding of the quality 
policy among staff. The key objective of the BSI is the development 
of a very clear operational and organisational structure, Section One 
of BS. 5750 is focused on 'management responsibility'. The Manual 
reflects this through the way in which it sets out clear 
organisational structures which highlights not only key post-holders, 
but the impact of post-holders on the quality system. 
The manual further defines the scope of work in the 
organisation that is to be assessed, which may be illustrated with 
reference to the 'quality manual' developed by 'Western Engineering 
Consultants' [WEC] - an engineering subsidiary of the Group that has 
attained BS. 5750 recognition. The manual for the Company set the 
scope of assessment to the 'design process' as broken down into three 
stages: receiving a request from a client, developing from design 
brief to final design, and award of contract. In order to comply with 
BS. 5750 all the top management team have job summaries; which at 
WEC extends down as far as the project manager, project engineer and 
design staff. The manual sets out the process for continually 
reviewing the quality process. The manual specifies the Group 
management representative responsible for overseeing the process and 
the form of the 'review process'. At WEC a 'management review' is held 
on a regular basis which considers feedback from audits and client 
complaints. There is also a 'general review' which considers how the 
general quality process could be 'improved'. 
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Level Two of the formal quality structure at WWG is constituted 
by a document that sets out operational procedures of the company in 
detail including the managers or members of staff responsible for 
each procedure. Level Three of the structure is constituted by 
records and documentation that enable the quality system to be 
audited (checklists, quality plans, guidelines and guidance notes. This 
is the quality systems model that has been developed in order for 
subsidiary companies such as WEC to achieve BS. 5750 recognition. It 
is the model that WWG intends to use for quality initiatives 
throughout the Group; in particular, with regard to the development 
of informal quality initiatives in the form of TQM or CIP. This will 
be illustrated more clearly through a case study of the way in which 
BS. 5750 has been developed at WEC 
6,2. b. Case Study Two: Formal Quality Systems 
and BS 5750 Accreditation at Western 
Engineering Consultants. 
Western Engineering Consultants (WEC], an engineering subsidiary 
of WWG, has recently been successful in attaining BS. 5750. In order 
to illustrate more clearly the way in which the development of 
quality management systems impact on the social and technical 
relations of an organisation, I will examine in detail the processes, 
procedures and problems associated with the development of quality 
systems at WEC. WEC was created from the engineering function of WWG 
following privatisation. The company's business is concerned primarily 
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with the design of large civil engineering projects (sewerage works, 
reservoirs, treatment works) and the Company, therefore, employs a 
highly skilled and 'professional' workforce of designers and 
engineers. The case study is particularly interesting given the way 
in which civil engineering and civil engineers have traditionally 
dominated the water industry. The creation of WEC and the 
development of quality systems therein constitutes the de facto 
marginalisation of the civil engineering function within WWG. 
The first stage in the development of the quality system at WEC 
was the determination of the functions and responsibilities of design 
staff: the determination and decomposition of the design process, 
Mike Edwards describes how this was achieved and the problems it 
raised: 
We asked people to say to us what they thought the 
design process was, and not put it down in any 
formal way, but just through a half-day workshop we 
said to everyone "You tell us what the design 
1labour? 17 process is! ". Now you might think that a 
designer would know when the process began, and when 
the process ended and to a large extent they did. 
Having said that, within the actual process there was 
disagreement. But essentially what we ended up with 
were 19 points on what the design process was about. 
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An important element of a quality system is the development of 
a 'quality plan'. The establishment of what constituted the design 
process was an essential precondition to the development of the 
'quality plan'. The WEC quality plan set out: 
- who the client is. 
- who the designers are. 
- what the resource imputs would be. 
- what key documents would be included. 
- the programme. 
- regularity of consultation with client. 
- level of approval required from client. 
- form of design output, drawings, etc. 
- verification and approval of designs 
Within the 'quality plan' process there are a series of procedures 
concerning the development of the quality plan: 
- use of codes and standards. 
- design controls to be included in the process. 
- how to review adequacy of documentation supplied 
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by a client. 
- how documents are to be controlled. 
- control of design calculations (independently 
assessed). 
- procedure for effecting changes in design. 
- reviewing design with client. 
- dealing with complaints from clients. 
- preparing tender documents. 
- awarding tender 
- records to be supplied on completion. 
The principles behind the development of the procedures were 
firstly, to keep the procedures as short as possible; the procedures 
being presented on one page together with specifications concerning 
the purpose and scope of the procedure. The procedure was then 
broken down into a series of steps no longer than one or two lines 
in length; including the initials of the person responsible for the 
function described in that step. The latter point is very important, 
for as Mike Edwards suggested, the procedures had to give both 
direction and ownership Indeed, in developing the procedures there 
had been 'a subtle attempt to insert ownership on almost every line'. 
Secondly, the procedures had to be general: the procedures concerned 
the activities of 'professional' workers, such as project managers and, 
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therefore, had to allow autonomy within a structure that gave general 
direction on process. 
It is important that workers feel that they own the -quality 
systems. The procedures were, therefore, developed by the workers 
themselves. At WEC the designers were invited to sit around a table 
and to talk through how they perceived the typical process of a 
design brief. The team initially laid out between 20 and 30 steps, 
which during a half day workshop were reduced to 7 or 8 short steps. 
The remaining codes and procedures were developed by sub-groups, and 
were presented to the designers for comments and recommendations and 
modified accordingly. This process took around four months, after 
which the final procedures were drafted and issued on a formal basis 
to everyone in the organisation - which is a fundamental requirement 
of BS. 5750. In keeping the procedures simple and general, Mike 
Edwards suggests that the Company was able to ensure the cooperation 
and enthusiasm of staff: 
I was very proud at the end of the whole process to 
be able to see that the level of realisation among 
the design team was "My goodness a procedure doesn't 
need to be a heavy tool, and we don't need to be hit 
over the head with it". Designers as people who 
conceptualise all day, then to see something in broad 
terms giving direction, but allowing them to have the 
artistic flair, the engineering flair, to come up with 
- 335 - 
these requirements, then we actually won them on day 
one. 
Following the drafting of the final procedures, WEC was assessed 
by the BSI and subsequently awarded BS. 5750. The BSI assessment is 
done in two stages. Stage One, BSI examines the procedures developed 
by a company and addresses each aspect of the standard. Stage Two, 
the BSI conducts an audit of the procedures in operation and 
highlights areas of non-conformance that need to be addressed. Once 
the non-conformances have been addressed, the BSI recommend the 
awarding of the standard. The attainment of BS. 5750 was important 
to WEC for reasons of commercial advantage. However, for Mike 
Edwards, the important impact of BS. 5750 has been on the behaviour 
and outlook of staff within the company: 
The real advantage of 5750..... was demonstrated on 
the day the recommendation came through. Everyone in 
the organisation, in that design department, really 
their chests were two inches further out than they 
were that morning. And the group bonding after that 
was quite marked. Increasingly over the weeks and 
months ahead, just passing by people you could here 
them on the telephone saying "Oh yes, we've got 57501. 
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First in the water industry! " Therefore the ownership 
was quite terrific. The benefit, the spin off, has 
been that the procedures have been reviewed once 
again. So that people involved in the quality system 
have actually said "Hey, hang on a bit! We can fine- 
tune this even better. We can actually bring in 
things that have changed within the company 
organically within the last few months. The ownership 
is very, very high. So although people may say that 
quality systems are very formal, they may stifle 
innovation, they're a bureaucratic nightmare, etc. 
etc., when they work well, and I've seen it work well, 
they really do touch on the total quality curve. 
S. 2. c. Informal Quality Systems and the 
"Quas i-Japanisation" of the Neo-Liberal Water 
Industry. 
The formal quality systems developed through the BSI in the 
context of commercial/regulatory pressure have been the catalyst for 
a more fundamental restructuring of the social and technical 
relations within the water sector. This was reflected at WWG where 
following the attainment of BS. 5750 by several Group subsidiaries, a 
decision was taken in 1991 to develop an informal quality system 
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alongside the formal BSI systems. The Group Quality Manager, Mike 
Edwards, suggests that the system is an attempt to develop 'Total 
Quality Management' [TQM] within the Group; although the Group has 
decided not to call the system TQM, but rather to view the 
development of the systems as part of a more long-term 'Continuous 
Improvement Programme' [CIP]. The CIP approach is of course an 
important element in the development and modification of formal 
systems as I demonstrated earlier. The Group were anxious, however, 
to develop quality systems in parts of the Group that did not require 
the development of BS. 5750 for commercial reasons; to create a 
financial proxy within the company to which the quality systems could 
respond. The advantage of the CIP is that: 
It can also be used in parts of the organisation that 
are not required to have BS. 5750. For instance, 
internally the Finance Department may have very 
little external customer contact, it may have a 
tremendous amount of internal customer contact, and 
may want to make things more efficient. But the 
driving force of BS. 5750 may not necessarily be 
placed upon them. So we looked also at the second 
strand of continuous improvement on the informal 
side. 
The development of a quality strategy has been given a high 
profile within the WWG, with the formation of a 'Quality Group', 
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chaired by Mike Edwards, and drawing on senior managers from across 
the Group. Support and encouragement for the development of a 
quality approach have come from the highest level within WWG. The 
modus operandi of the Quality Group is premised upon a 
conceptualisation of "quality" that is central to WWG's corporate 
identity and image, and a fundamental strand of business planning. 
The Chief Executive of WWG is very committed to the quality system 
process and an executive director has been given the responsibility 
of 'sponsoring' quality within the Group. With regard to the 
development of informal quality systems, the Quality Group was given 
the remit 'to research and report on the need to introduce a quality 
initiative across the organisation'. 
The approach to quality management at WWG may be broken down 
into five stages: 
1. The Brief: To Research and Report on the need to 
introduce' a quality initiative across the 
organisation. 
2. Group Research: Visits to organisations, management 
literature, and external consultants input. 
3. Building on Stated Objectives: Vision and mission 
statements. Values, style and business strategy. 
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Development of a quality strategy - viz.... THAT 
QUALITY PERVADES THE ORGANISATION IN ALL RESPECTS. 
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF QUALITY IS TO BE SUPPORTED BY AN 
EVIDENT PERCEPTION BY EMPLOYEE AND CUSTOMER. 
4. Strategy: Build on our previous success story. 
Company-wide, low-key initiative. Introduce pilot 
schemes in selected areas to define the cost of 
quality. Review methodology. Promote throughout the 
organisation. 
5. Support Needed: Top management commitment, Pilot 
study champions. Input from Consultant. 
In order to assess the extent to which WWG required to develop 
a quality strategy, the Quality Group considered advice and 
information from three main sources. First, the Group visited a range 
of private companies throughout Britain in order to assess and learn 
from the quality systems these companies had developed. Second, the 
Group considered 'management literature' on quality management; with 
the DTI 'Managing into the 90s Process' being particularly important 
and influential. Third, WWG acquired the services of an external 
'guru'; a management 'academic' who was brought in every three months 
in order to 'reinforce' and give 'direction' to the quality process 
developed by the Quality Group. 
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The Quality Group came to the conclusion that there was a need 
for the development of a 'quality strategy' within the Group. The 
need for a 'strategy', rather than a 'policy', was a deliberate 
corporate-level decision. The Group was in a good position for the 
development of a quality strategy: 'quality' being a central and 
fundamental element in the Group's vision and mission statements. The 
WWG mission statement states that the Group wishes to be seen as 
market leader in the environmental quality field by 1995. The 
corporate and business values and style of the Group that derived 
from the vision and mission statements had been outlined to everyone 
in the organisation in the form of a clear set of quality objectives; 
the form of this dissemination being the "Chief Executive's Roadshow" 
in which the Chief Executive toured the Group outlining WWG's key 
values and objectives. Everyone in the organisation was aware of the 
quality process or strategy: 'to try to make sure that quality is 
achieved in every area of the Business by every employee wherever 
possible'. 
The Quality Group attempted to established the extent to which 
the culture and values of WWG were conducive to the introduction of 
a quality strategy. A further consideration was why WWG needed to 
develop a quality strategy at all. For Mike Edwards the answer to 
this question was unequivocal: the cost of quality. Through a 
consideration of company information provided by the DTI, it was 
discovered that the 'cost of quality' could be between 15% and 40% of 
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turnover. This provided the main impetus for the development of the 
quality strategy: 
We said there has to be something there that we can 
develop. Therefore, as an organisation who 18 months 
ago had a turnover of £200M we said that even if we 
achieve 1% saving on turnover, then a £2M saving if 
nothing else, it would upgrade a sewerage works. We 
could use that money for the benefit of the customer. 
The Quality Group were thus able to outline the two clear 
elements of the quality strategy: customer satisfaction and improving 
profitability. The strategy had to meet these key objectives: 
We had to work through how we could reduce 
uncertainty and waste within the organisation. How we 
could increase value for money in everything that we 
did. Bringing in the people aspect, it had to be 
something on a continuous basis, and whatever we did, 
we had to be able to measure the results. It was no 
use just reporting on general things. We had to see 
in both financial terms, but also in other ways, 
quality of service etc.: How we were squaring up to 
things! 
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The prior restructuring of WWG determined the way in which the 
quality initiative was introduced and developed. The Group decided 
against a 'big bang' TQM approach; pursuing an approach that 
attempted to build upon the 'human relations' developments that had 
occurred in the previous 10-12 years. The main elements of this 
'staff development' were a programme of staff 'secondments' and 'team 
building' processes. The 'secondment process' encouraged managers, 
potential managers and supervisors to go on a series of 'secondments' 
throughout the organisation; with such sideways movement being made 
a pre-condition of promotion. Managers and potential managers were 
forced to 'go out and gain experience in the Business'. The 'Team 
Building Programme' had existed for the previous ten years and was a 
week-long intensive team-building exercise at one of the company's 
reservoir sites. These perceived strengths resulted in the Group 
decision to develop a low-key approach to quality attempted to 
combine a 'problem solving methodology' with the maintenance of 
managerial responsibility and authority. Thus: 
(The programme) would involve people looking at 
various parts of the process, and not solving the 
problems, but analysing the problems. Seeing where 
the waste was, where the potential was for 
improvement. Coming up through the analytical and 
then problem-solving phase into a report-back to 
their manager, where they could actually demonstrate 
certain efficiencies or certain advantages or certain 
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customer benefits. And it would then be the manager 
who would say: "0k, we'll tackle this or that, or we 
may need more work in certain areas". 
The main concern of the Quality Group was that by 'empowering' 
people within the organisation, it would allow a re-focusing of the 
way in which management information was transmitted through the 
organisation, and particularly focus upon the role and function of 
middle management within the organisation. The Group was particularly 
concerned by a growing body of management research which suggested 
that up to 60% of quality initiatives 'fizzled out' before the start 
of their second year. The research highlighted the problems caused by 
a lack of resources and enthusiasm, and in particular, the problem of 
'middle management mistrust'. This problem was therefore addressed in 
the CIP methodology: 
Inviting the manager of a department, with his team, 
to review how the department did their work. But 
importantly, whatever work the team came up with, to 
make it in a report back to management. So, it began 
and ended with the management. But the thick 
sandwich element of it was that the people in the 
problem solving process were then allowed to get on 
with the enthusiastic side of developing things, to 
reduce the problems in their everyday life. 
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The process thus aimed at utilising the expert knowledge of WWG 
staff in an attempt to solve the problems that they faced in their 
every day working lives; a process that would yield benefits for the 
company, for customers and above all for the staff themselves: 
So the process was to reduce hassle in their 
everyday life, to get them involved with things, to 
look at the areas that they were experts in and 
experienced in, and to see if we could actually 
improve things for their benefit, and the knock on 
effect is for the customer's benefit. 
In order to test the 'quality process' methodology three areas 
of the Company were selected to pilot the CIP; the basis of selection 
being areas with a high internal and external customer contact. The 
way the CIP was introduced at WWG was through an 'introductory 
seminar' in which the process was outlined to departmental staff by 
their senior manager and a member of the Quality Group. The average 
department contains 80-100 staff, and from these a 'pilot team' of 8- 
10 staff was selected at the seminar in order to address the 'key 
element' of the process - estimating the cost of quality. The groups 
were broken down into sub-groups by function, and other staff with a 
particular area of expertise were invited to sit ex officio on the 
sub groups. The definition of the concept 'cost of quality' developed 
into a serious obstacle to the development of the quality process in 
the pilot departments. Staff made the 'mistake' of equating the 
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process with 'Taylorism'. Mike Edwards describes this problem and how 
the Quality Group attempted to overcome it: 
Within our methodology what we found was that people 
viewed the "cost of quality" - whether it was the 
words that were wrong, benefits or opportunities 
might have been better words to use - but (it) had 
almost a works study connotation. People were a bit 
concerned..... "Is it works study by the backdoor? " 
But it also introduced uncertainty to them because 
they took the view that "Well, at the very beginning, 
of the methodology, here's someone asking us to 
define the cost of quality! Well, we can't define it, 
because we haven't defined the problem yet! " In 
reality, what we meant by the "cost of quality" was 
no more than: "If you look at key areas of the 
Business, how can you prioritise those into areas..... 
(and ask whether) we could be misguidedly tackling 
one area only to find that it contributed only 1% to 
the bottom line, whereas if they tackled another 
problem with the same level of involvement, it could 
have realised a better return". 
From the initial 'cost of quality' analysis, the 'pilot team' 
moved into the 'problem analysis' process. This was followed by the 
'problem workshop' process in which non-team members were drawn back 
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into the process in order to explore what the team had done, and to 
contribute fresh ideas to the quality process. This was followed by a 
more detailed 'problem solving' process in which the team made 
recommendations in a report to their manager. The manager had the 
power to accept or reject all or part of the proposals, or to suggest 
that the recommendations require more work. Indeed, it is a central 
feature of the CIP philosophy that teams are able to 'flag up' an 
overview of the areas that require further research and problems 
which could be resolved. The methodology was given top-management 
approval and in order to ensure that the programme was implemented 
in accordance with the methodology, external consultants were 
employed as facilitators, and members of the Quality Group were 
appointed as process 'project managers'. The aim was to outline the 
philosophy of the CIP; but within that, to allow subsidiary MDs to 
develop quality systems that corresponded to their 'business 
environment'. 
Mike Edwards argues that the pilot team process was a great 
success, and senior managers are now faced with the problem of how 
to proceed with the development of CIP throughout the Group. The 
process is to be flexible enough to meet the requirements of all 
parts of the group. The enterprise sector companies which require BS. 
5750 are able to fast-track the procedures and processes at a rapid 
rate through the parallel development of CIP. With the core business, 
where at present there is no pressure from OFWAT for companies to 
have BS. 5750 or CIPs, the CIP process is being developed in a low- 
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key way by local managers in order to increase efficiency. In the 
future, Mike Edwards projects that there will be teams covering every 
area of the Business, and an interchange and cross-fertilisation 
between teams in different parts of the business. Managers will 
follow the 'learning curve of quality' in individual departments 
through which staff become more aware of their internal and external 
customers' requirements, and this will be expanded into a wider 
'customer network' that will go beyond individual business areas. 
The main consideration facing the Group in the development of 
quality systems is the perception of the City. The 'golden share' of 
the Group is issued in 1994, and senior managers feel that it is 
important strategically to have quality systems covering all of the 
Group's 48 subsidiary companies prior to the issue. For Mike Edwards, 
therefore, it is vitally important that quality systems cover the 
whole of the organisation betore the company is vulnerable to the 
outside world. The ultimate dynamics with respect to the 
introduction of quality management at WWL are the abstract 
imperatives of valorisation. These imperatives are also reflected in 
the development of quality systems at CWL. 
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S. 2. d, Case Study Three: "Right First Time" 
and "Quasi-Quality Circles" at CWL. 
The demands of the regulatory/financial framework have provided 
a strong impetus towards the development of 'quality management' at 
CWL. But what is quality? The definition of quality at CWL is 'fit for 
purpose' or 'right'. Hence, the Company's quality strategy - 'the 
right time, at the right price, at the right place. The Company have 
attempted to maintain the separation between 'levels of service' and 
'quality'; the separation between what is done and how it is done; 
ultimately the separation between the production of use-value and 
the production of value. Hence, for Andrew Harris, the Business and 
Customer Services Director at CWL: 
We've made great strides to separate levels of 
service from quality. Quality is what you do, you can 
then rack it up to all sorts of levels. You know, 
we've been through the classic argument that quality 
is not a Rolls Royce versus a Ford Sierra. It was 
quality product, so the Ford Sierra is a quality 
product, and you must produce your Ford Sierra to the 
quality that you need. So I think we've tended to go 
straight down the "Fitness For Purpose" route. 
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The Company has appointed a 'Quality Assurance Manager' with 
the primary responsibility of overseeing the development and 
achievement of BS. 5750 throughout the organisation. The initial 
focus of the formal quality system was on the 'customer care' 
function, and particularly on the system that has been developed in 
order to monitor and audit the OFWAT performance measures. Following 
BSI accreditation it is intended to roll out the BS. 5750 approach to 
the rest of the Company. Developing systems in accordance with BS. 
5750 will ensure that all operations within the Company, starting 
with the 'customer care' function and the OFWAT system is repeatable: 
that is, to ensure that all customers and customer information are 
treated identically in accordance with a manual to which staff are 
able to continually refer. 
Alongside the formal and 'concrete' BSI system, senior managers 
at CWL decided to introduce an element of TQM into the organisation. 
Following consultation with a series of management consultants, 
senior managers decided that TQM did not really 'fit' the 'company 
culture' at CWL. TQM was perceived as being too 'flash' and 'clever'. 
Managers nevertheless perceived the need for an informal quality 
system to be developed in order to enhance the organisational culture 
of the Company, and attempted to develop a form of TQM that is 
compatible with CWL culture. Andrew Harris explains the main features 
of the quality system, and notes the centrality of the new 
financial/regulatory framework to its inception and development: 
- 350 - 
We have started running a programme called "Right 
First Time", which partly explains to people what all 
the new regulatory framework looks like and why the 
company is now working in a different environment, 
and then goes on to say so, you know, we have a 
fixed income and we can't afford to waste money with 
mistakes. So we must increasingly try to get the job 
right first time. Which is TQM in so many words. 
While the Company does not have 'quality circles' it does make 
increasing use of 'working parties' in the 'problem-solving' process. 
Rather than a series of managers coming together to form the 
parties, the managers are themselves setting up working parties of 
employees to solve managerial problems. Andrew Harris describes the 
way these groups work at CWL: 
(A Manager) has a problem and he gets a working 
party of the workers together. You need a manager 
there to open a few doors and to give them a bit of 
clout, perhaps help them with processing. But the 
basic work is done by the people who've got to do it. 
They may need help with a bit of vision, they may 
need help with a bit of process. But I think using 
the sort of, not quite quality circle - but that sort 
of thing: "Here we are lads, here's a problem, now you 
solve it for me! ". You're beginning to get them on the 
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ship. Now doing that certainly helps you break down 
the barrier..... So a bit of inter-departmental working 
at the lowest level. It's a marvellous improvement. 
Associated with the 'Right First Time' programme have been two 
key human resource developments: the introduction of 'internal 
customers' and the accreditation of all staff through the NVQ scheme. 
The introduction of the 'internal customer' involved everyone in the 
organisation attending a two-day seminar. The sessions were 
structured around diagonal slices of the Company in order to allow 
senior managers and directors to fulfil their role as cultural 
change-agents. The NVQ system is aimed at manual workers and lower- 
grade clerical staff, and aims to provide accreditation for staff 
carrying out functions for which no formal qualifications exist. The 
plan is to upgrade all manual and lower clerical staff to the 
appropriate NVQ level through a process which involves staff taking 
an exam and being awarded a certificate. The system is intended to 
benefit both the Company and the individual employee: raising the 
self-esteem of workers within a system which enables the Company to 
certify and accredit the quality of its 'human capital'. 
Despite the centrality of the OFWAT measures to the development 
and operation of 'quality management' systems at CWL, Andrew Harris 
suggests that the pressure from OFWAT has played a minimal r6le in 
the wide ranging quality initiatives that have been developed within 
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the Company. The primary dynamic has been the projection of a 
corporate image that customers and the City can trust: 
Water companies are as much about faith and 
confidence as they are about anything. I know there 
are 801 different measures, but essentially we find 
when we talk to customers that they just trust us 
and that is the way they view us. And it is 
maintaining that trust. I would think that is probably 
what you should be doing, and similarly the City goes 
as much about the feeling for a company, and if the 
feeling for a company is that it gets its business 
about right and it does it in the right way and it 
controls the costs and it gets its quality about 
right, then you're in the right route for dealing with 
the City. 
The introduction of quality management at CWL has not, however, 
been unproblematical. Andrew Harris describes the way in which the 
word 'quality' has tended to create a mental block among employees 
who have tended to perceive it as an implied criticism of their 
current performance (which indeed it is). In particular, the Company 
found resentment among manual staff with the introduction of the 
NVQs; many failed to see the necessity of passing an exam and being 
given a piece of paper that certified that they were qualified to do 
a job that in many cases they had been doing for the past 20 or 30 
- 353 - 
years. In many ways, therefore, the development of 'quality 
management' has engendered distrust among manual employees; many 
voicing the outrageous suggestion that an increase in the quality of 
their labour ought to be accompanied by an increase in its value. 
Further, many employees have voiced the fear that 'quality 
management' constitutes 'Speedy Taylor' by the backdoor. Andrew Harris 
outlines the ways in which employees have 'misunderstood' the new 
systems: 
People coming in studying their job. "Telling us how 
to do it! We think we should be paid more for doing 
this! If you're going to send me on a course, I want 
to be paid more! If you're going to ask me to get a 
qualification I want to be paid more! ". So it's very 
difficult for a manual area, which in most companies 
has been sorely neglected for many years. And 
suddenly they say to them "Good news chaps! You're 
now going to be turned into quality workers! ". For 
one, they probably thought they were anyway. Two, 
they know they've been studiously ignored for many 
years. And three, that's what they want paying for. 
We say: "Yes, Yes, and No! ". So not an easy area to 
work through. 
The term 'quality' has tended to 'jar' employees into a 'typical' 
response of "We do a good quality job, don't we? ": to which the 
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Company responds "Yes but not in the right way! ". The problem has 
thus been to make employees aware of the distinction between what 
they do and the way they do it. What they do (production of use 
values) remains the same, the way they do it (the production of value 
- but ever quicker and more intensive) requires development. Quality 
assurance is seen by staff at CWL as something related to the 
manufacture of washing machines; of having nothing to do with 
running a waterworks. The problem for CWL is that it doesn't have 
anything to do with managing a water works; but on the contrary, has 
everything to do with the production of value- The development of 
'quality management' has, therefore, involved reconstituting 
managerial authority and legitimation on abstract premises: quality 
management has been legitimated through a consumerist discourse 
focused on the way in which increased efficiency benefits the 
internal and external abstract consumers on which the rationality of 
abstract management is premised. 
6.2. e. The Problems of "Selling" Quality in 
the Neo-Liberal Water Industry. 
The introduction of quality (abstract) management has had an 
important impact on the labour processes within water companies. The 
essence of quality management is the deskilling of workers and 
incorporating the skill and knowledge of workers into the 
organisational and bureaucratic structures of water companies. This 
classic development highlighted by Marx has, however, taken on a new 
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form in the neo-liberal water industry. The deskilling is legitimated 
through a 'consumerist' discourse which emphasises the way in which 
labourers own their position in the management hierarchy. Within WWG, 
quality has been 'sold' by stressing the way in which systems reduce 
the day-to-day problems of managers and staff. Mike Edwards 
describes the way in which the Quality Group at WWG has attempted to 
'sell' quality systems: 
We feel we have to sell it to people within the 
Group. To say "Look, it will reduce your day-to-day 
hassle, if there are things within your job which you 
know are wrong or if you had the opportunity to put 
right". We're just trying to build empowerment 
through the managers to the people to look at ways 
of reducing their hassle, and obviously then to 
reduce waste within their departments. 
The justification and legitimation of the processes are 
articulated through the a discourse that stresses the way in which 
increased efficiency is passed directly to the customer. Public 
service is thus re-articulated in a neo-liberal form. Mike Edwards 
describes the way in which quality management benefits abstract 
consumers: 
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Our key requirements are to meet the requirements of 
the customer - whoever the customer is, whether its 
internal or external. We could then save money, but 
obviously, that then has a direct knock-on to the 
bottom line. Saving 1% means that we can either 
reduce the charge to customers or improve the 
service to customers by spending that saving. 
Quality management is thus the ideological form taken by 
abstract management in the neo-liberal water industry. The main 
impetus to the development of quality systems has been the 
valorisation imperatives of the financial/regulatory regime introduced 
by the 1989 Water Act: quality systems were introduced at WWG in the 
context of projected efficiency improvements of between £25M and 
£80M per annum. The new managerial systems have been legitimated 
through a 'consumerist' discourse that highlights the way in which 
improvements in efficiency benefit abstract customers. The raison 
d'etre of water companies, however, is the production of concrete 
use-values by concrete labourers and managers for concrete 
customers: the contradiction between value and use-value is 
manifested in the neo-liberal water industry as the contradiction 
between abstract and concrete customers. In the final two sections of 
this Chapter I explore the problem of mediating the interests of 
concrete consumers within the abstract institutional mechanisms of 
the neo-liberal water industry. In Chapter Seven I explore the 
problem of mediating the interests of concrete labourers. 
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6.3. The Problem of Nat o-L 1beral 
Customer Representation: Bringing 
the Concrete Custom8r Back 2n! 
The neo-liberal regulation of the water industry includes 
institutional arrangements for the representation of 'customer' 
interests and opinions. There are ten Customers Service Committees 
(CSCs) in England and Wales corresponding to the areas covered by the 
former RWAs. In contrast with the Consumer Consultative Councils 
(CCCs) they replaced, the CSCs are not embedded within the 
institutional structure of the water industry, but form part of the 
regulatory apparatus. The CSCs are constituted as independent bodies 
within OFWAT. These developments have had a marked impact on the 
institutional structures of water companies. Water companies have 
developed managerial posts and systems in order to 'manage' and 
maintain customer representation on an abstract basis. The problem of 
consumer representation is constituted by the extent to which the 
demands of concrete consumers deviate from the logic and rationality 
of the abstract power of money. OFWAT and the CSCs are constituted 
on the contradiction between regulation and administration determined 
through the contradiction between value and use-value. The state, 
therefore, mediates the conflict between real and concrete customers. 
The scope and limit of CSC involvement within the water 
industry are tightly controlled. The CSCs are not involved in the day- 
to-day regulation of the Company's operational performance. At WWL a 
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'Regulation Group' has been established in order to 'act on the 
company's behalf' with regard to liasing with OFWAT in Birmingham and 
the local CSC. Richard Dawson is responsible for Company-CSC liason 
at WWL, and he suggests that the involvement tends to assume two 
basic forms: consultation prior to major new developments and 
initiatives, and direct contacts between full-time CSC members and 
Regulation Group employees in respect of customer complaints that 
have not been adequately dealt with by WWL and have been reported to 
OFWAT. Richard Dawson suggests that there is an important distinction 
between the full-time secretariat (effectively employees of OFWAT) 
and the individual part-time members of the committees. The day-to- 
day contact between the Company and the CSC is at the level of the 
full-time secretariat. The most important function of the ordinary 
CSC members is to act as a forum for consultation and the 
dissemination of information on service issues. 
This is reflected at CWL where the most important point of 
contact between the Company and the CSC has been in response to 
guidance notes issued by OFWAT: such notes have included guidance on 
'Debt and Diconnection' (23-05-91) and 'Services for Disabled and 
Elderly Customers' (09-10-91). The Company has been required to do 
presentations to the CSC outlining its response to guidelines of this 
type. Contact with the CSC has been necessary when complaints have 
been made against the Company and referred to the CSC for 
adjudication; and the Company has used the CSC as a 'sounding board' 
prior to new developments and initiatives. The CSC were, for example, 
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consulted over changes to the design of the water bill prior to these 
being sent out to customers. 
The main problem that CWL has faced with regard to contact with 
the CSC, however, has been with regard to the CSC function of 
resolving customer complaints: the CSC have tended to undermine their 
own neo-liberal premises by generalising complaints, and hence re- 
politicising the regulatory relationship. Andrew Harris outlines the 
way he perceives the problem: 
One of the problems is that (the CSC) tend to deal 
with the rough end of the market, in that they are 
mostly dealing with a very small part of the 
population. Most of their work is focused at the 
complaint end unfortunately. So I suppose like the 
comment that people make about the police, if you're 
always dealing with the criminals.....! And one of the 
problems that we've had with the CSC is that they 
will often be trying to get us to do things for the 
population as a whole, based on the 1% sample that 
they are dealing with. Now sometimes it makes sense, 
but other times it just doesn't, and you can end up 
with a bit of a conflict. Because they are trying to 
resolve particular complaints, they will resolve that 
complaint and then say to us "Well look, you could 
avoid all of these in the future if only you'd do all 
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that". Well, probably 99% of our customers aren't 
interested. So it might help OFWAT with their work, 
but it doesn't actually help the bulk of the 
customers. 
The conflict between real and abstract customers is also 
reflected at SWL, where Helen Webster is concerned by what she 
considers to be a serious conflict between the quasi-customer qua 
OFWAT and the real customers to whom SWL supplies water. This 
conflict has been recognised and addressed by OFWAT, who have ruled 
that all water companies will have to undertake 'market research' as 
part of future periodic reviews. Indeed, SWL have already addressed 
this issue through the appointment of MORI to conduct a series of 
comprehensive surveys in order to measure the opinions of SWL's real 
customers. Helen Webster outlines the concerns that led to this 
development: 
OFWAT is supposed to be the quasi-customer (and) I've 
got concerns about that because they take what I call 
a rational and logical view of things. And with the 
best will in the world, the general public are not 
always rational and logical. So many of things I see 
coming from OFWAT where it says 'We believe this is 
the customers' view, it doesn't tie up at all with our 
perception of customers views' that are relayed to us 
by people getting on the phone or writing to us. In 
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many cases they are not logical. But they just feel 
very strongly about something and logic just goes 
straight out of the window. So I don't really think 
that either OFWAT or the CSCs truly represent the 
customers' views. 
The reason for the CSC not truly representing customer views 
emanates from the narrow base of interest groups on which it is 
constituted. Helen Webster is SWL representative on the CSC, and 
suggests that the Committee's constitution made up of local 
councillors, and representatives from agriculture, small business, and 
disabled and charity groups prevents the Committee developing what 
she terms a 'balanced view'. In considering the Committee's lack of 
rationality, she highlights the extent to which conflict is 
increasingly premised on the commodification of water: 
On the one hand, I've actually heard it within the 
CSC, you'll get one member saying "Well I believe that 
it's wrong for other water-company-payers to pay the 
bills of those people who won't pay, therefore water 
companies ought to disconnect supplies". And then in 
the same committee you've got another member saying 
'hat's terrible to disconnect people that can't pay 
their bills". So we do tend to get mixed messages 
coming from them. 
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The extent to which the water industry is now premised firmly 
on the premises of the rational abstract individual of liberal social 
theory is reflected in the way Helen Webster conceptualises the 
logical and ultimate development of 'customer sovereignty' - the 
freedom to receive poor service: 
I was speaking to Ian Byatt about a month ago, and 
he was saying the self same thing, because I posed 
the question, the hypothetical question, "What if our 
customers would actually prefer a lower level of 
service at lower cost? ". Because OFWAT is always 
talking about improving levels of service, but 
obviously, all these have a cost attached to them. 
And I'm actually turning the tables and saying, what 
about if they actually say, "Well we don't want this 
level of service, but will you knock 10% off our 
bill? ". What would OFWAT's reaction be to that? And 
he sort of mulled it over for a while, and he said: 
"Well, if that's what your customers really want, it 
would not be right for OFWAT to say no they can't 
have it! ". 
The weakness and problems associated with consumer 
representation in the neo-liberal water industry are perceived by 
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managers as emanating from the illogicality, irrationality and 
stupidity of real consumers. The contradictory premises of neo- 
liberal state regulation implies that managers have the problematical 
function of constantly maintaining abstraction. The maintenance of 
abstraction is the raison d'etre of management in the neo-liberal 
water industry. 
G. 4. The Corztradictioris of i lie Neo- 
Liberal Watar Irzdustr-y: 'rk-ie Prob1Qm 
of Ma3. ntais3Ling Abstractiori. 
The restructuring of the water industry has had an important 
impact with respect to all aspects of the 'economic' political' and 
'ideological' social relations on which the industry is premised. The 
neo-liberal form of the industry has (re)imposed the separation 
between economics and politics through the subordination of use- 
values to value and the domination of concrete by abstract labour. 
However, the fundamental contradiction between value and use-value 
cannot be transcended. In responding to the crisis of the 
managerialist form of the industry, the neo-liberal restructuring has 
laid the basis for further crisis. 
In this Chapter I have reviewed the way in which social 
relations have been restructured in the neo-liberal water industry, 
and I have isolated the nascent contradictions emerging from the new 
- 364 - 
forms of management-employee and company-customer relations. In 
conclusion, I wish to consider the way in which senior managers live 
the contradictions inherent in the new form of the industry: I wish 
to suggest that this takes the form of a fundamental concern to 
maintain abstraction - to fight at all costs the re-politicisation of 
the organisational and managerial structures of the water industry. 
Senior managers such as Mike Edwards at WWL are concerned by 
the way in which the quality advances made by WWL are not reflected 
in the public perception of either the Company or the industry as a 
whole. The company is spending more on the customer following 
privatisation and is committed to providing customers with adequate 
information about the company's activities in order to give them 
confidence that the Company is acting in their interests. The 
perception of the company is, however, coloured by public perception 
of the water industry at the macro level: 
It's the public perception of the water industry in 
general, not just WWG, that we're battling against. We 
have, for instance, still a long way to go in 
overcoming this privatisation myth that now we're 
privatised everyone in the organisation is on a fat 
salary. I'm not on a fat salary in terms of what I 
was on before privatisation, but I still work as hard 
as I did before. Internally there are a lot of people 
actually saying "Look, we are hard workers! " But its 
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very difficult to say that Western Water could 
influence the general public, when on NEWS AT TEN 
something indicates that, in macro-terms, customers 
are paying more and there are water restrictions. 
Now, there are no water restrictions in Western Water 
(region). But that colours the view and it's 
increasing. 
Similarly, the Company has suffered from the emergence of an 
increasingly important environmentalist discourse: 
Whether we like it or not it's the public's 
perception, not only of water and the quality of 
water, but the environment. We're big organisations in 
terms of destroying fields to build sewerage works 
or water works to benefit the customer. So we have 
to minimise the environmental impact. But 
nevertheless, we still come in for flak, as many 
utilities do - (for) digging up roads etc. 
Companies operating in the neo-liberal water industry have 
found it increasingly important to develop and maintain an image of 
themselves as 'quality' companies. It has been difficult to develop a 
public perception of water companies which would result in customers 
ranking their regional or local water undertaking alongside Marks and 
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Spencer with respect to service and efficiency. The communication of 
quality improvement has been extremely problematical: senior managers 
feel they have faced an uphill struggle against an unfair media and 
an unsympathetic 'public'. The media often devotes 'unfair' and 
'unwarranted' attention to the industry; feeding 'bad news' to a 
public among whom there is a pre-disposed appetite for 'bad news' 
about utility companies in general, and water companies in particular. 
Within the neo-liberal water industry the 'management of the media' 
has thus become an increasingly important function. 
Ultimately, however, water companies are unable to resolve the 
contradiction between the development of abstract management (value) 
and the public perception of the use-values produced by water 
companies. The last word goes to Mike Edwards at WWL who articulates 
the irresolvability of the contradiction. 
I think you just have to be realistic Graham, and say 
that we just have to keep working at it. I'm 
intensely proud of working in the organisation..... and 
there's a part of me that says "Hey look! If Joe 
Public doesn't want to know how well we're doing, 
then I can't break my neck, I can't break away from 
my job [development of abstract management systems] 
to tell them how well we're doing, or else we won't 
get the job done [!!! 7. We'll just have to accept it. 
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Cha pter Seven 
0 tate Regulat 1 on. Abstrract 
MariOLgement grid tide Politics of 
''Public Service' '. 
In the neo-liberal water industry the development of abstract 
control has taken the form of 'quality management' which has 
legitimated the imposition of abstraction through the way in which 
the new regulatory /production configuration is premised on the needs 
of the (abstract) customer - the law of money as public service. The 
managerialist form of the industry through which the neo-liberal form 
developed, however, was premised on the discourse of Fabian Socialism 
which also collapsed the contradiction between value and use-value, 
but collapsed the contradiction on the basis of concrete labour. The 
regulation, management and trade unionism associated with Fabian 
public service articulated the class interests of labour in an 
alienated form. The neo-liberal imposition of abstraction has 
therefore involved a fundamental restructuring of the economic, 
political, and ideological aspects of the capital relation. The central 
feature of this project with respect to the water industry, has been 
the radical reinterpretation and reconstitution of public service as a 
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management form. The struggle between concrete and abstract labour 
is manifested over the form of the public service. 
In this Chapter I explore the 'politics' of public service in the 
neo-liberal water industry. The development of abstract public 
service has been premised on the way in which concrete labour has 
been simultaneously marginalised from the regulation and 
administration of use-values, and partially-integrated within the 
managerial systems and structures concerned with the production of 
value. This shift in the determination of labour in the water 
industry has been manifested in fundamental changes in the 
management of 'human resources' and 'industrial relations'. The 
imposition of abstraction has also had fundamental implications with 
respect to the form and function of public service trade unionism. In 
bourgeois society, trade unions are simultaneously an opposition to 
capital and a component of capital which express the contradictions 
of capital (Anderson, 1967: 264). Trade unions are determined by, and 
articulate, the contradiction between value and use-value. The 
development of abstract regulation and abstract management has, 
therefore, been accompanied by the development of abstract forms of 
'public service' trade unionism. In this Chapter I demonstrate the way 
in which abstract trade unionism has been determined through the 
struggle to impose abstraction on the water industry. 
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7.1. State Regulatiori and 




The 'changing business demands' associated with the 
privatisation of the water industry have been accompanied by a 
radical reorganisation of Human Resource Structures [HRS]; and in 
particular has resulted in a marked reorientation in the skills and 
competences which water companies expect and demand from their 
employees. The domination of concrete by abstract labour has 
prioritised skills and competences associated with the production of 
value, vag, abstract managerial skills and the development of a 
flexible and polyvalent workforce. The latter has involved the 
restructuring of managerial control systems and labour processes 
within the water industry on the basis of the valorisation 
imperatives of the new WSPLCs. The reconstitution of management 
control and legitimation on abstract premises has heightened the 
problems of motivation, reliability and trust. The imperative of 
reconstituting motivation, reliability and trust on an abstract basis 
has resulted in the incorporation of labour within the abstract 
control structures of the neo-liberal water industry. 
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7.1 , a. Abstract Management and the 
Determination of Flexibility and Polyvalence. 
The managerialist restructuring of the 1980s, and the 
regulatory/ financial regime imposed by the 1989 Water Act have 
constituted important dynamics with respect to levels of efficiency 
and profitability. These dynamics have had a fundamental impact on 
the HRSs of water companies. The regulatory regime imposed by the 
state has been fundamental in determining the form of managerial 
control. This has been particularly marked at WWL, where Frank 
Watson, the Senior Personnel Manager, suggests that the pressures 
placed on the Company by regulation have played a major role in 
determining the shape of the the new HRS: 
We had to face increasing regulation which was a 
tremendous increase on what it had been previously, 
and continues to be so. 'Customer care' came out of 
regulation..... and new departments like 'customer 
care' sprung up. We embarked on a programme of 
'customer care' with customers being internal as well 
as external. Basically, people were asked generally to 
do, not only their old job, but new additional things. 
We restructured on a much flatter structure, with 
less management tiers..... So, the demands on people 
are clearly very much greater than they were before. 
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Fewer and fewer specialists, and more and more 
generalists employing a wider range of skills. 
In the higher levels of the Company, the most important 
competence that the new environment has demanded has been that of 
staff 'having to learn to manage people'. The Company has prioritised 
management skills over technical capacities and qualifications. Frank 
Watson illustrates this by suggesting that, while certain scientific 
positions will always require specific 'scientific' skills, many 
positions that had traditionally been filled by people drawn from 
particular disciplines in fact demand man-management (sic) as their 
primary competence. The revenue department would traditionally have 
been headed by an accountant. Following restructuring, the Revenues 
Department is headed by a civil engineer, and perhaps inevitably the 
new Operations Director is an accountant. In contrast to the public 
sector industry, managers are appointed according to their ability to 
manage; the technical knowledge required for positions being supplied 
to managers through a specially developed 'Technical Support Group': 
Basically, if people are good managers, and the job 
has a good proportion of man-management skills 
involved, then that person is given the job, and away 
we go! And somehow or another, its organised so that 
the technical support that may be lacking in his own 
background or qualifications, is supplied by our 
Technical Support Group..... or from other people 
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around, by basic cooperation and collaboration, or by 
buying someone in from our enterprise companies. It 
works very well for us, and so there are a good 
number of generalist managers around in charge of 
departments 
The Company has also attempted to optimise the flexibility of 
staff. This has involved flexibility both between and within positions 
and locations in the Company, The Company has reached a flexibility 
agreement with its employees, and this 'allows people to swap and 
change jobs and locations almost at the drop of a hat'. The primary 
objective in developing the HRS at WWL has been the creation of a 
highly skilled, flexible, polyvalent workforce. In 1991-2 the Company 
invested over £1M in a training programme which covered everything 
from skills training and development and further education courses to 
sponsoring staff on degrees, masters degrees and MBAs. According to 
Frank Watson, these initiatives have not only resulted in the Company 
becoming more responsive to its environment, but have served to 
enrich the working lives of employees within the company. 
Basically, we're looking for people to do everything 
that they can possibly do within their own job, and 
also to develop on to be promoted wherever possible. 
Even down to the clerks. We don't just hire clerks, 
they won't just be an admin clerk - they'll be a 
receptionist, they'll be a telephonist, they'll do 
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photocopying, they'll do a whole range of things. 
They'll have what would be classed in other companies 
as three or four jobs..... So as long as its within 
their capability, and they can be trained for it, then 
they get trained. And that same approach goes for 
everyone throughout the Company. We're very flexible, 
very quick on our feet...:. and we support that with a 
massive investment in training. 
The development of the new regulatory regime has also had 
important 'human resource' implications at EWL. Regulation has 
impacted particularly on customer-interface staff. The development of 
the 'customer care' function has increased the visibility on these 
staff, and made their work more critical to the successful 
functioning of the organisation. Staff involved in 'customer care' 
have undergone a process of 'up-skilling' in order to up-grade the 
skills and awareness of staff whose duties impinge directly on the 
DG's performance measures. Employees dealing with customer complaints 
or enquiries by letter or phone, employees dealing with 'shut offs' or 
customer's problems out in the field, employees dealing with 
customers that are unable to pay their bills have undergone an 
intensive period of training and development in order to ensure that 
they are critically aware of the way in which their duties impact on 
both the customer's perception of the Company and the requirements 
and constraints imposed by OFWAT. 
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A central element in the new culture at EWL has been the way in 
which the entire organisation has been permeated with the ideology of 
consumerism The extent to which OFWAT has been an important change- 
agent in the managerial restructuring of EWL is, however, a 
problematical issue for senior managers, For David Morris, describing 
the development of the new managerial structures in terms of 
'pressure from OFWAT' while 'reasonably factually accurate', 
nevertheless fails to adequately convey the total metamorphosis the 
Company has undergone in becoming 'totally customer-oriented'. The 
customer is so central to the way in which the Company is now 
constituted that OFWAT is becoming an increasingly marginalised 
member of what David Morris describes as the supplier-regulator- 
customer 'team': 
It's second nature to provide the service, considering 
costs and all of those other sorts of things, that 
the customer wants. So certainly, the regulator 
becomes marginalised. If anybody drops out of that 
team in the perception of how we do things it's the 
regulator. The customer and the supplier are a team 
and we work together, and the pressures of satisfying 
the regulator will disappear. We are not satisfying 
them anyway! We're not satisfying OFWAT! We're not 
satisfying our Customer Services Committee! We're not 
satisfying pressure groups that may come from London 
and don't drink Eastern water! And we're not 
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satisfying the shareholders directly! The whole focus 
is the customer! That's where we begin! That's where 
we end! And, by doing that right, everything else 
falls into place. Even the price of our shares and 
our dividend. All of that sort of thing falls into 
place - if we get it right with our customer. 
Managers describe the way in which OFWAT (the state) provided 
the initial impetus for changes in 'human resourse' management, but 
also stress the way in which the regulator will become increasingly 
superfluous as the focus on the customer becomes ever sharper. The 
state has articulated more fundamental changes at the level of the 
capital relation: the increasing domination of abstract labour on 
social relations within the water industry. OFWAT had a marked impact 
on EWL immediately after privatisation in terms of the pressures of 
producing effective information against performance targets. David 
Morris uses the example of information on comparative labour costs 
in order to illustrate the way in which OFWAT is now becoming 
marginal even in the sphere of performance information: 
Now we're looking beyond the regulator. We're saying 
"Well he hasn't asked for that, there isn't a DG 
(indicator) that covers that - there's a whole series 
of performance issues that the customer and we are 
interested in, but don't appear as a DG level of 
service. We've got to address those because our 
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customers want us to, not because the regulator 
thinks they ought to be pursued. He might well have 
some planning horizons that say there are other 
issues here that have to be brought into account. But 
that's almost secondary, that's marginal. He might 
ring us up one day and say "I would like to know 
comparative labour costs, so I can see who's most 
efficient". Now if he did, the theory that I'm trying 
to describe would say: "Fine! We already do that. 
Because our customers are interested in how cost 
conscious we are! How efficient we are! How many 
people it takes to put a pipe in the ground, or to 
design a sewage treatment works! ". They're our 
customers, they want to know: Are we efficient?, and 
that's a measure that we've decided. So we tell them 
(OFWAT). 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument of David Morris 
inevitably leads to the marginalisation of the (concrete) customer. 
The inexorable logic of abstract management is to escape the clutches 
of real customers as well as their supposed proxy qua state 
regulator (OFWAT): 
It's difficult to say the customer is marginalised, 
but in a sense they are as well, because they're so 
much part of the focus of what the business is all 
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about..... I think that's the scenario that we're at, 
because we'll always determine our own way forward, 
which is totally, single-mindedly customer-focused in 
everything that we do. And we share it with the 
customer. Perhaps we can tell the customer what they 
want, in the nicest possible way. And we set our 
resource scenario around it. So in a sense I think, 
we had to have OFWAT driving us at first, but we've 
now matured. 
Within the former SWCs, the restructuring of 'human resources' 
following the 1989 Water Act has been more rapid and more 
fundamental. The new regulatory framework has had a marked impact on 
social relations. At CWL, the imperative to generate vast amounts of 
information for OFWAT has provided the major dynamic in the 
development of new information technology. The technology has 
facilitated both a reduction in the number of staff, and the 
development of polyvalent skills among the remaining staff. The new 
framework has had an important impact on the types of skills that 
are important to the company; in particular a shift from a focus on 
engineering to a focus on accountancy. Andrew Harris, a senior 
executive at CWL, describes the shift in the company culture and its 
impact on human resource management: 
Traditionally water companies were driven by the 
engineer. Very high quality stuff, very fine, but 
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again almost endless resources to pay for it. We are 
now moving towards an area where you are customer 
driven, you get that right, and you begin to 
appreciate that engineering operations are to support 
that direction. So don't tell the customer what he 
wants, find out what the customer wants, then 
engineer it. I think we are also learning that small 
is beautiful. So we don't have an army of clerks, we 
get a bit of IT in, we get a couple of good quality 
people in, and say: "Rather than having 8 grade one 
people, what about two grade 3 people with a bit of 
IT to support them". That general drift. But there is 
also the expectation that the numbers are going to 
go down. 
The demands of the new environment have further focused the 
attention of the Company on the process of management education and 
development. The Company has traditionally focused management 
training and development on senior management. The new regulatory 
system is perceived to have had the most impact on supervisors; 
transforming them into managers, and transforming the skills they 
require from 'supervisory' (concrete) to 'managerial' (abstract). The 
increasing focus on management 'accountability' is associated with a 
fundamental transformation of the Company's payment and rewards 
system, with the development of 'appraisal' and 'performance-related- 
pay'. 
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The 'appraisal system' is currently applied to senior managers 
and has been designed in order that individual managers have 
elements of the 'Business Plan' inserted into their own individual 
contract of employment. Managers are rewarded in terms of the extent 
to which they achieve these objectives and thus in terms of the 
contribution they make to the success of the Business. The appraisal 
system is currently being extended to supervisor-level and below. The 
objective of the Company is to introduce simply defined targets at 
this level. For example, staff in the Accounts Department will be 
appraised in terms of the number of invoices they deal with. In order 
to maintain flexibility in the context of the bureaucratisation 
associated with 'quality management', appraisal for more junior staff 
will also take into account the overall financial performance of the 
Company: 
It may be that the reward systems that you put in 
will have to reflect Company performance as well as 
departmental performance. The prime focus is to get 
on to the person to do that properly, but you'd 
better understand that if someone comes along and 
wants a bit of help then you'd better do that because 
20% of your pay is going to be made up on how the 
Company does. So I think it will want designing 
fairly carefully otherwise you might very well drive 
people further into boxes. "I can't stop to help you! 
I've got a hundred invoices to shift today! " 
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Within two years the system will cover every employee in the 
organisation, and in preparation for this the Company has undertaken 
a comprehensive 'job evaluation programme' which has facilitated the 
development of a new grading system premised on 'single status' 
employees. The new systems will increase the motivation of staff; 
removing the rigid local government-type structure with its myriad of 
scales and increments, with a structure that will provide incentives 
for staff to work harder, and thus for the reward structure to 
differentiate between employees that perform and well and those that 
perform badly. 
The neo-liberal restructuring of the water industry has 
reconstituted management control and reward structures on abstract 
premises. The constitution of the employment relation on the basis of 
the abstract power of the law of money does not, however, guarantee 
the maximisation of valorised labour: maximising the productivity of 
labour is dependent upon both the coercion implied by the wage- 
relation and the cooperation engendered by the ideological legitimacy 
of management (Fox, 1985: 50-2). The development of abstract 
management has therefore been accompanied by the reconstitution of 
managerial legitimacy on abstract premises. 
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7.1. b. Abstract Management and the Problem of 
Motivation and Trust. 
The logic of abstract management has restructured the 
(concrete) structures of management associated with managerialism on 
the basis of abstraction. The necessary corollary of this 
restructuring has been a marked reduction in managerial positions and 
a fundamental 'flattening' of managerial control structures. The new 
structure has heightened the importance of 'trust' and 'reliability'; 
particularly in consideration of the way in which the operations of 
the water industry are constituted by geographically dispersed units. 
It has become increasingly important to ensure that staff are 
motivated, contented and trustworthy. 
At WWL the period since 1979 has been one of constant change 
and improvement, in which the workforce of the Company was reduced 
by 40% in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Frank Watson, 
the Company's Senior Personnel Manager, argues that 'trying to 
motivate people to do more was absolutely necessary as fewer people 
had more work to do in order to keep us going'. An important element 
in the restructuring of the HRS at WWL has thus been the cultivation 
of a 'growth culture'. The main feature of this has been the 
introduction of a series of 'development programmes'. Apart from the 
'Senior Management Development Programme', the company has not 
obliged other staff to take part in the programmes or singled out 
individuals for development: the company has rather attempted to set 
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up an enabling growth culture, and staff who were keen to develop 
have volunteered to go through the process. 
The emphasis within WWL is thus on training and development 
being 'employee-led'. Responsibility for training and career 
development is shared between the employee and the Company. The 
Company has attempted to create a climate in which employees who 
feel that they are capable of more challenging work, or feel that 
they want more responsibility, have the right to demand an interview 
with their supervisor or manager in order to discuss their career 
development. The interviews are not designed to assess aspects of 
the employee's day-to-day performance, but to address wider issues 
such as career development, and the extent to which the employee 
would like to take on more responsibility or be delegated more tasks. 
This often involves a consideration of 'Job enlargement', 'Job 
enrichment', 'job rotation', or various educational courses. Given the 
shared responsibility, Frank Watson believes that this process has 
both 'empowered' employees and significantly altered the relationship 
between manager and managed: employees being within their 'rights' to 
ask their manager for anything concerning their development to be 
considered. 
The new culture that has been built steadily over the past 
decade is now fully developed and staff fully conversant with the 
rules of the new game. They know instinctively what is required of 
them developmentally; they have to become what Frank Watson terms 
- 383 - 
'rounded off as people' - which amounts to fulfilling their own 
potential through the development of abstract managerial 'skills' 
which allows them to do the best for both themselves and their 
company. Frank Watson suggests that WWL is attempting: 
To get people in the round, to get them rounded off 
as people, to give them a third dimension, experience 
of man-management, experience of supervising people, 
moving them around the company. So we're basically 
trying to get them to develop in their own Job to 
fulfil their potential, and we don't like wasting 
skills, if they've got skills and abilities that are 
innate to them we're looking to release them within 
their job, and if possible, if we recognise that they 
can do a bigger job and be promoted, then that's 
built into the progression as well and eventually 
they will be promoted. 
In order to secure trustworthy and reliable workers WWL has 
also developed a 'high reward' philosophy. As Frank Watson points out, 
this involves more than paying good salaries; it contains a 'total 
employee package' comprising health and well-being, good offices, good 
vehicles, good depots, good working conditions out on site and a 
'tremendous' record on health and safety. The relationship between 
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this philosophy and employee relations is explicit. Frank Watson 
outlines the main motives behind the strategy: 
We do a whole host of things to make sure that our 
employees are well looked after. So that they'll want 
to come to work, they'll want to work for us, and 
they'll want to work hard. If you've got someone like 
that you don't have to worry too much about 
supervising them. So one of their skills or qualities 
would be self-supervision A lot of our manual 
workers and craftsmen are "off to the four winds" - 
you see them at 7.30 in the morning and don't see 
them again until 3.30 in the afternoon, apart from 
when a supervisor might visit a site. So there is a 
great deal of trust and reliability to be built in. 
Indeed trust and reliability have been key elements in the 
appointment and re-appointment of staff: 
(Trust) is a particular thing that we look for in the 
interview. Someone might have all the skills and 
abilities, but can he be trusted to work forty miles 
from the depot all day, every day on his own. Working 
out what needs to be done, doing it, doing it to 
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standard, making sure it works, protecting the supply, 
protecting the customer, protecting the Company. 
The task of securing a trustworthy and reliable workforce 
through this process is seen by Frank Watson, who has overall 
responsibility for personnel and training within the company, as a 
'moving target'. This reflects the environment of 'continuous 
improvement' in which the Company operates. The constant self- 
expansion of abstract values has thus imposed new human resource 
imperatives on the neo-liberal water industry. Managerial legitimacy 
has been reconstituted through the ideological discourse of 
consumerism and 'customer care'; workers have been incorporated into 
abstract management systems through their internalisation of the 
imperatives of abstract control and this has been legitimated through 
a 'consumerist' discourse which stresses the way in which staff own 
and are empowered by the new abstract systems. 
In capitalist society trade unions articulate the interests of 
concrete labour in an alienated form. The state-sponsored imposition 
of abstraction has, therefore, necessarily involved the 
marginalisation of organised labour qua trade unions within the water 
industry. I will now explore the way in which the increasing 
domination of abstract labour has involved a fundamental 
restructuring of 'industrial relations' within the neo-liberal water 
industry. 
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7.2. Abstract Mariagement mricl 't 1-140 
Marginalisation of Labour: The 
Politics of Healtiz and Ssfsty. 
The fragmentation of the water industry, and the demise of the 
NWC as a coordinating agency in respect of industrial relations, has 
resulted in a wide variety of IR strategies across the water sector. 
In this Section, I will contrast the exclusionary and incorporationary 
strategies pursued by WWL and EWL respectively in the context of 
developments around the issue of health and safety. I will 
demonstrate the way in which these strategies are merely forms of 
the same essential phenomenon: the restructuring of the capital 
relation and the domination of concrete by abstract labour. The state 
has played a central role in the exclusion of concrete labour from 
the regulatory and administrative apparatus of the water industry: 
the fragmentation of national negotiating machinery has linked the 
determination of pay and conditions directly with the valorisation 
imperatives of individual water companies. The restructuring of 
'industrial relations' is part of the wider project of imposing the 
imperatives of abstraction on the neo-liberal water industry. 
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7.2. a, Company Unionism and the Micro-Politics 
of Exclusion at WWL. 
WWL has pursued an exclusionary strategy with respect to the 
trade unions organising within the Company. Indeed, the Company has 
replaced the trade union-based system of consultative committees and 
shop steward representation with a 'company council' system. The 
unions retain a role in disciplinary matters and on the safety 
committee, and a full-time representative of the 'confederation of 
trade unions' (made up of the eight unions that organise in the 
Company) is allowed to sit on the 'Company Council' in an 'advisory' 
capacity. The new structure comprises a main 'Company Council' that 
deals with company-wide issues, and the members of which are drawn 
from the seven 'Employee Councils' that are situated around the 
Company. The councillors that sit on the councils are all employees 
of the Company, and the councillors have exclusive rights with 
respect to the negotiation of terms and conditions, the interpretation 
of agreements, and the representation of staff in grievances and 
disciplinary matters. 
The main impetus to the development of the new IR system was 
the refusal of the trade unions to cooperate with the Company in the 
development of single-table negotiations and the harmonisation of 
terms and conditions. The Company was eager to move away from the 
Whitley system which involved dealing with eight trade unions on 
three negotiating bodies for staff, craft and manual workers. The 
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Company decided that it would deal with only one trade union and 
deal directly with employees - rather than dealing with staff 
indirectly through a 'third party'. Frank Watson, the Senior Personnel 
Manager, alludes to the way in which this was related to the new 
managerial ethos: 
We decided that we only wanted one trade union, and 
we wanted as well not to talk through trade unions. 
There were wrong, biased messages getting filtered 
through when we did that. Staff were tending to look 
to trade unions rather than to their supervisors with 
problems, We believed supervisors needed to do their 
jobs properly and they needed support for that. So we 
didn't want to deal with a third party. 
The development of the new IR system carried a risk. The water 
industry is highly-unionised, and while WWL had faced no industrial 
action since the national strike of 1983, there was a risk of both 
local and even national action following their decision. As Frank 
Watson suggests, however, the risks were justified in the pursuit of 
a labour relations framework that was not based on potential 
conflict. In addition to the potential conflict in dealing with trade 
unions, a further problem for WWL was the extent to which the unions 
organising in the company were indelibly tarnished with a 
(concretist) public sector/town hall image. In the run up to 
privatisation, for example, WWL had initially opposed privatisation. 
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The Company was inevitably forced into 'conceding the inevitable' and 
attempted to 'make the best of the situation'. The continued 
opposition of the trade unions to privatisation, reflected not the 
concerns of WWL staff, who Frank Watson argues, had full confidence 
in their management irrespective of the ownership of the Company', 
but the 'self-interest' of the trade unions: 
(The unions> were coming on very strong from all 
angles, and not least of all because of self-interest. 
Does National and Local Government Officers have a 
place in a privatised company? National Union of 
Public Employees in a private company? It doesn't fit 
at ally Some of them started to get very worried 
because of self-interest. We think that we have a 
good relationship with our employees. So although the 
unions were worried, the employees were not. The 
employees knew that the same team of managers, who 
had built up a good reputation and a good 
relationship, were going to be there after 
privatisation as well. I think they took a lot of 
comfort from that. 
The trade unions have been excluded from the development of 
health and safety at a macro level since the abolition of the NWC in 
the early 1980s. What has been the effect of the demise of the 
coordinating and advisory role of the NWC on the development of 
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effective health and safety policy? The new safety manager at WWL, 
recently brought in from the chemical industry, suggests that the new 
system will not necessarily hinder the development of codes and 
standards; but change the form in which these are determined: the 
development of a more 'private sector' way of working. 
The result of the new 'employee relations' framework at WWL has 
resulted in the exclusion and marginalisation of trade unions 
nationally being reciprocated at company-level. To Peter Williams, 
however, the impact of this development has been limited owing to 
what he perceived to be the traditionally low level of trade union 
involvement in safety. Indeed the new system has served to heighten 
the awareness of representatives to the issue of health and safety; 
perhaps because the company is able to define the problem of safety 
ostensibly in its own (abstract) terms: 
I think we are getting more involvement, simply 
because we have raised the profile of safety within 
the Company. The [staff] who used to be the trade 
union safety representatives and shop stewards, who 
are now the area councillors sitting on the Company 
Council, are more aware themselves of safety. Because 
we have been proactive, and gone to them and said 
"this is what we're doing, and this is what we think 
is of interest to you and your rille. And in fact, 
we're directly involved in the training of company 
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councillors, which was put on and organised with a 
local university. Two of us actually did the safety 
session for that. 
The exclusion of organised labour at WWL has been accompanied 
by the reintegration of labour on an abstract basis. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, the management of health and safety at 
WWL has been restructured on the basis of the valorisation 
imperatives of the Company. Senior managers at WWL present the 
'company council' system as very 'democratic' and analogous to 
Parliament. The company councillors range from mainlayers to senior 
managers and represent all the staff in their 
geographical/operational area. The exclusion of trade unions at WWL 
has, therefore, been legitimated on the basis of neo-liberal 
'citizenship' rights: the interests of concrete labour defined and 
articulated in abstraction from the production of use-values. The 
specificity of WWL is derived from the way in which (abstract) 
representation is constituted by the 'Company Council'. In other water 
companies, trade union representation has been reconstituted on an 
abstract basis: abstract regulation and management determining the 
development of abstract trade unionism. 
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7,2, b, Abstract Management and the Development 
of Abstract Trade Unionism: The Micro-Politics 
of Incorporation at EWL. 
The management of health and safety demonstrates the extent to 
which the neo-liberal water industry has been subordinated to the 
logic of abstraction. The need to maintain abstraction is the primary 
concern of managers; even when the logic of abstraction undermines 
the effectiveness of management functions such as health and safety. 
The (state-sponsored) demobilisation of organised labour in the water 
industry has facilitated the domination of abstract over concrete 
labour at all levels and across all functions of the water industry. 
Trade unions have been forced to reconstitute their röle as the 
representatives of labour within the abstract order. The management 
of health and safety at EWL illustrates the imperative of abstraction 
on water industry managers and the determination of abstract public 
service trade unionism in the neo-liberal water industry. 
David Morris is a senior personnel manager at EWL and has 
special responsibility for the management of health and safety. He 
suggests that the absence of a national water industry coordinating 
body for health and safety 'works against the efficiency of the 
function'. There is a 'logic' for companies to cooperate and pool 
expertise in this area; an industry speaking with one voice obviously 
having more weight and influence in dealing with the HSE than a 
fragmented industry. Why then are water companies pursuing the 
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seemingly illogical strategy of developing health and safety policy 
as isolated individual companies? The answer to this question is to 
be found at the macro 'frontier of control': labour has been totally 
excluded and marginalised at this level, and the development of a 
national coordinating body for health and safety would threaten this 
continued exclusion. Companies are afraid of losing an element of 
their 'individual decision-making process': 
It's the thin end of the wedge scenario. You start 
off with health and safety, the next thing you know, 
the trade unions will only talk to a water industry 
health and safety forum, and they're very anxious to 
set up something like that. Then what else creeps in 
to the agenda, does training creep in, there's health 
and safety training, does it extend itself? The next 
thing we're back to pay and conditions, and so on and 
so forth. The sensitivity at the moment, which is 
very, very high, would say that at all accounts don't 
even open the potential for us to be seen to be 
acting, not as an individual PLC. 
EWL have not formally attempted to exclude trade unions at the 
micro-level; they have achieved the same outcome through the 
alternative strategy of incorporation. The trade unions have, 
nevertheless, been marginalised as a result of the 'human resource' 
policies developed by the Company. The Company have developed a pay 
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and conditions package and formula that practically 'puts the unions 
out of business'. More importantly, trade unions have been 
marginalised as the quality of (abstract) management has improved. As 
David Morris argues: 
Inevitably part of the process of managers becoming 
damn good managers is that the people who work for 
them have more confidence in going to them and 
getting something sorted out. Now in that sense, yes, 
there is a marginalisation process, but we make no 
apologies for that. Managers are going to get better, 
and are getting better. There's probably an inverse 
relationship: influence of trade union, influence of 
managers, and as they get better one goes up while 
the other goes down. 
The marginalisation of trade unions at EWL has resulted in an 
increasing emphasis by the unions on health and safety and the 
related issue of occupational- health. This constitutes, what David 
Morris terms, a 'struggle for role definition': having been 
marginalised by the Company on the quantitative issue of pay and 
conditions, the unions are attempting to redefine their r6le around 
providing qualitative support for their members. Trade unions have 
attempted to increase their involvement in an area which they 
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perceive to be low on the managerial scale of priorities. However, 
this can have beneficial consequences for the Company: 
We talk about managers owning health and safety, 
individual staff do as well. The safety 
representatives, who tend to be the trade union shop 
stewards, or opinion leaders almost, they're talking 
health and safety as well, it can only enhance what 
we're trying to do. So I think there is mutuality, 
with the approach to health and safety - as an issue, 
or not as an issue but as an important scenario. 
There's less and less to do in some respects, and I 
suppose that complacency can be something that can 
creep in. 
Senior managers at EWL have thus been happy to preserve trade 
union involvement in the management of health and safety within the 
Company. This has included a commitment to maintaining the 
involvement of union representatives in the jealously guarded role of 
safety representative. Indeed, the safety representative role 
'properly done' is perceived by senior managers to be a very 
supportive method of developing the issue of health and safety in the 
workplace. The involvement of the trade unions in health and safety 
can provide an important counterweight to the management complacency 
that inevitably develops in a low-risk area such as the water 
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industry. David Morris highlights the importance of having trade 
unions involved in health and safety management: 
There is a tendency for managers to stand away from 
that as a priority. Because let's face it if we have 
dirty water in an area, and it's in all the 
newspapers. If someone twists an ankle or has a 
spinal injury it doesn't get into the press, and it's 
a rare event where there is a serious injury that 
does get in the press. Now, that's a cynical business 
way at looking at it. So, you're keeping things in 
place, and you're making sure that things are up- 
dated, but you address the business issues, and the 
priorities as they are, and health and safety is not 
the top. Trade unions have seen that, they know that, 
the trade union safety reps., know that, 
In contrast to the micro-exclusion of trade unions in the 
management of health and safety at WWL, EWL have followed a strategy 
of micro-incorporation. The price of incorporation for the unions has 
been the requirement that they 'buy into' the new organisational 
culture at EWL, and this has been reflected in the structure and 
operation of health and safety representation and consultation within 
the Company. The Company has retained the company-level and 
divisional-level formal safety committees, but the committees have 
been fundamentally restructured in line with the Company's new 
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organisational culture. The committees were relics of the 
managerialist form of the Company, in which senior managers and 
safety experts were confronted by trade union representatives with a 
catalogue of health and safety issues and problems to which the 
managers were expected to respond. The new 'forums' constitute a 
'qualitative change' vis d vis the old committees; transformed from 
adversarial two-sided committees into forums for cooperation and 
development. As David Morris suggests, the new organisational culture 
obviates the need for the committees as they were constituted. The 
old structures: 
(Were) all nonsense really, you don't have a 
committee, if there is an issue, a health and safety 
issue, it's dealt with there and then. The fast green 
word if you like. "Get on with it on your own and 
don't wait for the meeting to deal with that! ". Now 
we've seen that managers we think are addressing 
issues that come up. If there is a health and safety 
issue, and a health and safety representative or an 
individual employee points it out, it should go no 
further, it should be addressed and dealt with and 
resolved there and then in the context of the 
problem. 
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The shift in the locus of managerial responsibility for health 
and safety from senior specialist managers to line managers and 
supervisors has driven down the management-union frontier of control 
in safety management to the supervisor- safety representative level. 
The committees have consequently been transformed into cooperative 
forums that are increasingly concerned with developmental issues such 
as awareness and health issues that transcend the traditional health 
and safety agenda. David Morris describes the approach of the newly 
constituted forums: 
The issues are not in the model they were before. 
"Can we develop? " is the sort of question. "Can we 
move on? ", and quite often the answer is "Yes we can, 
and we should! ". And it's sort of more of a coming 
together, there isn't two sides of the table. There's 
a group of people with a declared interest in health 
and safety trying to move a thing forward in a 
sensible way. That reflects human resource 
development across the business. 
In bourgeois society trade unions are determined by and 
articulate the contradiction between value and use-value. The crisis 
and contradictions of managerialism have been resolved through the 
imposition of abstraction on the regulation and management of the 
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water industry. The state restructuring of the industry has resulted 
in the domination of abstract over concrete labour, and has 
facilitated and been facilitated by the marginalisation and exclusion 
of organised labour in its (concrete) managerialist form. The (Fabian) 
managerialist form of public service trade unionism collapsed the 
contradiction between value and use-value and legitimated the 
inclusion of trade unions within the corporatist structures of the 
planner-state and managerialist forms of the industry through the 
conflation of the interests of public service labour and consumers. 
The development of abstract management and abstract forms of public 
service has therefore resulted in a serious crisis of public service 
trade unionism. I will now explore this crisis and the attempt to 
resolve the crisis through the development of abstract trade 
unionism. 
7.3. Abstract Marzagein. ernt and the 
Crisis of "Public Service" Trade 
Uri ion ism. 
The development of abstract regulation and abstract management 
have resulted in a serious crisis of the concretist and managerialist 
form of (Fabian) public service trade unionism. Public service trade 
unions conflated the interests of consumers and producers and 
therefore articulated the contradictions of (Fabian) managerialism. 
The contradictory determination of production in bourgeois society 
resulted in a situation in which the historical commitment of water 
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industry employees to notions of 'public service' was not reflected in 
the effective production and distribution of use-values. 
The 'public service' trade unions were ideologically committed to 
an inefficient and ineffective water industry incapable of producing 
either values or use-values. The imposition of abstraction on the 
neo-liberal water industry and the efficient and effective production 
of use-values within the abstract order has, therefore, evoked a 
fundamental crisis of (concretist) 'public service' trade unionism and 
resulted in the development of new forms of (abstract) 'public 
service' trade unionism, However, the contradictory determination of 
trade unions as in and against the abstract order implies the 
continued potential of trade unions in the struggle for non-alienated 
forms of public service provision. 
In order to explore the crisis of public service trade unionism, 
I conducted a series of semi-structured key informant interviews with 
representatives from the National Association of Local Government 
Officers [NALGO]. I was concerned to discover both the bases of trade 
union concerns with service, and the way in which these had been 
modified by the commercialisation and privatisation of the water 
industry. In the course of the interviews I spoke to Jim Thompson, a 
NALGO national officer for the water industry, Brian Peterson, a 
senior NALGO regional officer for the water industry, and Eric Brown, 
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a Nalgo branch secretary and a water industry employee at Northern 
Water [NWLI. 
7,3. a. Public Service Trade Unionism and the 
Challenge of Neo-Liberalism. 
NALGO is a 'public service' trade union. It has evolved through a 
tradition of organising white-collar workers in local authorities and 
the utilities. The policy of the post-1979 Conservative Governments 
has been to sell off the utilities to the private sector; creating 
'businesses' that sell a 'product' to 'customers'. The radical 
restructuring of the water industry has forced trade union officers 
and activists to reinterpret 'public service' as a management ideology 
and practice. The enduring concretist orientations of NALGO activists 
articulates both the crisis of 'public service' trade unionism and 
highlights the enduring subversive potential of trade unions within 
the abstract structures of the neo-liberal water industry. 
NALGO activists working within the water industry argue that 
the commitment of waterworkers and their unions to 'public service' 
has endured through privatisation. Despite the fact that the industry 
may now be investing more and operating more efficiently, this is not 
felt to justify the privatisation of the industry. For Eric Brown, 
while investment in capital infrastructure may be rising, and while 
the companies may be devoting more time and resources to the 
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development of 'customer care' systems, there remains a feeling among 
many staff that the company by which they are employed is less 
interested in the service provided to (real) consumers. This view is 
premised upon the perceived attempts of senior managers to get away 
from Fabian notions of 'public service' and to replace them with 
(abstract) neo-liberal conceptions of 'public service': 
All of a sudden they're no longer consumers, they're 
customers. I've been brought up in a public service 
for 30-odd years, and I think I'm a public servant. 
But they're trying to get out of this public service 
image now. They are a private company, who provide a 
service. Rather than provide a service to the 
consumer, (they) provide a service that the customer 
buys. And in a monopoly situation, the customer has 
no option but to buy it. And that is a distinct 
change. I wouldn't say that the younger element 
particularly bother about it, but those who have been 
with 'the water' a long time probably do. I certainly 
do. I try to treat people in my work, the same way 
that I've always treated them. But, that is not the 
message now. 
The reconstitution of 'public service' on essentially abstract 
premises has forced a fundamental reappraisal of the raison d'dtre of 
trade unions in the water industry. The concretist orientation of 
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Fabian trade unionism resulted in many activists perceiving that they 
had an obligation to get involved in service and operational issues, 
The legitimacy for NALGO's involvement in service issues, according to 
Eric Brown, is the dual r81e of Nalgo members as both employees and 
consumers of an essential product. Prior to privatisation Eric Brown 
and his deputy regularly attended the divisional 'Consumer 
Consultative Committee' (CCCs) meetings. In the context of the 
managerialist restructuring of the 1980s, the combining of trade 
union and consumer roles was very much frowned upon by senior 
managers at NWL. The neo-liberal restructuring, and the subsequent 
de-politicisation of the water industry, has made the dual r81e of 
NALGO members as producers and consumers problematical. However, the 
extent to which concretist attitudes prevail in union activists is 
illustrated through Eric Brown's assessment of the limits of trade 
union involvement and activity in the neo-liberal water industry: 
I don't think personally that there should be any 
limits. After all, every member of the union is at the 
end of the day.... a consumer. The service that they 
get, is the service that any other consumer gets, and 
as such, if they're not pushing the service aspect, 
they're not only letting other consumers down, they're 
letting themselves down. Any suggestion that we can 
make to better the service, they should certainly be 
listening, if not as an employee then as a consumer. 
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Despite the de-politicisation of the water industry NALGO 
activists continue to make a lot of suggestions on service to the 
consumer at branch level. NALGO members include supervisors and 
managers, and this clearly enhances the scope for involvement on 
operational issues. Following privatisation, NWL management have 
expressed a greater willingness to listen to the suggestions of the 
union, and have actually taken several NALGO ideas on board. There 
remains an unwillingness amongst managers, however, to acknowledge 
the source of the suggestions. As Eric Brown comments: 
(While) a lot of the suggestions have been taken on 
board, ok then they come out as NWL proposals, and 
its not known in meetings that the union has 
suggested them. Certainly, they are listening more to 
us than they would three or four years ago. Three or 
four years ago it was "Oh no not them again! ". And I 
think they eventually realised that some of our ideas 
were not as bloody crazy as they thought, and they 
realised eventually that we had put a lot of thought 
into what we were saying. So yes, but it's not in an 
open way. If we had to publicise it, we have to do it 
through the branch news letter, because NWL 
management wouldn't actually say "This has been 
amended because of the union! ". 
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Eric Brown articulates the development of abstract trade 
unionism in the workplace. The demobilisation of organised labour and 
the subsequent development of abstract management has enabled the 
concretist concerns of union activists to be incorporated into 
abstract management systems. The way in which abstraction has been 
imposed on the water industry, and the way in which this has 
facilitated the demobilisation of the union in the workplace, is 
illustrated with respect to rank-and-file concerns over the decade of 
managerialist restructuring. Despite the perceived cultural change 
associated with restructuring and privatisation, and NALGO's 
protracted campaign against them, Eric Brown does not feel that his 
members have particularly noticed any change in the service they 
provide to consumers. The main concern of staff at NWL has been to 
ensure that they came out of the decade of reorganisation and 
restructuring with a job: 
I don't think many people have actually thought about 
(levels of service)..... It's just been "Oh God here 
comes another reorganisation, I hope I'm going to 
have a job at the end of it..... " Another 
reorganisation, "God! Let me keep my head down and 
let me have a job at the end of it". Where people 
have noticed a difference however is with regard to 
the amount of work they are now expected to do in 
comparison with the situation prior to the 
reorganisations. 
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The Fabian premises of 'public service' trade unionism are 
apparent with respect to the way in which the state and its agents 
qua public servants articulate the 'public interest' and the 'common 
good'. The interests of 'public service' labour is conflated with the 
interests of consumers. The primary concern of NALGO activists and 
officers is with the 'monopoly' nature of water as a product, and the 
extent to which essential products such as water are not 'safe' in 
the care of private monopolists. NALGO continues to advocate the 
policy of returning the water industry to the public sector despite 
the fact that such a policy could alienate many of its members on 
higher grades who have benefited financially from the 
commercialisation and privatisation of the industry. As Eric Brown 
comments with reference to his own branch: 
Now, ok, it may not please a lot of the members, 
because a lot of the members are making a lot of 
money out of privatisation. Some of them are on 25% 
bonus, and they're the people who are on £32,000 in 
any case, (But) I'm a firm believer that, under 
whatever guise, I am a public servant. Because there 
is no other place that they can go to get water. 
The 'public service' trade unionism that has endured into the 
neo-liberal water industry continues to articulate the interests of 
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labour in an alienated form. Indeed, the vociforous opposition of the 
trade unions to privatisation and the successful anti-privatisation 
campaign coordinated by the trade unions were fundamental in the 
determination of the regulatory regime associated with the 1989 
Water Act. The contradictory determination of OFWAT and the NRA 
articulates the struggle between concrete and abstract trade unionism 
as manifested in the struggle between the state and organised labour. 
7,3b. NALGO as Guardian of the Fabian Water 
Industry: Privatisation and the Politics of 
"Public Service". 
The struggle between the state and organised labour with 
respect to the water industry during the 1980s took the form of a 
struggle over the form of 'public service'. The trade unions 
articulated the interests of concrete labour in an alienated form: 
through a Fabian discourse which was premised on the neutrality of 
the state and a conflation between the interests of 'public service' 
labour and the consumers of water services. The trade union campaign 
brought together an array of pressure groups concerned with the 
concrete activities of water companies: environmental groups 
concerned with the pollution of rivers and beaches, consumer groups 
concerned with the quality of drinking water and amenity groups 
concerned with access to the land of water undertakers for activities 
such as angling, walking and water sports. The campaign played a 
fundamental r6le in the determination of the administrative and 
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regulatory regime associated with the 1989 Water Act. This 
demonstrates the away in which the neo-liberal water industry 
developed through and articulates the contradiction between value and 
use-value and the strugle between concrete and abstract labour. 
Senior union officers suggest that it is part of NALGO's 
'culture' as a 'public service' trade union to take an interest in 
environmental and consumer issues. These concerns were heightened 
during the anti-privatisation campaign. During the 1980s Nalgo ran a 
series of campaigns, at both national and regional levels, against 
plans to privatise the industry. At the national level, the 'Water 
Industry Liason Committee' was established, and both this committee 
and the regional 'committees, involved both trade unions and 
environmental and consumer groups. The campaign to keep the water 
industry in the public sector was official NALGO policy decided at 
national conference. Jim Thompson is a NALGO national officer 
responsible for the water industry, and he suggests that the policy 
reflected the deeply held views of the union's membership: a 
reflection of the 'public service' orientation of delegates. 
During the anti-privatisation campaign the unions organising 
within the water industry built up relationships and sophisticated 
channels of communication with environmental and consumer 
organisations. During the campaign NALGO was in daily contact with 
organisations such as Friends of the Earth [FoE], and representatives 
of these groups were invited to sit upon trade union committees. The 
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campaign had an important impact on issues such as the environment 
and price formulae. The effectiveness of the campaign was dependent 
upon the large amount of operational information that the unions 
received from their members. The unions 'manipulated' this 
information and passed it on to other relevant groups in the 
campaign. As Jim Thompson recalls: 
If say something on the environment happened, we 
wouldn't get up as NALGO and say the industry's 
causing a deterioration in water standards, because 
people wouldn't listen to us..... We're not 
environmentalists. But what we would do, is pass the 
information on to FoE, and people would then listen. 
So we could exert pressure in the right places, and 
basically it was our members in the industry who 
were supplying this information. 
In the NWL region these concerns led to the formation of a joint 
trade union-led regional campaign which also involved consumer and 
environmental groups. The decision to involve consumer and 
environmental groups was a conscious decision taken by the unions. 
Brian Peterson is a regional officer for NALGO, and was secretary of 
the campaign. He recalls its founding philosophy and the Fabian 
discourse through which the campaign was articulated: 
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There is no doubt that (as) part of our campaign 
against privatisation, we very consciously said: "This 
is not just an issue that applies to us as trade 
unionists and employees, but something that is a 
matter of major public concern from the angle of the 
public as consumers, but also from an environmental 
angle as well". Therefore, the whole nature of the 
anti-privatisation campaign, was very much a public 
campaign designed to reach out to and involve 
consumers' groups and so on. 
NALGO perceived the privatisation of the water industry as 
against the public interest. Brian Peterson argues that the 
privatisation of the water industry was clearly a 'crackpot scheme', 
and from the perspectives of trade unionists, consumers and 
environmentalists it made little sense to sell off the industry - the 
privatisation process ultimately vitiated against the national 
interest: 
I mean, you look at a Government in the late 20th 
Century, and all the challenges we're facing: and how 
is it going to improve the lot of the people? You'd 
have to have a pretty strange brain to say "Well, 
what I'd do is sell off the Water Industry! ". So it 
was an absolutely crackpot scheme. As consumers, who 
are interested in quality of service and not having 
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to pay through the nose to do it. Trade unionists who 
provide that service and, therefore, as professionals 
are interested in the public they serve and the 
quality of service they provide, but also their own 
pay, their own working conditions. Environmentalists, 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, who are interested 
principally in the environmental issues..... Local 
authorities who have got different interests again. 
(These) could all easily come together because it was 
in everyone's interest to say water privatisation 
makes sense on none of those levels. 
The NALGO coordinated campaign was fundamental in determining 
the form of the neo-liberal water industry. The success of the anti- 
privatisation campaign in which NALGO played such a prominent part 
played a major r6le in defining the shape of the post-privatised 
industry. Brian Peterson argues that the campaigns had a major impact 
on service: the pressure exerted by the campaigns being fundamental 
with respect to the establishment of the NRA as a separate 
regulatory agency, and the heightened public awareness on the issues 
of water standards which led to the tight regulatory framework 
administered by OFWAT and the DWI. The pressure exerted by the 
campaigns was also manifested with respect to the so-called Green 
Dowry given to the water companies to clean up water supplies: 
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The fact that they felt obliged to put money into the 
Water Industry was testimony to the fact that we and 
others had been raising the importance of the issue 
on the political agenda - the fact that the water 
industry is suffering from under-investment, that it 
was not meeting European Quality Standards, that 
sewerage works were not meeting their consent 
conditions. I think our campaign, along with the 
others, was part of bringing that in. 
The way in which water companies are devoting an increasing 
level of resources to 'customer care' is also presented as a result 
of the trade union campaign by NALGO officers. The realisation that 
the water industry was unpopular led companies to devote more time 
and resources to 'communicating' with a public among whom a 
heightened perception and awareness had been created vts d vis the 
need for improved levels of service. While Brian Peterson accepts 
that the industry is indeed trying more, he believes true customer 
care is incompatible with the private ownership of the water 
industry. Indeed, Brian Peterson admits that despite his 'obvious' 
support for it remaining in the public sector, he has no 'starry-eyed' 
illusions that the water industry was, in anything but the most 
tenuous way, publically responsive. The ultimate contradiction of 
Fabian trade unionism derives from the way in which the concrete 
struggles of the 1980s determined the abstract forms of regulation 
and management on which the neo-liberal water industry is premised. 
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The contradiction is resolved by officers and activists through the 
imposing of democratic (state) control on the abstract water 
industry: 
You can only have customer care effectively if 
ultimately you put the customer first. I think that 
is still one of the contradictions in privatisation, it 
puts the shareholder first, and that's a contradiction 
that I don't think will be resolved while the 
structure of the industry remains as it is. But they 
do spend more time trying to communicate with the 
public. Within the limits that they can do that, and 
despite the contradictions at the root of that, all 
credit to them for that. 
The role of the unions in the anti-privatisation campaign has 
resulted in serious organisational difficulties for the trade unions 
in the neo-liberal form of the industry. Senior managers in the water 
industry perceive NALGO as too political: a town hall union exuding 
political dogma. Despite the claim that 'public service' trade unionism 
is not incompatible with private sector industry, NALGO's concern with 
operational issues have been pushed into the background following 
privatisation. This reflects a conscious concern to develop a working 
relationship with the newly-privatised companies in order to protect 
members' interests in the traditional areas of pay and conditions. Jim 
Thompson argues that NALGO will only return to campaigning on the 
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subject of the water as a product with the election of a Labour 
Government: 
(Concerns with water as a product have) slipped into 
the background a bit..... I don't think it plays a 
major part in our thinking at the moment anyway. It 
may do again say if a Labour Government got back 
into power. What we'd do is we'd go and dig out all 
the things we were saying, we do keep them all on 
file, close at hand. We do talk to the Labour Party. 
If an election was announced, we'd then go out and 
dig out all these statements we've made, and all 
these policy documents. And we probably would then 
start using that sort of approach, playing more on 
the nature of water as product. 
The main problem that is faced by NALGO is a reluctance by 
managers to involve trade unions in operational matters. Despite the 
rhetoric of NALGO representatives, a working relationship with water 
company managers requires an acceptance of the total commodification 
of water. In practice, this has meant the increasing marginalisation 
of NALGO. NWL have stressed the extent to which they would like to 
involve their workforce; but approaches made by NALGO on the issue of 
employee involvement have not been welcomed. Many of the objections 
to involving NALGO in service issues at NWL emanate from the 
acrimony developed by the anti-privatisation campaign and, indeed, 
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many activists reciprocate the distrust and oppose the idea of NALGO 
involvement in operational matters: 
Our wish to be more involved, not just in straight 
terms and conditions issues, but wider issues of 
service and so on - to comment on that - have not 
generally met with a good response. They've felt that 
this is really trade unions being political again - 
getting a bit too big for their boots, and 
threatening management's right to manage. Although on 
the other hand, you do find them saying that they 
would welcome their employee's involvement. But I 
don't really think they would involve their employees 
through a trade union route, they'd welcome it 
through an [abstract] management route. (But) it 
seems to me to be a hallmark of whether you truly 
want to involve people, as to whether you're prepared 
to give them independence in their way of putting 
forward issues - or at least autonomy - and it's only 
really through the trade union route that they can 
have that. 
NALGO are attempting to adopt strategies and procedures which 
they feel are appropriate to the private sector water industry. This 
has involved attempting to depoliticise the organizational culture and 
structure of the union in relation to the water industry. These 
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changes have, however, met with little response from senior managers 
in the water industry, who have been concerned to exclude the union 
from consultative machinery while attempting to incorporate staff via 
non-union routes of staff involvement and consultation. The 
marginalisation and exclusion of concrete labour within the water 
industry have therefore resulted in the development of abstract trade 
unionism. 
7.3. c. Abstract Regulation and the 
Determination of Abstract Trade Unionism. 
The development of abstract trade unionism has been determined 
through the domination of abstract over concrete labour. The 
imposition of the law of money has resulted in the de politicisation 
of the industry: the neo-liberal restructuring of the industry having 
demobilised organised labour and resulted in the re-incorporation of 
labour on a fundamentally abstract basis. The response of trade 
unions such as NALGO has been to develop new organisational 
structures which enable the union to represent the interests of 
concrete labourers on an abstract basis. The restructuring process 
has involved making the union more relevant to the neo-liberal water 
industry. The union has attempted to expunge all traces of Fabian 
ideology and practice from its operations in the water industry, and 
attempted to orientate the representational and negotiatory functions 
of the union on the basis of the valorisation imperatives of 
individual water companies. The restructuring of NALGO's operations 
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has been legitimated through a 'consumerist' discourse which presents 
NALGO members as customers and the development of abstract trade 
unionism as a response to customer pressure. 
The restructuring and privatisation of the water industry has 
forced NALGO to consider a radical 'cultural change'. The 
privatisation of gas and transport in the early 1980s resulted in a 
severe 'culture shock'; the union receiving many complaints, especially 
from members in the gas industry, that NALGO was no longer 
'relevant'. The entry of electricity and water industries into the 
private sector has resulted in nearly a third of NALGO membership 
being in the private sector. NALGO has been concerned to restructure 
its operations in order to make the union more relevant to private 
sector members. 'Promoting NALGO In the Water Industry' has involved 
employing MORI to ascertain the views of ordinary members with 
respect to what their opinion is of NALGO, their perception of the 
industry following privatisation and the level of morale in the union. 
The Campaign is coordinated by Jim Thompson. He suggests that the 
major objective of the Campaign has been to adapt NALGO to the new 
private sector environment in which it now operates: to resolve the 
'culture shock' suffered by the union following privatisation, and to 
reconstitute the image of the union on a 'private sector' basis. 
The major cultural challenge facing NALGO in the water industry 
is the perception among both managers and members that NALGO is a 
town hail union The Campaign is responding to this through the 
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promotion of the water identity of NALGO members. As Jim Thompson 
observes: 
All the minority services complain like mad about the 
local government image, so what we're doing now is, 
and this appeared in the MORI survey as well as in 
the complaints, is to try and create a brand image 
It's using a lot of advertising jargon and marketing 
techniques and this kind of thing, to actually try to 
make water members feel that (NALGO) is a water 
union, and take out any references to local 
government wherever possible. 
The 'tailoring' of services to individual industries has been 
facilitated through the development of new technology. The monthly 
newspaper 'Public Service' has been redesigned in order to tailor the 
front and back pages to individual industries: the union previously 
published only one edition which was widely perceived to be dominated 
by local government issues. The recruitment and publicity material of 
the union with respect to the water industry will similarly be 
expunged of any mention of local government. Jim Thompson outlines 
the philosophy behind the new approach to NALGO literature: 
When people get it, at least they might think, you 
know, NALGO is a water industry union..... (It) will 
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have no reference on it to local government, it will 
all be about water, the water industry, and the whole 
process is about tailoring and getting rid of the 
local government image..... If there is an important 
local government story, or an issue we would 
obviously expect them to be aware of it, or tell our 
members in the water industry about it. But there is 
a feeling that this gets rammed down their throat a 
bit, and we're using all these modern techniques to 
get away from that. 
The concern to make NALGO more relevant to the new private 
sector industry is reflected in the NWL region by attempts to adapt 
the 'public service' background and traditions of the union to the new 
private sector NWL. The 'political' campaigning of NALGO in the 1980s 
has led senior managers to question its relevance to the newly 
privatised industry. Senior managers at NWL perceive NALGO as too 
political: a reflection of both its involvement in the anti- 
privatisation campaign and its enduring image as a 'town hall union'. 
The result has been that NALGO has stopped campaigning on 
operational and environmental issues: as Brian Peterson argues: 
There is no doubt that if we continued to be upfront 
on those kind of issues then the objection to dealing 
with NALGO would grow. 
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In an attempt to display the relevance of NALGO to the neo- 
liberal water industry, the Union in the NWL region has attempted to 
frame the annual pay negotiations in the context of the valorisation 
imperatives of the Company. Brian Peterson argues that NALGO has 
developed an understanding of the pressures on private sector 
companies: 
One of the things that has been significant about our 
approach to pay negotiations, and has been applauded 
by some of the more enlightened managers, but I think 
has been rather resented by some of the others, is 
the fact that we have not just said we want lots 
more money, but we have presented for two years 
running very carefully researched pay claims, that 
looks at the commercial situation of the Company, 
that examines that and analyses it, and sets the pay 
claim in that context. Now, they have this prejudice 
that public sector, or public service, means town 
hall, means just excessive political dogma. It doesn't 
meet with the facts! 
The crisis of (Fabian) 'public service' trade unionism 
articulated the contradictions of managerialism. The historical 
commitment of NALGO to 'public service' was premised on Fabian 
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notions of the state as an embodiment of 'common good' and the 
'general interest'. The technocratic restructuring of the water 
industry prioritised the interests of abstract labour with respect to 
the production and distribution of use-values and undermined the 
rationality of the state qua public servant. The struggle between 
concrete and abstract labour was manifested as the struggle over the 
form of 'public service'. The struggle between concrete and abstract 
'public service' resulted in the demobilisation of organised labour in 
the water industry. The partial nature of the demobilisation, however, 
resulted in the demands of concrete labour being incorporated into 
the administrative form of neo-liberal state regulation. The abstract 
form of regulation and management has resulted in the 
marginalisation of concrete 'public service' trade unionism, and NALGO 
has been forced to reconstitute and redefine its r6le in terms of the 
abstract premises of neo-liberal ideology. 
7.4. Summary and Conclusion. 
The neo-liberal state restructuring of the water industry has 
had a fundamental impact on social relations within the industry. The 
restructuring has facilitated the domination of concrete by abstract 
labour manifested in the subordination of managerial control systems 
and labour processes to the valorisation imperatives of capital 
accumulation. The development of abstract regulation and abstract 
management has been determined through the marginalisation of 
organised labour, but the increasing importance of trust and 
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reliability has resulted in the partial reintegration of labour on 
fundamentally abstract premises. 
The contradictory determination of abstract control, however, 
highlights the enduring importance of trade unions in the struggle 
for non-alienated forms of public service. While trade unions have 
reconstituted their role on abstract premises, the way in which trade 
unions articulate the (concrete) interests of (concrete) labour in the 
abstract order highlights the contradictory determination of trade 
unions in capitalist society. Trade unions articulate the 
contradiction between value and use-value and this contradiction 
determines the limits and possibilities of trade union action in 
extant historical conjunctures. 
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Pert Threc-a 
The Contradictions of Abstraction and 
the Struggle for Non-Alienated 
111_. " I 
Use-Values. 
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C on c lu s ion 
State Regulcxtiori, Marisgement Form 
and thze Contradictions of 
Atots tr-actiori. 
The state regulation of the water industry in Britain developed 
through and continues to articulate the contradiction between value 
and use-value which results from capitalist production being 
simultaneously a labour process and a valorisation process The 
historical and logical analysis of state regulation presented below 
demonstrates the way in which the state is a social form which is 
determined through the struggle between concrete and abstract labour, 
viz, the struggle between the working class and capital. The 'value' 
analysis presented in this thesis highlights the fundamental and 
enduring importance of Marx's theory of 'commodity fetishism', which 
as Rubin (op cit: 5) argued, forms the basis of the 'labour theory of 
value'. In capitalist society social relations inevitably take the form 
of things, and this 'real mystification' has been reflected in analyses 
of capitalist state regulation and capitalist management: the 
dominant tendency in 'Marxist' and 'Post-Marxist' theory having been 
to collapse the contradiction between value and use-value and present 
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the state and management as 'class neutral' technical 'instruments' 
concerned with the production of things. 
The inevitable political concomitant of these analyses has been 
the development of technologically determinist and reformist projects 
concerned with restructuring labour on the basis of the imperatives 
of the state. The analysis of the state as a (socially determined) 
political form of capital highlights the theoretical weakness and 
politically disastrous implications of these approaches. The state 
cannot be used in the struggle for socialism as it is determined 
through categories in which abstraction is inherent. The capitalist 
state emerged historically and logically with the domination of 
concrete by abstract labour: the 'liberal' form of the state 
determined through the separation of the social power of money from 
the political power of the state. The state is historically and 
logically premised on the, contradiction between value and use-value, 
and the articulation of the 'municipal', 'planner-state' and 'neo- 
liberal' examined in this thesis are precipitates of this 
contradiction in movement. 
The domination of concrete by abstract labour is manifested in 
capitalist society through the domination of the (abstract) consumer 
over the 'needs' and interests of (concrete) labourers as both 
consumers and producers. The state articulation of the 'general 
interest' and the 'common good' through the ideological form of 
'public service' is ultimately premised on the 'needs' and 'interests' 
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of the state and capital with respect to the maintenance of 
abstraction. The contradictory premises of the state in capitalist 
society, however, creates a space for political struggle over the form 
in which user-values are produced and distribution within and against 
the alienating forms determined by the state. In the neo-liberal 
water industry the trade unions and their 'political' representatives 
in the Labour Party have accepted the abstract determination of use- 
values and the abstract determination of 'public service' as an 
ideological form. The material articulation of the interests of 
concrete labour within the abstract state and water industry provides 
the potential for future struggle premised on the interests of 
(concrete) labourers as both producers and consumers. 
The development of a non-alienated water industry is dependent 
on a fundamental reinterpretation and reconstitution of the meaning 
of 'democracy' and social membership qua citizenship The early 'guild 
socialist' position of GDH Cole provides an important illustration of 
the way in which the production and distribution of non-alienated 
use-values needs to be premised on the real 'needs' and 'interests' of 
individuals as concrete producers and consumers. Producers and 
consumers are ultimately constituted by the same concrete individuals 
arranged in different formations: the consumer of neo-liberal 
economic theory is an abstraction. The 'general interest' as 
articulated by the form of the state in bourgeois society cannot 
transcend the particular interests of individuals as concrete 
producers and consumers: citizenship is a metaphysical mystification 
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premised on the alienated form of the state in capitalist society. 
The development of non-alienated forms of production and distribution 
is ultimately dependent on the development of direct and functional 
democratic control of use-values by individuals as producers and 
consumers. The state is ultimately premised on the alienating and 
abstract power of money: the struggle for non-alienated use-values 
has to be premised on a struggle against and through the state and 
the money form on which it is premised. 
t 
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Metizodological Appendix 
Beyond Metizodology! Ttie 
Dialectical Imagirzat ion. 
The main concern of my PhD project was an attempt to 
develop a materialist analysis of the state regulation of labour 
as it has impinged upon the water industry from 1800 to the 
present day. The theoretical and substantive foci of the project 
are the operation of the 'value form' in the industry, and the way 
in which the industry has been represented as a 'public service'. 
In conducting the research I have utilised a variety of 
'methodological' approaches in an attempt to analyse the way in 
which standards of service are measured and monitored by 
different forms of the state, and relate this to the conceptual 
distinction between value and use-value. The main methodological 
techniques featured in the design of my research are 'key 
informant' interviews with managerial and trade union 
representatives and documentary research focusing upon existing 
literature and public and official documents. 
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An important corollary of the growing influence of 
phenomenology on bourgeois sociology has been an attempt by 
'methodologist s' to go beyond the notion that research is 
constituted by a set of uniform techniques. There has been an 
increasing interest in the 'processual' nature of research: the way 
in which research 'depends on a complex interaction between the 
research problem, the researcher and those who are researched.... 
the researcher is an active decision-maker who decides upon the 
most appropriate conceptual and methodological tools that can be 
used to collect and analyse data' (Burgess, 1984: 6; see also 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 1984: 1-27). This interest has been 
accompanied by a burgeoning literature devoted to introspective 
and subjectivist accounts of the 'processes' underlying research 
projects (Bell & Newby, " 1977; Bell & Roberts, 1984). 
The subjectivist concern with the processual nature of 
research has served to highlight the tensions and weaknesses 
within approaches premised upon alternative ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions (Johnson et aI., 1984: 22-3). The 
methodological presuppositions of my research derive from the 
the approach outlined by Karl Marx in the Introduction to the 
Grundrisse. The processual nature of this substantiaUst approach 
is premised upon a dialectical process by which abstract concepts 
are constantly mediated by empirical reality. My own role in this 
process is not unequivocally that of an active decision-maker, as 
my subjectivity as a researcher is ambiguous: I am both subject 
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and object of my research, and to perceive or portray myself as an 
active decision-maker would be problematic. I am both active and 
acted upon. Dialectical research articulates the essentially 
praxiological status of knowledge. 
1, Subjectivity and Objectivity in the 
Design Process, 
The concerns and problems that informed my initial research 
proposal presented to the ESRC were focused upon the way in which 
state restructuring of the utilities sector had impacted upon the 
technical, institutional and social forms of these industries. The 
genesis of this initial focus may be related to my biography, and 
the way in which I developed a critical/dialectic perspective for 
analysing the oppressive capitalist structures by which I was 
surrounded. My background as an ex-water industry employee played 
a central role in the selection and subsequent development of the 
empirical focus. The overall conceptual focus, however, was a 
resultant of the way in which this experience has been 
subsequently mediated by conceptual theorising. In order to 
illustrate this dialectical process, I will examine the empirical 
and conceptual elements by which it was mediated: viz, my 
biographical history and the value theory of labour developed by 
Karl Marx. 
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The substantive focus of my research project may be related 
to my employment history. Between leaving school in 1978 and 
entering higher education in 1986, I was employed by the Yorkshire 
Water Authority as a mains inspector. My duties put me in 
frontline contact with consumers, and through this contact I 
became increasingly aware of an emergent gap between the 
expectations of consumers and the levels of service provided by 
my employer. The Authority was inefficient and wasteful. The de- 
centralised management structure allowed employees a large amount 
of autonomy in the execution (and most often the non-execution) 
of their duties, and gave almost unlimited arbitrary power to 
foremen and lower managers; many of whom were engaged in various 
forms of nepotism, extortion, and corruption. 
The above management structure was attacked by the neo- 
liberal project of Thatcherism, and resulted in severe bouts of 
centralisation and rationalisation. These experiences resulted in 
the problematical concept of public service having a central 
position in my initial research design. Prior to restructuring, the 
organisation by which I was employed was a 'public service' in the 
public sector, but was quite evidently not serving the public. The 
new management structures, following restructuring, were an 
explicit response to the perceived inefficiency of the Authority, 
but the emergent stress upon financial targets diverted the 
organisation even further from the needs and values of consumers. 
The overall conceptual framework of my study emerged from the 
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mediation of the above biographical history with the conceptual 
totality of historical materialism. 
2. The Dialectical Method and the "Value of 
Value". 
The primary conceptual category within the conceptual 
totality of historical materialism is Marx's theory of value: the 
concept of value allowing the social processes that underpinned 
capitalist development to be rescued from beneath the obfuscating 
fog of quantitative economic magnitudes (Clarke, 1930: 4-5). The 
object of Marx's theory of value was labour: viz, the forms taken 
by labour and the political consequences of labour taking these 
forms (Elson 1979: 123). In Capital Marx attempted to analyse the 
'value form' of labour by probing beneath its apparent appearance 
in order to reveal its inner essence. 
The primary dichotomy developed by Marx was between form 
and content, and this dichotomy forms the basic presupposition of 
my own methodological approach. In order to demonstrate the 'value 
of value', I will briefly consider the theory of value developed by 
Marx in Capital, and with reference to my own project, demonstrate 
the way in which the law of value, mediated by the experience of 
contemporary capitalism, provides the fundamental categories to 
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think the oppressive social relations of capitalist society 
(Clarke, op cit: 5-6). 
The ontological and epistemological presuppositions of 
historical materialism suggest that social forms are determinant 
and yet transient, and thus analyses of social forms must attempt 
to treat social forms as precipitates of an on-going process 
without detaching them from the process. With regard to the value 
form, Marx constructed a dialectical framework by which forms 
were analysed as the temporary precipitates of opposed potentia. 
as different aspects of the continuum of forms in process, and 
thus as embodiments of contradiction. The potentia considered by 
Marx were the abstract and concrete aspects of labour. Marx 
sought to demonstrate the extent to which the specificity of 
social formations were a result of the relationship between these 
potentia. 
The specific nature of capitalist social formations was 
premised on the dominance of the abstract form of labour: the 
concrete aspects of labour being mediated by the abstract. The 
result of the dominance of abstract labour was a 'state of society 
in which the process of production has the mastery over man, 
instead of being controlled by him' (Marx, 1954: 85): abstract 
labour taking on a practical truth 'objectified' or 'crystallized' in 
the equality of diverse human labours and reflected in the 
physical form of exchange values. In its most basic form the 
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dominance of money and capital were thus expressed in exchange 
values, and for this reason Marx began his analysis with a 
consideration of the commodity. 
The analysis of the commodity developed by Marx in Capital 
introduced the notion of 'value' as a substance crystallized from 
objectified abstract labour. Marx was concerned with the way in 
which labour in its objectified abstract form facilitated the 
commensurability of commodities in capitalist society. In order to 
understand this process, Marx analysed commodities dialectically, 
as moments of the coexistence of the opposed elements of use- 
value and exchange value. This allowed a consideration of the way 
in which the equivalence of commodities in capitalist society 
resulted not from subjectively-determined 'use-values' but from a 
general social process that takes place 'behind the backs of 
commodity owners'. In considering the commensurability and 
exchange of commodities, however, Marx was concerned to 
demonstrate that while the form of this process appeared 
'naturalistic' its content was human self-activity. The concern, 
therefore, was to examine the particular form in which labour 
assumes the substance of value, and to demonstrate the way in 
which this formed the basis of capitalist exploitation. 
The synthesis of Marx's dialectical analysis of the 'value 
form' was his attempt to construct a 'law of value': a 'law' of the 
process through which abstract labour is objectified through its 
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direct expression in the form of the money commodity. Marx was 
concerned to demonstrate the dominance and self-expansion of the 
money form. Marx did not consider the 'value form' as an absolute 
entity. Value is a one-sided abstraction: lacking internal 
independence, and part of an antithesis with use-value that is 
reflected externally as the 'fetishism of commodities'. This 
value/use-value antithesis within the commodity demonstrates the 
way in which the process of production produces both value and 
exchange value, and the possibility that the regulation of prices 
by value may break down owing to the relative autonomy between 
the production of goods and the circulation of money. The 
value/use-value antithesis within commodities is thus the source 
of capitalist crises and constant attempts to overcome crises 
through the restructuring of labour in terms of its 
exchangeability. 
Marx's value analysis has three important political 
implications. Firstly, the theory of value overcomes the 
fragmentation by which capitalist exploitation is experienced; 
particularly the bifurcation of money relations and labour process 
relations, and thus the bifurcation between the politics of 
circulation and the politics of production. Secondly, the theory 
of value enables capitalism to be grasped as a contradictory, 
crisis-ridden process, subject to continual change. While money and 
production relations are aspects of the same unity, they are also 
relatively autonomous. This not only lays the seeds of potential 
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crises, but also potential space for political action against the 
capitalist form of determining labour. Thirdly, the theory of value 
builds into our understanding of how the process of exploitation 
works and the possibility of action to end it. Marx's analysis 
makes it possible to understand why capital can appear as the 
dominant subject and individuals as the träger of capitalist 
relations of production; whilst simultaneously highlighting the 
limits of the tendency to reduce individuals to träger of value 
forms through the concepts of 'concrete labour' and the collective 
aspects of 'social labour'. These have a relative autonomy and 
provide a material base for political action (Elson, op cit: 171-4). 
I will now return to the initial conceptual edifice of my 
research project, and attempt to demonstrate the fundamental 
importance of the theoretical and political implications of Marx's 
theory of value outlined above. The conceptual distinction between 
value and use-value has allowed me to dialectically deconstruct 
the form of the water industry as a 'public service' and to 
uncover the social relations underlying the technical operation of 
state regulation and utility management. I approached this through 
a detailed examination of the way in which use-values have been 
produced and regulated by the state. Further, the analysis of the 
way in which the relationship between value and use-value has 
been restructured has allowed an insight into limits and 
possibilities of both past and future struggle over the form of 
provision and regulation. 
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3, The Limits of Sociology and the 
Possibilities of the Critical Dialectical 
Method. 
Good social research has a necessarily subversive quality. As 
C. Wright Mills (1959) argued, the sociological imagination 
demanded the sensitivities of history, anthropology and criticism. 
The combination of the first two allow an escape from a 
naturalistic interpretation of the present, while critical 
sensitivity facilitates a consciousness of alternative futures and 
thus a critique of existing forms of society. In my research, I 
have gone beyond the sociological imagination. I have engaged in a 
(dialectical) form of 'critical social research' (Harvey, 1990): a 
form of research that draws upon both history and anthropology, 
and which rests upon the critical conceptual presuppositions of 
historical materialism. 
In contrast to both positivism and phenomenology, critical 
research attempts to delve beneath the surface of historically 
specific and oppressive structures. Knowledge is not perceived as 
'objective' but as structured by extant social relations. The 
presupposition of critical research is that knowledge and critique 
are inseparable. The critical process underlying knowledge is an 
attempt to engage with oppressive structures and dominant 
conceptual frameworks in order to reveal both underlying 
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processes of power, and the ideological and historical forms by 
which these processes are concealed (Harvey, ibid: 1-3). 
The attempt to delve beneath appearances takes the form of 
a dialectical analysis that attempts to reveal the fundamental 
nature of things through the deconstruction of abstractions in a 
mediation with the empirical world; this enabling the inner 
relations of concepts to be deconstructed and subsequently 
reconstructed in terms of a conceptual totality. What is stressed, 
therefore, is the praxiological nature of social research: 
knowledge is dynamic and changes through practice. The 
praxiological nature of knowledge has important implications vis ä 
vis the design of social research. My research has been concerned 
to deconstruct historical and anthropological data on the state 
regulation of the water industry. 
4, "History as Process" and the Development 
of a "Dialectical Historicism". 
The design of my research project includes an engagement in 
an 'historicist' analysis of the historical forms of 'gas and water 
socialism' and 'public service management'. The presuppositions 
underlying my analysis are a denial of the objectivity of history, 
and an epistemological assumption that historical knowledge 
emerges from a reconstruction of the past on the basis of a 
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dialectically reconstructed analysis of extant social systems: that 
is, the reconstruction of a logical theory of history guided by 
structural analysis (Harvey, op cit: 6-9). 
The object of my historical survey of the state regulation 
of the water industry has been to construct a logical theory of 
the way in which labour has been represented in these industries. 
This historical (and historicist) analysis will be crucial to 
understanding both the modern structure of the industry and the 
potential for future change. As Edward Thompson has argued, 
history has a logic that is in constant movement. Historical logic 
must test hypotheses with respect to structure and causation, 
whilst attempting to eliminate the self-confirming procedures that 
emanate from instantiations and illustrations. This necessitates a 
constant dialogue between conceptual totality and empirically 
derived research: history as process 
The historiography of Marxism is inseparable from Marxism 
as theory (Thompson, 1978: 46-7). The historical materialist 
approach has as its object the real human object in all its 
historical forms, and attempts to understand these forms through 
a discrete discipline that brings unitary concepts into a rigorous 
dialectical engagement with empirical reality. The observation of 
historical eventuations reveal the way in which social being bears 
upon social consciousness. Historical knowledge is not a prisoner 
of the past, for each moment of being is also a moment of 
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becoming: historical moments are 'both a result of prior process 
and an index towards the direction of its future flow' (Thompson, 
ibid: 47). Historical materialism attempts to grasp these 
eventuations through the articulation of historical concepts in a 
conceptual totality: the resultant being an emergent historical 
knowledge that approximates to, but remains distinct from, 
concrete reality. 
The consideration of history as a 'process' raises the 
important issue of the relationship between agency and process 
The work of Engels on this subject is highly problematical and has 
contributed to the theoretical and political abominations 
associated with Stalinism and Althusserian structural 
functionalism. Engels argued that 'we make our own history, but in 
the first place under very definite presuppositions and 
conditions', and that, 'among these the economic ones are finally 
decisive'. Engels proceeded to resolve this contradiction through 
the suggestion that 'history makes itself' (Engels 1968: 682-4). 
However, to the extent that individual wills are conditioned in 
'class' ways, and history is the result of contradictory class 
interests and forces, human agency gives rise to involuntary 
results. There is, therefore, a crucial ambivalence to our presence 
as human beings in history: 'part-subject, part-object, the 
involuntary agents of our 
, 
own involuntary determinations' 
(Thompson, op cit: 88). 
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The key concept in the historical process is determination 
The essentially ambivalent status of human beings in history 
makes the 'crude' Marxian notion of a 'law of motion' driven by 
'class struggle' problematic. Thompson suggests that 'law of 
motion' should be replaced by 'logic of process': determination 
thus amounting to a setting of limits or exerting of pressures; 
'structural actuation within a social formation that remains 
protean in all its forms' (Thompson, ibidt 110). The 'dialectic' is 
not a law deriving from the antagonism produced by the law of 
motion, but a 'class' practice. Through the dialectical interplay 
between the conceptual dichotomy of value and use-value and 
empirical historical data I have analysed the pressures and limits 
relating to the reduction of social actors concerned with the gas 
and water industries to träger of the money form and thus the 
domination of abstract labour (capital). 
S. Dialectical Method and the Promise of 
"Critical Ethnography". 
I will now turn to a consideration of the importance of 
anthropology to the development of critical social research. 
Bourgeois sociologists writing from a phenomenological perspective 
stress the extent to which ethnography provides an opportunity to 
construct 'objective' and 'systematic' accounts of social systems 
from the 'subject's point of view'. The researcher upholds an 
'unbiased' and 'impartial' approach (Schwartz & Schwartz, 1955), and 
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is reflexive with regard to the effect of her presence upon 
methodological techniques, data collection and theoretical 
suppositions (Hammersley & Atkinson, op cit: 27-54). The 
contradictory determination of human beings obviously makes these 
approaches problematical. Notwithstanding the extent to which the 
epistemological and ontological presuppositions of phenomenology 
are diametrically opposed to those of historical materialism, 
however, the utility of ethnographic research can nevertheless be 
applied to dialectical analysis through the development of what 
Harvey (op cit: 9-14,204-5) has termed critical ethnography. 
Critical ethnography is not 'value neutral', and 'reflexivity' 
is focused upon the questioning of taken-for-granted propositions, 
and the proposal of radical alternatives: indeed, positivistic 
ethnography is ideological through the way in which the 
'individual subject' is abstracted from the 'economic' relations of 
capitalist society. Critical ethnography goes beyond the meanings 
of subjects through the incorporation of ethnography into a 
dialectical analysis. This involves linking the detailed insights of 
ethnography with wider social structures and systems of power 
relations (totality). The detailed nature of ethnographic research 
renders it an extremely useful tool in 'making the invisible 
visible': enabling anomalies to be transformed into contradictions 
which, through dialectical analysis, may be placed in wider social 
and historical analytical frameworks (Harvey, ibid: 204). 
Dialectical ethnographic research thus allows the constant 
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mediation between totality and empirical detail that is necessary 
in order to unearth the nature and operation of oppressive social 
structures. 
Empirical data is essential to dialectical analysis; the 
conceptualisation and reconceptualisation of conceptual reality 
being grounded in the material world. The type of data and its 
reliability and validity (the much-vaunted, gods of sociological 
positivism) are, however, irrelevant to the dialectic research. Data 
is meaningful only in its theoretical context and the 
epistemological presuppositions the researcher brings to the 
enquiry. 'Cases' are selected not for their 'representativeness', 
but as 'paradigm' cases: that is, foci for the analysis of 
contradiction (Harvey, ibid. 202). The design of my research 
project includes an ethnographic study of managers and trade 
unionists involved in the water industry and a series of 
associated 'case' studies that will examine documentary data 
pertaining to selected companies and organizations. The initial 
selection of data sources was thus premised upon my initial 
abstract, but empirically mediated, conceptual presuppositions. 
The interviewees in the water industry and trade unions 
constitute paradigmic cases which illustrate the way in which 
individuals live the contradiction between value and use-value 
which is inherent in the capitalist state and capitalist 
production. A central element of my research has been an 
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ethnographical survey of the way in which managers and workers 
working within the water industry live the contradiction between 
value and use-value. The ethnographic study of 'key informants' 
drawn from within the water industry has gauged the way in which 
these individuals live the constant attempts to reduce them to 
träger of the abstract power of money, and the way their 
opposition and resistance to abstraction is crucial to the future 
social forms of these industries. 
Anthropological data is useful as it illustrates the way in 
which 'life goes forward within structures' (Thompson, op cit: 152- 
8). The great achievement of Marx was to uncover the partly 
visible structure of rules by which human relations are mediated. 
This may be compared with playing a game: a rule-governed 
structuration of historical eventuation in which men and women 
are subjects of their own history. Anthropology allows an insight 
into the necessary gap between the abstract concepts pertaining 
to modes of production and historical materiality: that is, the way 
in which the circuit of capital is obstructed and resisted at 
every point, and thus the way capital 'forms' are diverted in 
theoretically improper ways by the class struggle itself. A 
consideration of the way in which men and women may be perceived 
as 'subjects' 'handling' their experiences within their 
consciousness and culture in complex and relatively autonomous 
ways. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion. 
In this Appendix I have demonstrated the way in which my 
research project is premised upon the presuppositions of 
historical materialism, and the implications of these 
presuppositions for the 'design' and 'process' of social research. I 
have attempted to highlight the way in which the 'materialist 
ontology' and 'realist epistemology' associated with my 
'substantialist' position, imply a 'praxiological' theory of 
knowledge, and the way in which this implies a methodological 
approach that is both 'dialectical' and 'historicist'. I have 
outlined the implications of the above theoretical presuppositions 
for the practice of empirical social research: arguing that over- 
subjectivist concerns with the research process and positivist 
concerns with 'sampling' are peripheral and irrelevant to the 
theory and practice of dialectical social research. 
In conclusion, my own research project has developed an 
analysis of the value relations imminent to the state regulation 
and management of the water industry: to penetrate the for-ms in 
which these industries have become historically manifest in order 
to reveal the underlying content of their oppressive social 
relations. I have developed an analysis of the value relations 
within the water industry from the class perspective of labour. To 
follow in the footsteps of Marx, I consider my research to have 
been part of the process of highlighting the potential for the 
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oppressive capitalist forms of these industries to be challenged 
and replaced non-alienated communistic social relations and 
service provision premised on the needs and capacities of concrete 
labour. 
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